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1Introduction
The best introduction to Agamben’s political thought is a stack of 
Agamben’s volumes. This book can therefore only aim to be second-
best and would be able to attain this goal if it succeeded in getting 
students of political science, international relations, philosophy, soci-
ology, history and other disciplines to read this Italian philosopher, 
if it managed to assure them of the relevance of his erudite, elliptical 
and admittedly arcane writings to the key concerns of contemporary 
world politics, if they finished this book with the dissatisfaction of 
not having learned enough about Agamben’s politics and the desire 
to find out more. For this reason, this book is not intended as a 
summary of all Agamben’s writings and statements on politics, an 
exhaustive treatment of his philosophy in the context of the wider 
history of political thought or an illustrative application of his politi-
cal thought to historical or contemporary situations. It is rather an 
invitation to read Agamben that ventures to demonstrate the origi-
nality of his political thought in the contemporary theoretical and 
sociopolitical context, its capacity to disturb our familiar assump-
tions about politics, provoke unease about the political positions we 
uphold and offer new perspectives on the key political issues of our 
time. To be successful in this task the book should demonstrate why 
Agamben’s works are important for anyone interested in politics.
Yet it is here that things become somewhat complicated, since 
Agamben is neither a political scientist nor a political theorist in 
the usual sense of the term and we would look in vain for a fully 
articulated theory of politics in his work. While the scope of his 
interests is remarkably broad and certainly includes politics, his 
approach to it is quite distinctive. The readers interested in what 
Agamben has to say about various issues in contemporary politics, 
from the financial crisis to the war on terror, from the Arab Spring 
to anti-Putin protests, from gay marriage to gun control, are bound 
to be disappointed. With a few exceptions Agamben’s works rarely 
address concrete contemporary or historical events and when they 
do, it is usually in an abstruse historico-philosophical context that 
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is apparently devoid of immediate political significance. Moreover, 
Agamben’s own repeated references to the ‘eclipse’ of politics in our 
day and age (2000: ix; 1998: 4) may create an impression of an apo-
litical philosopher who loftily dismisses all present-day concerns and 
has little to say to us about contemporary politics. 
And yet almost all of Agamben’s books make explicit or implicit 
references or allusions to politics and the most esoteric philosophi-
cal formulations are presented as responses to an immediate politi-
cal exigency. Moreover, these references never fail to highlight that 
this politics is not yet practised, let alone encapsulated in a fixed 
form of regime or system, but rather remains entirely to be invented 
(Agamben 1998: 11) Politics is thus central to Agamben’s philosophy 
but it is a different kind of politics. To talk about Agamben and poli-
tics, as this book does, is thus not to interpret Agamben’s views on 
politics as we know it but to probe into Agamben’s own redefinition 
and reinvention of politics, a task that will take us to the places that 
the more conventional political theory tends to ignore and avoid. 
It therefore should not be surprising that many of the pages of this 
book are devoted to things that are ostensibly far away from politics: 
personal pronouns, the axolotl, Kafka, St Paul, boredom, etc. Yet, as 
we shall demonstrate, it is precisely through the reinterpretation of 
these ostensibly non-political phenomena that Agamben is able both 
to problematise the entire political tradition which we continue to 
inhabit and advance a thoroughgoing alternative that seeks to deac-
tivate this tradition, or, in Agamben’s terminology, render it inopera-
tive. The central focus of this book is thus on Agamben’s politics as 
a philosophical invention, produced both through a critical engage-
ment with the existing traditions of political thought and practice 
and through a reconsideration of what these traditions exclude as 
non-political. Overturning the distinction between the political and 
the non-political, Agamben finds in the former little more than traces 
of a profound depoliticisation and instead surveys the latter for the 
signs of a coming new politics. Any assessment of Agamben’s criti-
cal studies of historical or contemporary politics would therefore be 
incomplete without the consideration of his engagement with the 
ostensibly non-political subject matter as the source for a new politi-
cal affirmation. 
This reading of Agamben is distinct from the dominant mode 
of reception of his thought in the English-speaking academia that 
emphasises his critique of the Western political tradition at the 
expense of his affirmation of a radically new politics, which tends 
PROZOROV 9780748676200 PRINT.indd   2 04/12/2013   15:07
3introduction
to be dismissed as utopian, naive and incoherent or simply ignored. 
Agamben is thereby read as a strident if not outright shrill critic of 
the occidental tradition of politics, particularly in its modern versions 
which, notwithstanding ideological differences between, for example, 
liberal democracy and Nazi or Stalinist totalitarianism, all appear to 
lead inescapably to the concentration camp that is posited as the 
paradigmatic site of modern politics (see Mesnard 2004; Bernstein 
2004; Laclau 2007; Connolly 2007; Patton 2007). While this reading 
is not, strictly speaking, incorrect, it obscures the affirmative attune-
ment that grants this critique both its meaning and its power. In con-
trast, we shall begin with this affirmative attunement as the context 
necessary for grasping Agamben’s critical project and evaluating its 
strengths and weaknesses. Prior to addressing Agamben’s most con-
troversial theses about, for example, the indistinction of democracy 
and totalitarianism or the camp as the paradigmatic political space 
of modernity we shall illuminate the overall disposition that makes 
these theses more intelligible and rather less extreme than when they 
appear out of context. 
This approach to Agamben’s politics determines the structure of 
the book. In Chapter 1 we shall reconstitute what we shall term the 
‘comic mood’ of Agamben’s philosophy. Drawing on Agamben’s 
own rejection of the ‘tragic paradigm’ in politics and ethics, we shall 
present the break with the tragic vision of politics and the embrace 
of comic affirmation as the fundamental attunement or mood 
of Agamben’s philosophy. While this argument may be counter- 
intuitive, given the morbid subject matter of many of Agamben’s 
key works, we shall argue that this ‘negative’ image is secondary 
and subordinate to the affirmative aspect of Agamben’s thought that 
accords with the understanding of comedy in classical aesthetics as 
the passage from a ‘foul’ beginning full of misfortunes to a happy 
end. Agamben’s detailed analyses of the lethal contradictions of 
established forms of politics are not intended as tragic ruminations 
on the inaccessibility of redemption but rather as the proper pathway 
towards it. It is only by engaging with the existing forms of power at 
their most extreme points that it is possible to bring their operation 
to a ‘happy ending’. Thus, Agamben’s genealogical studies of the 
most tragic moments of the Western political tradition function as 
diagnostic tools in the service of its comic overcoming.
Chapter 2 elucidates the logic of the comic affirmation that 
defines Agamben’s politics. While numerous passages on the ‘coming 
politics’ and ‘happy life’ in Agamben’s texts are often dismissed as 
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naive utopianism at odds with the clinical detachment of his critical 
analyses, this dismissal is due to the misunderstanding of the logic 
of comedy: happiness is possible but only at the end. The key to 
understanding Agamben’s politics is his rethinking of the very idea 
of ending, of coming or bringing something to an end. The ‘happy 
end’ that his politics affirms is neither the teleological fulfilment of 
a process nor a merely negative disappearance of something but 
rather the process of becoming or rendering something inoperative, 
neutralising its ordering force and making it available for free use. 
The chapter introduces inoperativity as the fundamental concept 
of Agamben’s thought, marking the continuity of his philosophical 
project from the earliest work onwards. Drawing in particular on 
Agamben’s reading of Aristotle, we shall reconstitute the original for-
mulation of this problematic and its linkage with another key concept 
of Agamben’s thought, i.e. potentiality. We shall then elucidate the 
functioning of the logic of inoperativity in Agamben’s conceptual 
apparatus by considering a series of paradigmatic examples from the 
most diverse spheres: the glorious body in Christianity, the Sabbath 
in Judaism, the religious hymn, the empty throne, etc. Since the most 
famous and extreme example of inoperativity in Agamben’s work 
is the protagonist of Melville’s novella Bartleby the Scrivener, we 
shall devote particular attention to the critical analysis of Agamben’s 
reading of Bartleby. 
The four remaining chapters elaborate the logic of inoperative 
politics in four key domains of Agamben’s political thought: lan-
guage, statehood, history and humanity. Justin Clemens has argued 
that ‘Agamben’s net is wide but he catches the same fish time after 
time’ (2008: 55). In our view, this statement ought not to be taken 
as criticism but rather as an indication of both the fundamental 
consistency of Agamben’s political philosophy and his fidelity to its 
key principles. As we shall see, the affirmative logic of Agamben’s 
politics remains the same across the dazzling variety of thematic 
concerns and spatiotemporal contexts, persistently tracing the pos-
sibility of rendering inoperative the structures of power that capture 
and confine human existence. 
Since Agamben’s thought is remarkably diverse in its thematic 
foci, intellectual influences and methodological strategies, any choice 
of domains to be covered is bound to exclude something of interest 
and this book is no exception. It is with some regret that we have 
to bracket off the discussion of Agamben’s fascinating interventions 
into the field of aesthetics, particularly poetry and literature, or his 
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rethinking of commodity fetishism and the capitalist ‘society of the 
spectacle’. Nonetheless, there is one aspect of Agamben’s thought 
that has become so prominent in recent works that its apparent 
exclusion requires justification. This is theology, which plays an 
ever more important role starting from The Kingdom and the Glory 
(2011, see also Agamben 2013). In our reading, theology does not 
constitute a separate domain of Agamben’s work but is rather a 
fundamental aspect of his reinvention of politics as such that has 
arguably been present all along (cf. Dickinson 2011; De la Durantaye 
2009: 367–82; cf. Toscano 2011, Sharpe 2009). Suffice it to recall 
that Agamben’s discussion of post-statist community (1993a) makes 
numerous references to the limbo, halos, Kabbalah, Shekinah, etc, 
while his theorisation of politics beyond the law and the logic of 
sovereignty is phrased in unequivocally messianic terms (2005a). As 
Agamben has argued, ‘it is only through metaphysical, religious and 
theological paradigms that one can truly approach the contemporary 
– and political – situation’ (Agamben cited in De la Durantaye 2009: 
369) At the same time, Agamben’s works are clearly ‘confrontations 
with theology’ (ibid.): his use of theological genealogies of the most 
familiar aspects of our political tradition is a part of his effort to 
render this tradition inoperative and open it to free use that he calls 
profane. We shall therefore encounter theological themes in each of 
the four domains that we shall cover in this book, which makes any 
separate consideration of the theological realm superfluous for our 
purposes.
The choice of the domains of language, statehood, history and 
humanity is determined by their significance for understanding the 
logic of Agamben’s inoperative politics in its historical development. 
While at first glance it would be more logical to begin the account 
of Agamben’s politics with his work in the sphere of statehood and 
law, the foundations for his arguments in this sphere are laid by his 
earlier critique of the negative foundations of language. Indeed, the 
main thesis of Homo Sacer is already contained in the conclusion 
to the 1982 book Language and Death (Agamben 1991). Similarly, 
Agamben’s affirmative rethinking of the experience of language prior 
to and beyond all signification paves the way for his theorisation 
of political community beyond every particular identity, which is a 
precondition for any post-statist politics. This post-statist politics is 
in turn explicitly posited as post-historical, not in the more familiar 
Kojèvian or Fukuyaman sense of the final fulfilment of the historical 
process but in the sense of a deactivation of this very process, the 
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suspension of the dialectical negating action that subjected human 
existence in the present in the name of its future emancipation. 
Finally, insofar as historicity has been traditionally posited as consti-
tutive of human existence as such, this reconsideration of the end of 
history brings up the question of the effect of inoperative politics on 
the very distinction between humanity and animality. 
The order of our presentation of these four domains roughly 
corresponds to the historical development of Agamben’s political 
thought: the work on language and community of the late 1970s 
to early 1980s, on law and the state in the late 1980s to 1990s, 
on history and messianism in the late 1990s to early 2000s and on 
humanity/animality during the 2000s. Yet, more importantly, this 
order corresponds to the radicalisation of the ambitions and claims 
of Agamben’s philosophy of inoperativity, which begins with the 
more restricted technical and philosophical problem of the negative 
foundations of language and progressively expands its focus to law, 
history and ultimately humanity as such. The variations on the theme 
of inoperativity that we shall analyse in Chapters 3–6 thus produce 
a crescendo effect as Agamben’s affirmation of a path out of the 
tragedy of modern politics becomes ever more exigent.
Chapter 3 addresses the operation of the logic of inoperativity in 
the domain of language, central to Agamben’s work of the 1970s 
and the 1980s. In a series of works from this period Agamben dem-
onstrates that the Western philosophy of language has been guided 
by the logic of negative foundation, whereby the positivity of human 
language as signifying discourse is conditioned by the negation 
of natural or animal sound. It is this moment of negation, which 
Agamben terms Voice, that remains inaccessible to speech as such, 
making the foundation of language ineffable and ultimately mystical. 
Agamben then seeks to render this negativity of Voice inoperative in 
a pure experience of language (experimentum linguae) that brings the 
unspeakable to speech in the suspension of signification. This logic 
is then transferred to the domain of political community, which is 
rethought in the absence of any predicates of identity and conditions 
of belonging, as the precise correlate of the pure experience of lan-
guage. It is this community of ‘whatever being’, founded solely on the 
basic fact of human multiplicity, that becomes the subject of a new, 
singularly universalist politics that seeks to deactivate all particular 
communities and political orders.
The analysis of Agamben’s rethinking of language and commu-
nity prepares the ground for our interpretation of his best-known 
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political texts in the Homo Sacer series from the perspective of inop-
erativity in Chapter 4. Starting with the discussion of Agamben’s 
reinterpretation of Foucault’s theory of biopolitics and Schmitt’s 
theory of sovereignty, we shall demonstrate how the notion of bare 
life as the object of biopolitical sovereignty corresponds to the idea 
of the ineffable Voice in the philosophy of language. We shall then 
address Agamben’s account of the confinement of bare life in the 
state of exception, including the familiar figures of homo sacer and 
the Muselmann, and probe into his resolution of the problem of 
sovereignty. In accordance with the general logic of inoperativity, 
this resolution does not take the form of either the revolutionary 
takeover or the anarchist destruction of the state and the legal appa-
ratus but rather consists in the deactivation of their ordering power 
in what Agamben, following Walter Benjamin, terms the ‘real state 
of exception’, in which human praxis is severed from all relation to 
the law. We shall conclude with the analysis of Agamben’s notion of 
‘form-of-life’ as the effect of the reappropriation of bare life from its 
capture in the logic of sovereignty.
Chapter 5 traces the operation of the logic of inoperativity in the 
domain of history. While in the early 1990s Agamben joined other 
continental thinkers in the criticism of the recycling of the Hegelo-
Kojèvian thesis on the end of history by Francis Fukuyama, he 
went beyond the derisive dismissal of this argument and developed 
an alternative account of historicity and its deactivation. Tracing 
Agamben’s critical engagement with Hegel’s and Kojève’s thought, 
we shall reconstitute Agamben’s ‘happy ending’ of history as the 
suspension of the Hegelian Master–Slave dialectic by the figure of 
the Slave that ceases to work without striving to attain mastery. 
As we shall argue, for Agamben history does not end by fulfilling 
its immanent logic but is rather brought to an end in emancipatory 
social practices that suspend its progress and thus render inopera-
tive the positions of both Master and Slave. We shall then elaborate 
this logic of suspension by addressing Agamben’s reinterpretation of 
Pauline messianism, focusing in particular on the notion of messianic 
time as the eruption of the kairos, a critical moment of emancipatory 
possibility, within the chronological time of history. We shall elabo-
rate this ‘profane messianism’ by contrasting it with the ‘katechontic’ 
logic that restrains and delays the messianic parousia, perpetuating 
the reign of sovereign power. 
Chapter 6 probes Agamben’s affirmation of inoperativity at the 
very site where the subject of politics emerges, i.e. humanity. If 
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human existence has been understood as constitutively historical, 
then what are the implications of the end of history for our very 
notion of humanity? In his recent work Agamben has explicitly 
engaged with the problem of anthropocentrism in the Western politi-
cal tradition, overcoming its vestiges in his own earlier texts. In this 
chapter we shall analyse Agamben’s figure of the anthropological 
machine as the historical apparatus of distinguishing humanity from 
animality and address his attempts to bring this machine to a halt. 
In particular, we shall focus on Agamben’s critical reinterpretation 
of Heidegger’s attempt to distinguish humanity from animality on 
the basis of the exclusively human faculty of the disclosure of the 
world. In an intricate reversal of Heidegger’s argument Agamben 
demonstrates that rather than authorise any distinction this faculty 
rather points to an extreme affinity between humanity and animal-
ity, rendering any opposition between them inoperative in the figure 
of ‘saved life’ beyond all separations and divisions. We shall address 
this figure of post-anthropocentric ‘saved life’ as the most radical 
version of the affirmation of inoperativity in Agamben’s work, 
whereby his attempts to break outside the confines of signification, 
law and history lead his form-of-life ‘outside of being’ as such.
In conclusion we shall address the immanent critique of Agamben’s 
work, focusing in particular on the paradoxical and somewhat coun-
ter-intuitive optimism that Agamben has repeatedly professed with 
regard to his vision of the coming politics. We shall argue that the 
central problem of Agamben’s affirmative politics is his principled 
opposition to any form of a voluntarist project, which leaves him 
incapable of accounting for the process of the constitution of the 
political subject, including the inoperative community of whatever 
being. Having demonstrated the violent and vacuous character of 
particularistic political communities governed by biopolitical sov-
ereignty and pointed the pathway for escaping their subjection and 
reclaiming the potentialities of existence confined in them, Agamben 
cannot demonstrate why this step outside would be taken by the sub-
jects of contemporary societies. The principled affirmation of inoper-
ativity as both the telos and the method of the coming politics makes 
it logically impossible to discuss this politics in the traditional terms 
of the composition of a social movement or a coalition of parties, of 
raising awareness and mobilising the civil society, of articulating and 
aggregating particular interests, etc. All that the definition of politics 
in terms of inoperativity permits is the affirmation of the sheer poten-
tiality of the subtraction from the apparatuses that govern us and 
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the coming together of singularities into an open and non-exclusive 
community of whatever being. Thus, Agamben’s politics lacks not 
only teleological assurances but also the hope that could be invested 
in voluntarist action and is left with nothing to fall back on but its 
affirmation of its possibility, which is by definition also a possibility 
for it not to be actualised. While it is ultimately up to the reader to 
decide whether this problem is a weakness of Agamben’s thought or 
the proof of its consistency, it is important to understand the reason-
ing behind it.
This book is explicitly pitched at two audiences. It is intended as 
both an introduction to Agamben’s political thought for first-time 
readers and a critical interpretation of his work that will be of inter-
est to the readers already acquainted with his thought. The focus on 
inoperativity as the logic of Agamben’s affirmative politics serves 
both purposes. For newcomers to Agamben it provides an overarch-
ing frame for a dazzling and somewhat intimidating array of diverse 
themes that Agamben’s political thought addresses, from angels 
to porn stars, from camps to pronouns, etc. For the more familiar 
readers, it offers a specific interpretive perspective that highlights 
the originality of Agamben’s insights in the contemporary intellec-
tual context, accentuating the stakes, achievements and problems 
of his vision of the coming politics. With respect to both audiences, 
this book will fulfil its purpose if it succeeds in its invitation to read 
Agamben, either for the first time or repeatedly. 
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Chapter 1 
All’s Well That Ends Well:  
Agamben’s Comic Politics 
In this chapter we shall introduce the idea of mood as a methodo-
logical key to the interpretation of Agamben’s political thought. 
Approaching the idea of the mood as the fundamental attunement 
characterising a philosophical standpoint, we shall argue that the 
mood of Agamben’s philosophy is comic in the sense used in aes-
thetic theory. While tragedy is understood in terms of a passage 
from a pacific beginning to a terrible end, comedy is defined by the 
reverse movement from a misfortune or predicament to a happy 
resolution. In contrast to many orientations in continental philoso-
phy, whose approach to politics is marked by the tragic awareness 
of the limits of political possibility, Agamben’s politics is radically 
affirmative, emphasising the contingency of the apparatuses that 
govern our existence and hence the possibility of their overcoming. 
In the remainder of the chapter we shall elaborate the comic mood 
of Agamben’s philosophy by addressing his readings of Dante, Kafka 
and other authors. 
What is a Mood?
The primary task of this book is to elucidate the overall orientation 
and development of Agamben’s political thought from his earliest 
works of the 1970s to the most recent writings. In our view, the best 
way to do this is by grasping the fundamental attunement to politics 
that characterises Agamben’s writings. The concept of ‘fundamental 
attunement’ or mood (Stimmung) was developed in the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger, the key influence on Agamben’s intellectual devel-
opment. In Being and Time (1962), Heidegger famously described 
anxiety as a fundamental mood, in which the mode of human being-
there (Dasein) is disclosed. In this mood, distinguished from fear 
by the lack of any determinate object, Dasein is separated from its 
everyday immersion in the world and is able to gain access to its 
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all’s well that ends well: agamben’s comic politics 
being-in-the-world as a whole. In this experience the familiar world 
appears to us as uncanny and strange, which for Heidegger is the pre-
condition for any authentic and free engagement with it. Similarly, 
in a later course of lectures, entitled The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics (1995), Heidegger posited ‘profound boredom’ as the 
mood of world disclosure, in which the world is rendered manifest as 
an opening, in which individual beings come to appearance. It is only 
when we are ‘left empty’ by beings that become indifferent for us and 
are ‘held in limbo’, all possibilities of our action suspended, that we 
experience the clearing of being as such. Such moods as anxiety and 
boredom are thus fundamental in the sense of giving us nothing less 
than an experience of being itself, making possible the phenomenal 
appearance of the ontological dimension. 
The notion of a fundamental attunement may also be applied to 
the work of individual philosophers, for example Heidegger himself, 
whose own mood Agamben discussed in terms of a paradoxical 
‘openness to a closedness’, being delivered over to something that 
refuses oneself (Agamben 2004b: 68). In this sense the notion of a 
mood indicates something like an ontological tenor of an author’s 
philosophy, which permits one to grasp its fundamental orientation. 
By illuminating the mood of Agamben’s politics and its unfolding in 
the key domains of his writings we may expect to gain an interpretive 
key to his often controversial, counter-intuitive or outright enigmatic 
claims about politics.
In his 1985 collection Idea of Prose Agamben devoted a separate 
vignette ‘The Idea of Music’ to the notion of mood, arguing both for 
the centrality of this notion to any philosophy and for its gradual 
descent into obscurity in contemporary thought: 
Our sensibility, our sentiments, no longer make us promises. They survive 
off to the side, splendid and useless, like household pets. And courage, 
before which the imperfect nihilism of our time is in constant retreat, 
would indeed consist in recognising that we no longer have moods, that 
we are the first men not to be in tune with a Stimmung. [And] if moods are 
the same thing in the history of the individual as are epochs in the history 
of humanity, then what presents itself in the leaden light of our apathy 
is the never yet seen sky of an absolute non-epochal situation in human 
history. The unveiling of being and language, which remains unsaid in 
each historical epoch and in each destiny, perhaps is truly coming to an 
end. Deprived of an epoch, worn out and without destiny, we reach the 
blissful threshold of our unmusical dwelling in time. Our word has truly 
reached the beginning. (Agamben 1995: 91)
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This fragment is a good illustration of the tenor of Agamben’s 
approach, presenting in a condensed, if also somewhat cryptic, 
manner a number of theses that, as we shall show in this book, are 
emblematic for Agamben’s political thought: the assertion of a radical 
discontinuity in our contemporary condition, the mercilessly nega-
tive view of our current predicament, the argument for the exhaus-
tion and vacuity of our traditions, the sense of a looming end that 
is then converted into the expectation of a new beginning. Despite 
Agamben’s claim for the increasing oblivion of the idea of mood in 
our contemporary experience, this statement actually provides us 
with a glimpse into the fundamental mood of his own philosophy. 
Taking Leave of Tragedy
This book argues that the basic mood of Agamben’s political thought 
is comic. Those familiar at least with the subject matter of Agamben’s 
books will certainly protest in disbelief. Comic? Isn’t this the author 
who writes about concentration and refugee camps, about states of 
exception and state terror, and whose best-known conceptual perso-
nae are homo sacer, the being that can be killed with impunity, and 
the Muselmann, the emaciated and apathetic inmate of Nazi concen-
tration camps? There certainly does not appear to be anything comic 
about that. On the contrary, what defines the reception of Agamben 
in many quarters of political and international relations theory is 
precisely the interpretation of his reading of the Western political 
tradition as tragic and, perhaps, far too tragic. Agamben’s provoca-
tive theses about the concentration camp as the paradigmatic site of 
modern politics, the indistinction between democracy and totalitari-
anism with respect to the logic of sovereignty, the state of exception 
becoming the rule in modern politics have been frequently criticised 
as excessively totalising and ahistorical. 
In fact, this ‘tragic’ reading has so far been the dominant mode of 
the reception of Agamben’s work in Anglo-American political theory. 
Although Agamben’s early works were translated into English start-
ing from the early 1990s, the book that made him famous was the 
first volume of Homo Sacer (1998) and the context of its reception 
was dominated by the US-led War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks of 
2001. Agamben’s analyses of sovereignty, biopolitics, bare life and 
the camp were particularly topical in the context of American excep-
tionalism, preventive war without legal sanction, the Guantanamo 
camp, the Patriot Act, and so on. In this context, Agamben was 
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read as an excessively pessimistic theorist who finds in the current 
events the manifestation of the underlying logic of the entire Western 
political tradition, making today’s policies appear tragically prede-
termined by the millennia of history as the unfolding of the lethal 
paradox of sovereignty that was there already in Ancient Rome. 
In line with this mode of reception, Ernesto Laclau accuses 
Agamben of positing an ‘unavoidable advance towards a totalitar-
ian society’ (Laclau 2007: 17), ‘[dismissing] all political options in 
our societies and unifying them in the concentration camp as their 
secret destiny’ (ibid.: 22). Similarly, William Connolly argues that 
‘[Agamben] carries us through the conjunction of sovereignty, the 
sacred and biopolitics to a historical impasse. Agamben’s analysis 
exacerbates a paradox that he cannot imagine how to transcend’ 
(Connolly 2007: 27). The criticism of Agamben’s tragic teleology 
is fortified even further by Andreas Kalyvas, for whom ‘Agamben 
proposes a theory of history that does not seem to bring forth any-
thing new’ other than the ‘survival of sovereignty over a period of 25 
centuries’, so that the history of Western politics ends up nothing but 
a ‘history of repeated failures’ (Kalyvas 2005: 111–12). Moreover, 
these failures are allegedly ‘guided by the iron hand of historical 
necessity all the way to the camps’ (ibid.: 112). William Rasch suc-
cinctly sums up the logic underlying this reading of Agamben: ‘What 
reveals itself in the sovereign ban is the long, slow, but inevitable 
telos of the West, an ingrained imperfection that inheres as much in 
the democratic tradition as it does in absolutism or twentieth-century 
totalitarianism’ (Rasch 2007: 100). Agamben’s politics is thus not 
merely tragic as a matter of contingency, but rather as a matter of 
teleological necessity, from whose grip one apparently cannot twist 
loose, since every concrete instance of political praxis ultimately 
bears the full metaphysical weight of the millennia of tragedy: ‘At the 
basis of Agamben’s analyses of the law, the state and the citizen lies 
this fundamental premise that Western metaphysics is a metaphysics 
of death, a deadly metaphysics’ (Deranty 2008: 175). Thus, the con-
sensus among the critics is that Agamben’s work is an exemplar of 
a ‘radically pessimistic philosophy of history’ (Marchart 2007: 13).
So far, so very non-comic. And yet, these readings of Agamben 
ignore (or scornfully, and a little too hurriedly, dismiss) the persistent 
references throughout his work to ‘happiness’ and ‘redemption’ that 
come at the end of the tradition whose reign has indeed been tragic 
and, moreover, going from bad to worse. To recall Agamben’s frag-
ment on moods, the experience of being ‘deprived’, ‘worn out’ and 
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‘apathetic’ simultaneously marks the ‘true beginning’ of our ‘word’. 
The reversal of the tragic predicament into the possibility of a ‘happy 
life’ that we find in the final pages of almost all Agamben’s books 
permits us to rigorously distinguish his thought from what we may 
term the tragic logic dominant in contemporary continental thought. 
The tragic reading of politics, which ranges from a Schmittian politi-
cal realism to a Lacanian or Heideggerian poststructuralism, posits 
the ultimate goals of politics as radically unattainable, resigning us 
to, at best, temporary and unfinalisable outcomes that necessarily 
compromise our ideals and, at worst, a perpetual possibility of a 
relapse into violent antagonism. Particularly in the post-Cold War 
period, this tragic understanding of politics has been accompanied 
and reinforced by a melancholic interpretation of ‘radical’ or ‘pro-
gressive’ politics as necessarily harbouring its own failure, its own 
reversal into reaction or terror and usually both (see Žižek 2008: 
1–8; Badiou 2009: 1–9; Bosteels 2011: 269–87). Thus, the ‘tragic’ 
approach in contemporary continental thought affirms the inescap-
able limits of political possibility and warns about the catastrophic 
results of every attempt at transgressing them. 
In contrast to this tragic pathos, whose central motif is our best 
intentions going terribly wrong, Agamben’s politics may be under-
stood as comic, evidently not in the sense of being funny or humor-
ous, but rather in the sense espoused by classical aesthetics. Whereas 
tragedy is marked by a pacific beginning after which things go wrong 
and end badly, comedy begins with various misfortunes only to 
lead at the end to what Agamben refers to as ‘happy life’ (Agamben 
2000: 114). In aesthetic theory, comedy does not designate a genre 
that would be ‘feelgood’, hilarious or humorous throughout. After 
all, even Dante’s famous book, in which all sorts of terrible things 
happen, is called Divine Comedy. It is specifically the movement 
from the misfortunes or mishaps at the beginning to happiness at the 
end that defines comedy. Indeed, it is precisely in his reading of Dante 
in End of the Poem (1999a) that Agamben elaborates his theory of 
comedy that has not been applied in the study of his politics, but in 
our view provides the best interpretive key for it. A brief analysis of 
this text will help us illuminate the fundamental mood of Agamben’s 
political philosophy as thoroughly heterogeneous to the image of the 
prophet of doom constructed by his critics. 
Why did Dante decide to entitle his masterpiece Divine Comedy? 
In his attempt to answer this question Agamben goes beyond the 
strictly stylistic opposition between the elevated style of tragedy and 
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a more ‘humble’ or ‘lowly’ style proper to comedy and articulates 
the tragic/comic opposition on the level of content ‘as an opposition 
of beginning and end: tragedy is marked by an “admirable” and 
“peaceful” beginning and a “foul” and “horrible” end; comedy by 
“horrible” and “foul” beginning and a “prosperous” and “pleas-
ant” end’ (Agamben 1999a: 6). In the context of the subject matter 
of Dante’s poem, which deals with the question of humankind’s 
salvation or damnation after the divine judgment, this opposition is 
concretised in the following manner: 
That Dante’s poem is a comedy and not a tragedy means [that] man 
appears at the beginning as guilty but at the end as innocent. Insofar 
as it is a ‘comedy’, the poem is an itinerary from guilt to innocence and 
not from innocence to guilt. Tragedy appears as the guilt of the just and 
comedy as the justification of the guilty. (Ibid.: 8) 
Thus, the tragic situation consists in the conflict between the sub-
jective innocence of the hero and his objectively attributed guilt, 
whereby the just end up guilty despite themselves, while the logic of 
comedy consists in the overcoming of the subjective guilt that ensures 
a ‘prosperous and pleasant’ ending.1 While the tragic logic is conven-
tionally held to characterise the Ancient Greek world and the comic 
logic is made possible by the historical event of Christianity, this divi-
sion is made more complex by Agamben through the introduction of 
another opposition, that of nature and person. The ‘tragic guilt’ that 
characterised the antiquity certainly persists in the Christian universe 
in the form of the doctrine of the original sin, in which it was, as it 
were, nature itself that sinned: ‘[as] natural and not personal guilt, 
as guilt that falls to every man through his own origin, original sin is 
a perfect equivalent of tragic hamartia, an objective stain independ-
ent of will’ (ibid.: 11). It is Christ’s passion that radically alters this 
situation, ‘transforming natural guilt into personal expiation and an 
irreconcilable objective conflict into a personal matter’ (ibid.: 12). 
The salvation that Christianity promises is not of a ‘natural’ or objec-
tive nature but is rather a matter of personal achievement that cannot 
be passed on to others. Rather than simply cancel out the original sin 
and restore the Edenic condition of humanity, Christianity transforms 
guilt from an objective condition to a question of personal practice: 
‘Transforming the conflict between natural guilt and personal inno-
cence into the division between natural innocence and personal guilt, 
Christ’s death thus liberates man from tragedy and makes comedy 
possible’ (ibid.: 13). 
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From that point on, the only tragic experience that remains pos-
sible is that of love, insofar as the body with its desires remains in 
the state of original sin, resigning one to natural guilt despite one’s 
personal innocence. It is precisely in this sphere that Dante ventures 
a comic reversal, whereby the erotic experience ceases to be a ‘tragic’ 
conflict between personal innocence and natural guilt and becomes a 
comic reconciliation of natural innocence and personal guilt. In the 
Divine Comedy this reconciliation takes the form of Dante’s charac-
ter’s full assumption of shame: while tragic heroes, of which Oedipus 
is the best example, could not assume their shame due to their sub-
jective innocence, the comic character renounces every claim to per-
sonal innocence as well as every attempt to return to the Edenic state 
and instead fully assumes the fracture between the natural and the 
personal within one’s existence. Yet it is precisely this fracture that 
founds comedy by making it possible to assume one’s (guilty) person 
without fully identifying with it. Relying on the originary etymologi-
cal sense of ‘person’ as a mask, which he will invoke in many of his 
other works (2010: 46–54; 2007b: 55–60), Agamben emphasises the 
possibility to combine the assumption of personal guilt with a claim 
to natural innocence: ‘the one who accomplishes the voyage of the 
Comedy is not a subject or an I in the modern sense of the word, but, 
rather, simultaneously a person (the sinner called Dante) and human 
nature’ (Agamben 1999a: 20). Moreover, the one to be redeemed at 
the end of this journey is the ‘creature’ in its natural innocence and 
not the person, which ultimately remains nothing but a ‘mask’, a 
‘foreign person’, a product of the external forces that may well be 
consigned to its guilt. What would be properly tragic is rather one’s 
identification with this ‘foreign person’ (Agamben 1999a: 18–20), 
whereby it begins to define one’s identity without any remainder, 
completely crowding out the innocent creature (Agamben 2007b: 
59–60; 2010: 50–4). In contrast, the comic character resists this 
identification, reclaiming its natural innocence while leaving its guilty 
person to the external forces of the law.
Kafka and the Apparatuses of Tragedy
This logic of the overcoming of tragedy is elaborated in Agamben’s 
reading of a more contemporary literary figure whose works have 
been routinely misinterpreted as tragic, Franz Kafka, who is the most 
important literary reference in Agamben’s entire oeuvre (see Snoek 
2012; Murray 2010: 99–107).
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It is a very poor reading of Kafka’s works that sees in them only a summa-
tion of the anguish of a guilty man before the inscrutable power of a God 
become estranged and remote. On the contrary, here it is God himself 
who would need to be saved and the only happy ending we can imagine 
for his novels is the redemption of Klamm, of the Count, of the anony-
mous, theological crowd of judges, lawyers and guardians indiscrimi-
nately packed together in dusty corridors or stooped beneath oppressive 
ceilings. (Agamben 1995: 85)
Contrary to the interpretations of Kafka as the founding figure of a 
specifically modern form of tragedy, in which the sheer fact of objec-
tive guilt remains despite the disappearance of its sense, Agamben 
approaches Kafka’s literary gesture as a modern repetition of Dante’s 
renunciation of tragedy. Kafka’s novels seek less the redemption 
of the guilty than the redemption from the very idea of guilt, the 
redemption which can only be universal and pertain as much to 
those accused as to those who accuse, judge and punish. Rather 
than attempt to justify those considered guilty by reassigning guilt to 
others, Kafka seeks to dispense with guilt as such, understanding it as 
ultimately a product of our ‘self-slander’ before the law 
[Kafka’s] universe cannot be tragic but only comic: guilt does not exist, 
or, rather guilt is nothing other than self-slander, which consists in accus-
ing oneself of a nonexistent guilt (that is, of one’s very innocence, which 
is the comic gesture par excellence). (Agamben 2010: 21) 
In Agamben’s interpretation of Kafka’s novel The Trial, Joseph K 
allows himself to be captured in the trial and persists in this capture 
until his death due to his own fascination with law that he cannot 
escape and which eventually gets the best of him. The problem 
of guilt is ultimately the problem of the capture and confinement 
of human existence within what Agamben terms an ‘apparatus’ 
(2009c): a structure of ordering beings by endowing them with posi-
tive identities and roles. 
The concept of the apparatus (dispositif) was originally devel-
oped by Michel Foucault in his History of Sexuality (1990a). In a 
methodological move typical of his later work, Agamben takes up 
Foucault’s concept, traces its genealogy further back in the history 
of philosophy and generalises it far beyond its original articula-
tion. While Foucault’s dispositif referred to a heterogeneous set of 
discursive and nondiscursive practices that organises the relations 
of power and forms of knowledge in specific domains such as sexu-
ality, punishment, law, and so on (see Deleuze 1992, 1988: 30–7), 
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Agamben relies on his theological genealogy of the notion of the 
economy (2011) to isolate the idea of dispositio as the generic activ-
ity of governing. The apparatus is thus generalised to designate ‘a set 
of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures and institutions that aim 
to manage, govern, control and orient – in a way that purports to 
be useful – the behaviours, gestures and thoughts of human beings’ 
(Agamben 2009c: 13). Thus, Agamben replaces Foucault’s largely 
methodological notion of the apparatus with what amounts to a 
general theory of order: 
I wish to propose to you nothing less than a general and massive parti-
tioning of beings into two large groups or classes: on the one hand, living 
beings (or substances), and on the other hand, apparatuses in which living 
beings are incessantly captured. On the one hand, then, to return to the 
terminology of the theologians, lies the ontology of creatures, and on the 
other hand, the oikonomia of apparatuses that seek to govern and guide 
them toward the good. (Agamben 2009c: 13) 
This division ultimately corresponds to the Heideggerian difference 
between the ontological and the ontic. Only living beings (or what 
Agamben calls ‘substances’) have an ontological status, while the 
apparatuses are purely ontic figures of order that have no founda-
tion in being (Agamben 2009c: 10; see also Agamben 2011: 53–66). 
While both categories refer to beings, only the beings of the former 
category are endowed with being. On the basis of this distinction 
Agamben defines the apparatus as 
[literally] anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, 
determine, intercept, model, control or secure the gestures, behaviours, 
opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, 
madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, but also the 
pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, 
computers, cellular telephones and – why not – language itself, which is 
perhaps the most ancient of the apparatuses. (Agamben 2009c: 14) 
While many of these apparatuses are certainly themselves substan-
tial, what constitutes them as apparatuses is not their materiality but 
their capacity to capture and order the existence of living beings. It is 
in the gap between the apparatuses and the beings they capture that 
Agamben locates a third class, that of subjects defined as products of 
the relation between the two, be it harmonious or antagonistic. From 
this perspective, the subject of tragedy is ultimately the product of the 
apparatuses of law, which alone are capable of adjudicating on one’s 
guilt or innocence.
PROZOROV 9780748676200 PRINT.indd   18 04/12/2013   15:07
19
all’s well that ends well: agamben’s comic politics 
It is only when one enters, by force or willingly, into the domain 
of law that one can be found, or find oneself, guilty, paving the way 
for tragedy: ‘[When] Being is indicted, or “accused”, within the 
sphere of law, it loses its innocence; it becomes a cosa (a thing), that 
is a causa (a case): an object of litigation’ (Agamben 2010: 23). And 
yet Agamben’s Kafka does not simply dismiss the idea of guilt in a 
nostalgic affirmation of the innocence of Being before any indict-
ment. Indeed, in Agamben’s often repeated methodological principle, 
‘history never returns to a lost state’ (ibid.: 54. See also Agamben 
2009b: 82–104; 2005a: 88) and whatever has been captured in an 
apparatus cannot simply return to innocence. In both Dante and 
Kafka, the liberation from tragic guilt takes the form of the full 
assumption or ‘liberation’ of shame: ‘[Kafka’s] greatness is that he 
decided at a certain point to renounce theodicy and forego the old 
problem of guilt and innocence, of freedom and destiny, in order to 
concentrate solely on shame’ (Agamben 1995: 65). When objective 
guilt is dissolved, our confinement within the apparatuses of law and 
politics appears to be nothing but a series of historical accidents, 
of which one cannot be guilty but can certainly be ashamed: ‘One 
cannot be guilty or innocent of an accident, one can only feel embar-
rassed or ashamed as when we slip in the street on a banana skin’ 
(ibid.: 84). From this perspective, the criticism that accuses Agamben 
of positing a teleological necessity to the Western political tradition 
appears misdirected. Not only is there no teleological argument or 
other claim to necessity in Agamben’s works, but his critical exercise 
demonstrates precisely the radical contingency of the apparatuses of 
sovereign power, which in turn makes possible the liberation from 
one’s tragic confinement within them. 
Agamben’s most explicit break with the logic of tragedy takes 
place in the context of his discussion of what is undoubtedly the most 
tragic event of the past century – the Shoah. In his book Remnants 
of Auschwitz (1999c), Agamben takes up the challenge of resuming 
ethical discourse after this horrendous event. Recognising how the 
experience of the camps makes meaningless, if not outright obscene, 
many of the ethical perspectives of the two preceding centuries, from 
Nietzsche’s amor fati to Apel’s discourse ethics, Agamben argues 
that the pathway to a post-Auschwitz ethics must begin with the 
abandonment of the tragic paradigm. Addressing the testimony of 
camp survivors, Agamben notes the inapplicability of the tragic logic, 
where the hero must assume its objective guilt despite his subjective 
innocence of the crime, to the experience of Auschwitz:
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The deportee sees such a widening of the abyss between subjective inno-
cence and objective guilt, between what he did do and what he could 
feel responsible for, that he cannot assume responsibility for any of his 
actions. With an inversion that borders on parody, he feels innocent pre-
cisely for that which the tragic hero feels guilty and guilty exactly where 
the tragic hero feels innocent. (Agamben 1999c: 97) 
Moreover, the model of tragic ethics is rendered suspect by the way 
it was readily resorted to not by the victims but by the executioners, 
who sought justification by pointing to the tragic conflict between 
their objective guilt (as a result of following orders) and their subjec-
tive innocence of the acts they committed: ‘The Greek hero has left 
us forever; he can no longer bear witness for us in any way. After 
Auschwitz, it is not possible to use a tragic paradigm in ethics’ (ibid.: 
99). In his Nobel lecture Joseph Brodsky famously argued, with ref-
erence to twentieth-century totalitarianism, that ‘in a real tragedy, it 
is not the hero who perishes; it is the chorus’ (Brodsky 1987). Both 
the scale and the senselessness of totalitarian violence destroy the 
very possibility of adjudicating between the objective and the subjec-
tive, guilt and innocence that the chorus in Greek tragedy made pos-
sible, rendering the death of the hero insignificant in the literal sense 
of being devoid of all meaning. 
Bucephalus
Agamben’s reversal of the tragic logic of politics may be elaborated 
with the help of his reading of one of Kafka’s explicitly comic texts, 
‘The New Advocate’. This short parable describes the entry of 
Alexander the Great’s renowned horse, Bucephalus, into the legal 
profession, ‘mounting the marble steps with a high action that made 
them ring beneath his feet’ (Kafka 2002: 58). The other lawyers ‘in 
general’ accept Bucephalus into their field, understanding the ‘dif-
ficulty’ of his condition, which is that of a war horse without his 
master in the times that no longer call for heroism: 
[Nowadays] – it cannot be denied – there is no Alexander the Great. 
There are plenty of men who know how to murder people; the skill 
needed to reach over a banqueting table and pink a friend with a lance is 
not lacking; but no one, no one at all, can blaze a trail to India. Today the 
gates [to India] have receded to remoter and loftier places; no one points 
the way; many carry swords, but only to brandish them, and the eye that 
tries to follow them is confused.
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So perhaps it is really best to do as Bucephalus has done and absorb 
oneself in law books. In the quiet lamplight, his flanks unhampered 
by the thighs of a rider, free and far from the clamour of battle, he 
reads and turns the pages of our ancient tomes (Kafka 2002: 59).
In his reading of the story Walter Benjamin emphasised the fact 
that while Bucephalus studies the law, presumably diligently, he does 
not practise it. Absorbed in study, he remains ‘free’ and ‘unham-
pered’, which is what brings Benjamin to his famous claim that 
Agamben takes up on many occasions in his writings: 
The law which is studied and not practiced any longer is the gate to 
justice. The gate to justice is learning. And yet Kafka does not attach to 
this learning the promises which tradition has attached to the study of the 
Torah. His assistants are sextons who have lost their house of prayer, his 
students are pupils who have lost the Holy Writ. Now there is nothing to 
support them on their ‘untrammelled, happy journey’. (Benjamin 1968: 
139; cf. Agamben 2005a: 59–64) 
Indeed, we do not even know if Bucephalus’s absorption in the 
pages of the ancient tomes produces any effects of knowledge – 
probably not, since it is, after all, a horse. But how can something 
be studied in the absence of any support and what could possibly be 
the purpose of such study? Benjamin concludes his essay on Kafka 
by bringing together the ‘new advocate’ Bucephalus with another 
character of a Kafka parable, Sancho Panza, whom Kafka inter-
preted as an author of ‘a lot of romances of chivalry and adventure’ 
who thereby managed to divert from himself his demon ‘whom he 
later called Don Quixote’, sending him out on the ‘maddest exploits’ 
that lacked a real object and did not do anyone any harm: ‘Sancho 
Panza, a sedate fool and clumsy assistant, sent his rider on ahead; 
Bucephalus outlived his. Whether it is a man or a horse is no longer 
so important, if only the burden is removed from the back’ (ibid.: 
140). The purpose of studying without a clue, of reading ancient 
tomes that no longer mean anything to us, is precisely to remove the 
burden of their continuing presence and significance from our backs, 
to free us from the self-slanderous guilt by twisting loose from one’s 
capture in the apparatuses of law and tradition (see Lewis 2013). 
Revealing ‘the sickness of tradition’ (ibid.: 143) is the sole possibil-
ity to regain one’s own health. This is why Agamben concludes his 
reading of Kafka with the claim that ‘the new advocate’ studies the 
law ‘only on the condition that it no longer be applied’ (Agamben 
2010: 36). 
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And this is exactly what Agamben does himself in this pains-
takingly detailed archaeology of the Western political tradition. 
Agamben’s critics discussed above are entirely correct in noting the 
sense of gravity produced by Agamben’s account of the persistence 
of, for example, the logic of sovereignty, the state of exception 
or the ‘anthropological machine’ throughout the history of the 
West. Where they are mistaken is in taking this sense of gravity 
as Agamben’s final word on the subject, whereby the sole effect of 
his archaeology would be the experience of entrapment within the 
inescapable tradition. In fact, as we shall demonstrate on many occa-
sions in this book, the effect of Agamben’s reading of the tradition 
is its dispersion or even dissipation into a multiplicity of historical 
accidents. By demonstrating the sickness of the tradition Agamben’s 
political thought seeks to remove its burden from our backs, affirm-
ing the possibility of another politics, no longer grounded in the 
tradition, not even negatively by attempting to overcome it from 
within. 
This is why despite the gloomy and even morbid nature of the 
subject matter of his books, Agamben’s thought cannot be subsumed 
under the tragic logic. The persistent attempts of the critics to do so 
only result in the understandable perception of his critical pathos 
as excessive and hyperbolic. If, on the other hand, our interpreta-
tion is correct and the mood of Agamben’s philosophy is primarily 
comic, the hyperbolic character of his criticism only seeks to make 
us drop the burden of the tragic tradition off our backs sooner than 
later. To return to Brodsky’s understanding of tragedy, the stakes 
of Agamben’s thought do not consist in the endless mourning of 
the death of the hero but rather in the redemption of the chorus, 
in halting the very possibility of the repetition of the bloodbath by 
halting the performance of the tragedy.
Evidently, this does not mean that for Agamben the entirety 
of the Western tradition is simply to be negated. In full accord-
ance with our idea of the comic, Agamben’s politics is ultimately 
a matter of redemption, reclaiming and reappropriation. As we 
shall argue in Chapter 5, Agamben’s political thought belongs to 
the wider ‘messianic’ turn in continental philosophy which seeks to 
mobilise the heritage of Judeo-Christian messianism for emancipa-
tory and egalitarian politics. While we shall focus on Agamben’s 
understanding of redemption in detail below, we may introduce its 
basic logic with the help of the Bucephalus parable. The law that is 
studied and not applied is posited by Benjamin as a ‘gate to justice’ 
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(note that it is not itself justice), which in the context of the ‘New 
Advocate’ immediately brings to mind the ‘gates to India’ to which 
Bucephalus’s erstwhile master once ‘pointed the way’. The age in 
which Bucephalus lives is the age of exhaustion and expiry, where 
there is no longer anyone resembling Alexander the Great who 
could blaze a trail to India. Yet the absence of heroes does not seek 
to make these times any less violent: the swords are abundant and 
the art of murder well developed, yet it seems to have lost its point, 
since the ‘gates to India’ have ‘receded’. This account of the age 
resonates with Agamben’s description of our contemporary ‘poli-
tics’ as a nihilistic machine whose tasks have long been abandoned 
but which continues to run on empty, though no less violently than 
before. 
[We] are witnessing the incessant though aimless motion of the [gov-
ernmental] machine, which, in a sort of colossal parody of theological 
oikonomia, has assumed the legacy of the providential governance of the 
world; yet instead of redeeming our world, this machine is leading us to 
catastrophe. (Agamben 2009c: 24)
For Agamben, it is only the halting of this machine that will ulti-
mately permit the fulfilment of what it once promised, be it freedom, 
equality, community or justice, in the same manner as the impracti-
cable law, the ‘gate to justice’, might well be the very same ‘gate to 
India’ that Bucephalus’s contemporaries have long lost sight of (cf. 
Agamben 1998: 58). Yet what is left when the machine of govern-
ment is halted? We have seen that the very form of the subject is a 
result of the interaction of living beings with the apparatuses that 
order them, which logically entails that halting the governmental 
machine would result in the disappearance of the subject as we know 
it, leaving us with the living being as such. 
Yet, this being is, to say the least, an arcane and enigmatic figure. 
After all, our knowledge of human and other beings is entirely 
dependent on a myriad of apparatuses that constitute them in various 
positive ways and it is very difficult to imagine what a living being 
‘as such’, devoid of any positive predicates, might be. Yet this is 
precisely the task that Agamben’s entire philosophical project sets 
itself. Starting from the 1970s Agamben has attempted to elucidate 
this figure in various domains and contexts and in this book we shall 
trace his account of a life beyond the apparatuses in the domains 
of language, statehood, history and humanity. At this stage, we 
shall only introduce the immediate answer that Agamben gives to 
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the question of what remains after the halting of the governmental 
machine: ‘the Ungovernable, which is the beginning and, at the same 
time, the vanishing point of every politics’ (Agamben 2009c: 24. See 
also Agamben 2011: 65). Beyond the apparatuses and the forms of 
subjectivity that they produce there is the excess of living being that 
can never be subsumed under them. While this excess does not in 
itself constitute a political subject, it testifies to the fact that the appa-
ratuses are never all there is, which is precisely why a comic ending 
to their tragic operation remains possible.
The Limbo
While Agamben’s break with the tragic logic appears indisput-
able, the comic character of his thought should not be overstated. 
Agamben is evidently not a utopian thinker affirming an infinite 
wealth of possibilities of a new and better politics. The argument for 
comedy as the fundamental attunement of Agamben’s thought must 
therefore be qualified in three ways. 
Firstly, while for Agamben the overcoming of the tragic logic 
is certainly possible, more often than not it takes place in circum-
stances that we would in ordinary language pronounce to be very 
tragic indeed. Many commentators have noted Agamben’s ‘morbid 
obsession with the dehumanized and disenfranchised’ (Kearney 
2009: 154), his fascination with abject figures from Bartleby to the 
bandit, from porn stars to the camp inmate, from the fetishist to the 
anorexic. This fascination is not due to Agamben’s eccentricity but 
reflects a principled methodological focus on those sites or subjects, 
where the reversal of tragedy into comedy may take place. One of 
the most regularly cited phrases in Agamben’s work is a line from 
Patmos, a hymn by the German Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin: 
‘where danger grows, grows also saving power’. As we recall from 
the fragment on moods, the desolate experience of the exhaustion 
of our ‘epochal’ traditions is simultaneously the mark of a true 
beginning of our ‘word’. While the tragic logic of politics would 
focus on the dangers necessarily contained in every claim to ‘saving 
power’, Agamben rather affirms the saving power arising amidst the 
hyperbolically extreme danger. His reading of the Western political 
tradition explicitly asserts that Western politics is moving ‘from bad 
to worse’, producing at best a vacuous nihilism and at worst a geno-
cidal totalitarianism. And yet precisely the current exhaustion of this 
tradition, its self-destructive running on empty, opens a possibility of 
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a transformation so radical that it would leave this tradition behind, 
whereby the misfortunes and horrors of our tragic history are over-
come. This theoretical standpoint calls for a methodological focus on 
extreme situations and settings as sites, where a comic reversal of the 
abject condition of the ‘state of exception’ or the ‘ban’ into a state of 
‘happy life’ is most likely.
Secondly, this reversal itself does not take the form of a grand 
transformation of the ‘unhappy’ condition into a ‘happy’ one. 
Agamben frequently cites Benjamin’s claim in the essay on Kafka that 
the coming of the Messiah would not radically change the world by 
force but would ‘only make a slight adjustment within it’ (Benjamin 
1968: 134). This ‘slight adjustment’, after which ‘everything will be 
as it is now, just a little different’ (Agamben 1993a: 53), is best exem-
plified by a story presented by Benjamin in the same essay. 
[In] a Hasidic village Jews were sitting together in a shabby inn one 
Sabbath evening. They were all local people, with the exception of one 
person no one knew, a very poor ragged man. All sorts of things were 
discussed, and then it was suggested that everyone should tell what 
wish he would make if one were granted him. One man wanted money, 
another wished for a son-in-law, a third dreamed of a new carpenters’ 
bench. After they had finished, only the beggar in his dark corner was 
left. Reluctantly and hesitantly he answered the question: ‘I wish I were a 
powerful king reigning over a big country. Then, some night while I was 
asleep in my palace, an enemy would invade my country. Roused from 
my sleep, I wouldn’t have time even to dress and I would have to flee in 
my shirt. Rushing over hill and dale and through forests day and night, I 
would finally arrive safely right here at the bench in this corner. This is my 
wish.’ The others exchanged uncomprehending glances. ‘And what good 
would this wish have done you?’, someone asked. ‘I’d have a shirt’, was 
the answer. (Benjamin 1968: 134–5)
This parable is not merely comic in the conventional sense but illus-
trates the logic of comic reversal that we shall trace below in various 
domains of Agamben’s political thought. The ‘net result’ of the wish 
fulfilment is admittedly meagre, even though we need not underesti-
mate the importance, even a salvific one, of a shirt for the one lacking 
it: ‘Seek for food and clothing first, then the Kingdom of God shall be 
added unto you’ (Hegel cited in Benjamin 1968: 254; cf. Vatter 2008: 
63). Yet, despite ultimately returning to one’s place, the beggar argu-
ably travels quite a long way, assuming the sovereign power of a king 
and then losing the possibility of its exercise, ultimately ending up in 
the position of the opposite of the sovereign, with the consolation 
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prize of the shirt. What is formed in these travels is what Agamben 
terms a ‘zone of indistinction’ between sovereign and rabble, which 
for him is the mark of a truly messianic politics. The beggar does 
become king, yet while in the tragic logic his becoming king would 
come at the cost of transforming someone else into a beggar, thus 
perpetuating the tragic story of sovereign power, in the comic version 
the very logic of sovereignty is suspended so that all the sovereign 
gets for his troubles is the shirt, which levels his difference from the 
beggar. It is this transformation that constitutes the ‘messianic dis-
placement that integrally changes the world, leaving it at the same 
time almost intact’ (Agamben 2000: 79). While Agamben certainly 
differs from numerous representatives of the tragic logic in vesting 
his hope in such a messianic displacement, he also emphasises its 
minimal, almost imperceptible character.
Finally, we ought to emphasise that the relation between the comic 
and the tragic is not a binary opposition between two distinct states 
of affairs but rather between two perspectives on or attunements to 
the same situation. The comic mood is a modified way of dealing 
with the tragic that liberates us from its burden. The relation between 
the two moods is eloquently summed up in Agamben’s moving 
fragment on Elsa Morante, an Italian author and Agamben’s long-
time friend. Noting that Morante’s work is usually associated with 
the tragic tradition that has never been dominant in the Italian lit-
erature since Dante’s Divine Comedy, Agamben nonetheless defines 
her work as an ‘antitragic tragedy’, ‘as if inside tragedy there were 
another tragedy that resisted it’ (Agamben 1999a: 132). To illustrate 
this point Agamben uses the example of the children of limbo that is 
central to his own theorisation of political community that we shall 
address in Chapter 3.
[The] limbo is the place not of innocents but rather of those who have 
no other guilt than natural guilt, of those infants who could not have 
been submitted to the punishment of language. The baptism of the Verb 
cancels this natural guilt but it cancels it only through another, more 
atrocious punishment. But in Elsa it is as if, at a certain point, the crea-
ture from limbo lifted its fragile arm against the historical tragedy of a 
language in a hopeless gesture, in a silent confrontation whose outcome 
cannot easily be understood. (Ibid.: 132)
The liberation from natural guilt through baptism comes at the cost 
of one’s subjection to language, history and politics, one’s subsump-
tion under the historical apparatuses whose reproduction resigns one 
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to the perpetual replay of tragedy. Yet does not the resistance against 
this secondary punishment, which is indeed fragile, hopeless and dif-
ficult to understand, leave us in the tragic logic, which, after all, is 
based precisely on the idea of natural guilt? It is here that Agamben 
undertakes an intricate yet crucial reversal that points to a comic 
resolution of the ‘antitragic tragedy’. 
Since the children of limbo have no guilt other than the original 
sin, they cannot be consigned to hell and their only punishment is the 
‘perpetual lack of the vision of God’ (Agamben 1993a: 4). However, 
since these children were not baptised and therefore lack any super-
natural knowledge, implanted at baptism, they cannot suffer this 
lack, or even perceive it as such. Thus, Agamben argues, what was 
intended as privation turns into a natural joy for the inhabitants of 
limbo: 
Irremediably lost, they persist without pain in divine abandon. God has 
not forgotten them, but rather they have always already forgotten God, 
and in the face of their forgetfulness, God’s forgetting is impotent. Like 
letters with no addressee, these uprisen beings remain without a destina-
tion. Neither blessed like the elected, nor hopeless like the damned, they 
are infused with a joy with no outlet. (Ibid.: 5)
Thus, limbo, which at first appeared to be a tragic place, is trans-
formed into a site of the definitive taking leave of tragedy, whereby 
natural guilt is neutralised without being converted into personal 
guilt: 
These beings have left the world of guilt and justice behind them: the light 
that rains down on them is that irreparable light of the dawn following 
the novissima dies of judgment. But the life that begins on earth after the 
last day is simply human life. (Ibid.: 6)
It is this striking image of a simply human ‘happy life’ (2000: 114) 
that Agamben’s political thought affirms as an ever-present poten-
tiality of the human condition that survives the ‘last day’ of history 
and flourishes in its aftermath. Through a ‘fragile’, ‘hopeless’ and 
often barely understandable confrontation with the logic of tragedy 
at work in the Western political tradition, he seeks not to resolve the 
problems that have plagued political thought in its tragic mode but 
to leave these problems behind in a ‘tiny displacement’ that would 
integrally transform our condition. Let us recall that the distinction 
between comedy and tragedy is based on the difference with regard 
to the ending: while tragedy leads from a happy beginning to an 
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unhappy end, comedy begins with various misfortunes and ends 
in the restoration of happiness. The motto of comic politics is thus 
‘all’s well that ends well’: while the tragic logic knows the end to be 
unhappy and seeks to hold off its inevitable arrival, perpetuating our 
condition, the comic logic finds the possibility of happiness at the end 
and only at the end, and therefore welcomes and accelerates it, eager 
to start a new life after the last day.
It is this distance from the tragic logic of both classical and 
modern political thought that makes Agamben’s work simultane-
ously alluring and difficult, resulting in frequent misreadings or no 
less frequent ‘non-readings’, whereby Agamben is simply excluded 
from the purview of political philosophy. In contrast, this book will 
proceed on the assumption that Agamben’s comic overcoming of 
the Western political tradition is among the most provocative as 
well as most promising avenues in contemporary political thought 
and certainly deserves more than a cursory misreading or a curt 
dismissal. 
Of course, our initial formulation of the fundamental mood of 
Agamben’s political thought leaves more questions than it answers. 
Our presentation of the comic mood was largely based on concepts 
and examples from the domains that are quite distant from what we 
would conventionally characterise as the ‘political sphere’: Dante, 
Kafka, Bucephalus, Sancho Panza, limbo, and so on. Is this political 
thought or, more precisely, how is this thought political? How is it 
capable of intervening in the more conventionally defined political 
sphere and what effects does its intervention produce? In the follow-
ing chapters we shall consider precisely these questions. We shall 
begin by outlining a general logic of comic politics, which consists 
in rendering apparatuses of government inoperative, and elucidat-
ing the idea of inoperativity with a series of paradigms. We shall 
then trace the operation of this logic in the four key domains of 
Agamben’s work: language, statehood, history and life, demonstrat-
ing the persistence of the same logic in these different domains. 
Note
1. This dualism ipso facto excludes such intermediate forms as tragicom-
edy, which historically referred to a tragedy with a happy ending that 
usually combined the elevated pathos of tragedy with the lighter comic 
moments. Evidently, from a strictly dualistic perspective a tragedy with 
a happy ending is simply a comedy, insofar as its tragic tribulations find 
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a happy resolution in the end (just as a tragedy with lighter themes or 
moments is still a tragedy if its ending is unhappy). Given the importance 
of the theme of ending in Agamben’s work, we shall rely on this dualistic 
approach to interpret the mood of Agamben’s thought as comic, even 
though the conventional notion of tragicomedy might be more appropri-
ate to describe his works.
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Chapter 2 
The Sabbatical Animal:  
The Politics of Inoperativity 
In this chapter we shall elaborate the logic of Agamben’s comic 
politics. In contrast to tragedy, comedy affirms the possibility of hap-
piness, but only at the end. The figure of the ending, of coming or 
bringing to an end, is thus central to Agamben’s work yet acquires a 
very specific meaning in it. The ‘happy end’ of Agamben’s politics does 
not consist in the teleological fulfilment of a process or the destruc-
tion or elimination of an object but rather in becoming or rendering 
something inoperative, neutralising its force and making it avail-
able for free use. Inoperativity is the central concept of Agamben’s 
thought, marking the continuity of his philosophical project from the 
earliest work onwards. Drawing on Agamben’s reading of Aristotle, 
we shall reconstitute his original formulation of this problematic and 
its linkage with the Aristotelian concept of potentiality. We shall then 
elucidate the functioning of the logic of inoperativity by analysing a 
series of paradigmatic examples from diverse spheres: the glorious 
body in Christianity, the Sabbath in Judaism, the religious hymn, the 
empty throne, etc. We shall conclude with a discussion of arguably 
the most famous and extreme example of inoperativity in Agamben’s 
work, Melville’s Bartleby. 
The Worklessness of Man
While numerous passages on the coming politics and happy life in 
Agamben’s texts are frequently dismissed in the secondary literature 
as naive utopianism at odds with the clinical detachment of his criti-
cal analyses, this dismissal is due to the misunderstanding of the logic 
of comedy, for which happiness is possible but only at the end. This 
accounts for Agamben’s preoccupation with endings: suspension, 
deactivation, closure, halting are all privileged figures in Agamben’s 
work. In order to understand Agamben’s politics it is thus necessary 
to engage with the question of what the idea of the end means in 
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his work: is it a matter of fulfilment, negation, summation, elimina-
tion, interruption, etc? In this chapter we shall address this ques-
tion, focusing on the neologism central to Agamben’s work from his 
earliest writings onwards: inoperativity (inoperosita). For Agamben, 
the way to bring things to the end consists neither in the teleologi-
cal fulfilment of a process of development (the end as completion or 
accomplishment) nor in the merely negative act of the destruction 
or elimination of an object (the end as termination or cessation). 
Instead, it is the process of becoming or rendering something inop-
erative, deactivating its functioning in the apparatus and making it 
available for free use. Happy life is thus made possible by neutralis-
ing the multiple apparatuses of power to which we are subjected, 
including our own identities formed within them.
In our elucidation of the concept of inoperativity in this chapter 
we shall rely on Agamben’s own method, which he terms paradig-
matic. The notion of paradigm was introduced in Thomas Kuhn’s 
seminal Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970b), where it was 
used to distinguish ‘normal science’, characterised by the cumulative 
growth of knowledge, from ‘revolutionary science’, arising due to the 
growth of various anomalies to which no solution could be found 
by normal-scientific means. While normal science is characterised by 
the presence of what Kuhn termed a paradigm, within which science 
unfolds as a ‘puzzle-solving’ activity, in revolutionary periods the 
paradigm itself is put in question and challenged by alternatives. Yet 
what is this paradigm? The use of the term in Kuhn is ambiguous to 
say the least – according to Masterman (1970) the term is used in the 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions in twenty-one senses. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to group these many usages into two categories identi-
fied in Kuhn’s later work. On the one hand, the notion of paradigm 
refers to widely shared background assumptions, principles, methods 
or practices of a scientific community that Kuhn later proposed 
should be termed ‘disciplinary matrix’ (Kuhn 1970a). In this sense, 
we might speak of the ‘comic paradigm’ of Agamben’s thought as 
the fundamental mood at work in various domains of his thought 
or treat the concept of inoperativity as paradigmatic for Agamben’s 
political philosophy as such. On the other hand, Kuhn also used 
the notion of the paradigm in the more restricted sense of a single 
exemplar of a problem-solution (for example, a formula, a method, a 
model) that guides scientific research in the absence of explicit rules. 
In this latter sense, the concept of paradigm has an affinity with 
the Foucauldian concept of the apparatus, discussed in the previous 
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chapter. Such famous figures of Foucault’s studies as the panopticon 
or the confessional (1977, 1990a) are precisely singular examples 
that permit to grasp rationalities of power and forms of knowledge 
in the absence of explicit rules of their functioning. In his meth-
odological essay ‘What is a paradigm?’ Agamben undertakes an 
operation similar to his radical generalisation of the concept of the 
apparatus, tracing the genealogy of the term back from Foucault and 
Kuhn through Kant and Heidegger all the way to Plato and Aristotle 
(Agamben 2009b: 1–32). In Agamben’s definition, the paradigm is 
an example that illuminates the set to which it belongs, a ‘singular 
object that, standing equally for all others of the same class, defines 
the intelligibility of the group of which it is a part and which, at the 
same time it constitutes’ (ibid.: 17), Thus Foucault’s panopticon or 
Agamben’s own famous figures of the homo sacer and the Muselmann 
are concrete historical phenomena whose significance nonetheless 
goes beyond their immediate historical context or domain, since they 
also establish a ‘broader problematic context’ (ibid.: 17). 
Paradigms thus obey a complex logic: insofar as they illuminate 
something beyond themselves, their normal denotative use must be 
suspended in order to enable the constitution of a new ensemble. As 
opposed to induction (the move from particular to the universal) 
and deduction (the move from the universal to the particular), the 
paradigmatic method moves from one particular to another in the 
absence of a universal principle or a general rule, in the manner 
of Kant’s aesthetic judgment or the use of an example in grammar 
(ibid.: 21). For instance, the word ‘paradigm’ may itself be used 
paradigmatically as an example of an English noun, for which its 
own specific denotation must be suspended. And yet ‘it is precisely 
by virtue of this nonfunctioning and suspension that it can show how 
the syntagma [of other English nouns] works and can allow the rule 
to be stated’ (ibid.: 24). This is precisely the function of the numerous 
paradigmatic figures that we encounter in Agamben’s works – homo 
sacer, the Muselmann, the porn star, Bartleby, angels – are all used 
in the paradigmatic manner, making intelligible the wider ensemble 
from which they stand out due to the suspension of their own deno-
tation. While Agamben’s key concepts are often introduced in an 
elliptical, arcane or esoteric manner, their intelligibility is established 
through the proliferation of such examples. In this chapter we shall 
briefly introduce the theoretical concept of inoperativity and proceed 
to elaborate it through a consideration of a series of paradigmatic 
examples in Agamben’s works.
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The concept of inoperativity was derived by Agamben from 
Alexandre Kojève’s notion of désoeuvrement or ‘worklessness’, whose 
formulation in the context of the problematic of the end of history we 
shall address in Chapter 5. While Kojève’s work is arguably the most 
important reference for Agamben’s concept of inoperativity, he was 
undoubtedly also influenced by the use of the concept of désoeuvre-
ment in later French philosophy, most notably in Maurice Blanchot’s 
(1988) and Jean Luc Nancy’s (1991) reinterpretations of the idea 
of community. Another source of the concept may be found in the 
political praxis of the period, i.e. the Autonomist Marxist movements 
in Italy in the late 1970s, one of whose key ideas was ‘refusal of work’ 
(see Thoburn 2003: 103–38), which evidently did not refer to mere 
valorisation of idleness but rather sought to overcome the set of rela-
tions and identities formed around work in capitalist society.1
As Leland de la Durantaye suggested, inoperativity remains one 
of the most enigmatic and misunderstood concepts in Agamben’s 
entire oeuvre (2009: 18–20). Difficulties begin at the stage of 
translation. How should the Italian inoperosita be translated into 
English? In most translations of Agamben, the term is translated 
as ‘inoperativity’, even though some translators also opt for ‘inop-
erativeness’ (Agamben 1998: 62), ‘inactivity’ (2005a: 64) or ‘inop-
erability’ (2000: 141). While in this book we shall go along with 
the predominant translation, we must emphasise that in Agamben’s 
work this term is given an idiosyncratic technical sense, which may 
indeed make a loan word or a neologism like ‘inoperosity’ (Negri 
2012; Prozorov 2009a, 2009b, 2009d) more appropriate. While the 
standard use of ‘inoperativity’ in English denotes either the absence 
of action and failure to function (inoperative as out-of-order, defec-
tive, invalid, etc.) or the absence of utility (inoperative as useless, 
unworkable, out of service, etc.), Agamben applies the concept to 
refer to a specific kind of action that, moreover, does not minimise 
but rather augments the possibilities of use. As we shall demonstrate 
repeatedly throughout this chapter, to affirm inoperativity is not to 
affirm inertia, inactivity or apraxia, let alone dysfunctionality or 
destruction, but rather a form of praxis that is devoid of any telos 
or task, does not realise any essence and does not correspond to any 
nature. It is this form of praxis that for Agamben manifests the origi-
nary feature of the human condition: ‘Because human beings neither 
are nor have to be any essence, any nature, or any specific destiny, 
their condition is the most empty and the most insubstantial of all’ 
(Agamben 2000, 94–5). 
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Agamben’s thesis of the constitutive inoperativity of the human 
being is inspired by his reading of a passage from Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics (I, 7, 1097b22–1098a18). While for Aristotle 
human beings may have a task or a function that arises out of the 
particular activity in which they are engaged (as sculptors, flute 
players, shoemakers, etc.), it is difficult to conceive of a task that 
would apply to humans qua humans, leading to the question of 
whether man as such is not essentially ‘workless’, without any tasks 
to achieve. While this possibility was eventually dropped by Aristotle 
in favour of identifying ‘the work of man’ with life according to the 
logos, it continued to haunt the entire history of philosophy from 
Averroes through Dante to Hegel and Bataille (Agamben 2007c: 6–9; 
2005b: 99–104; 1998: 60–2). The problem of inoperativity reaches 
its most extreme manifestation with the (late-)modern condition that 
Agamben refers to as nihilism and dates back to World War I.
For Agamben, modern nihilism renders void all established values 
and discloses the absence of any historical tasks to which humanity 
must devote itself. While the originary inoperativity of the human 
being was for centuries veiled by religion or political ideology, the 
advent of nihilism entails its coming to the foreground of social life: 
[T]oday, it is clear for anyone who is not in absolutely bad faith that there 
are no longer historical tasks that can be taken on by, or even simply 
assigned to, men. It was in some ways evident starting with the end of the 
First World War that the European nation-states were no longer capable 
of taking on historical tasks and that peoples themselves were bound to 
disappear. (Agamben 2004b: 76) 
And yet, the apparatuses of states, nations and peoples have sur-
vived the nihilist disclosure and continue to exist in the present. In 
Agamben’s reading, they were only able to do so by positing life 
itself as the supreme task of the human being and reorienting gov-
ernment towards the protection, fostering and augmentation of life 
as such. While ‘traditional historical potentialities – poetry, religion, 
philosophy, which from both the Hegelo-Kojèvian and Heideggerian 
perspectives kept the historico-political destiny of peoples awake, 
have long since transformed into cultural spectacles and private 
experiences’, ‘the only task that still seems to retain some serious-
ness is the assumption of the burden of biological life, that is, of 
the very animality of man’ (ibid.: 76–7). This is the phenomenon of 
modern biopolitics, which is central to Agamben’s diagnosis of our 
tragic political predicament and which we shall analyse in detail in 
PROZOROV 9780748676200 PRINT.indd   34 04/12/2013   15:07
35
the sabbatical animal: the politics of inoperativity 
Chapter 4. The apparatuses of government take life as their object 
not merely in order to colonise and control it, but primarily because 
in the condition of nihilism they have no other object and are at the 
risk of unravelling due to the expiry of all positive historical projects. 
In contrast to this setting of life itself to work, Agamben’s politico-
philosophical project advances a radical affirmation of the inopera-
tivity of the human being as the pathway to a new politics that leaves 
the exhausted apparatuses behind: 
[Politics] is that which corresponds to the essential inoperability of 
humankind, to the radical being-without-work of human communities. 
There is politics because human beings are argos-beings that cannot be 
defined by any proper operation, that is, beings of pure potentiality that 
no identity or vocation can possibly exhaust. Politics might be nothing 
other than the exposition of humankind’s absence of work as well as 
the exposition of humankind’s creative semi-indifference to any task, 
and might only in this sense remain integrally assigned to happiness. 
(Agamben 2000: 141–2) 
In its abandonment of all tasks, the idea of inoperativity goes beyond 
the ethico-political models that supplant the external imposition 
of the ‘work of man’ with freely chosen forms of self-fashioning, 
most notably the ‘work on the self’ that is the centrepiece of a 
Foucauldian reconstruction of ethics as an aesthetics of existence. 
The Foucauldian ethics certainly does away with any external task 
to which human activity is subjected, but retains the overall work-
oriented and teleological vision of human praxis – it is important 
to recall that one of four dimensions of a Foucauldian ethics is pre-
cisely telos (Foucault 1990b: 25–32). In contrast, what is at stake in 
Agamben’s idea of inoperativity is dispensing with the work-oriented 
vision of human existence as such.2 Yet, as we shall see in the follow-
ing section, the absence of tasks or work proper to the human being 
is not understood as a privation but, on the contrary, is conceived as 
the precondition for any meaningful freedom.
Inoperative Potentiality
At this point we must introduce the concept that is closely inter-
twined with the idea of inoperativity, i.e. potentiality. Similarly to 
the former, Agamben develops this concept through an engagement 
with Aristotle, specifically with his account of potentiality in De 
Anima and Metaphysics. For Aristotle, something is potential not 
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simply because it is capable of being, but, more importantly, because 
it has the capacity not to be (see Agamben 1993a: 35–8; 1998: 45–7; 
1999b: 249–50). In contrast to the ‘material’ or ‘possible’ potential-
ity of, for example, a child who cannot write but may potentially 
become a poet, ‘perfect potentiality’ is only accessible through the 
image of a poet who already can write poetry but does not do so 
(Agamben 1999b: 247). To be worthy of the name, potentiality must 
retain its potential for being ‘impotential’, for not passing into actu-
ality. Thus, potentiality necessarily ‘maintains itself in relation to its 
own privation, its own steresis, its own non-Being’ (ibid.: 182). Yet 
it is evidently not equivalent to non-Being as such, but rather con-
sists in the paradoxical ‘existence of non-Being, the presence of an 
absence’ (ibid.: 179). While this understanding of potentiality might 
at first glance appear esoteric, it is precisely this potential ‘not to’ that 
is constitutive of human existence as such:
[Beings] that exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of their own 
impotentiality; and only in this way do they become potential. They can 
be because they are in relation to their own non-Being. Human beings, 
insofar as they know and produce, are those beings whom more than 
any other, exist in the mode of potentiality. This is the origin of human 
power, which is so violent and limitless in relation to other living beings. 
Other living beings are capable only of their specific potentiality: they can 
only do this or that. But human beings are the animals that are capable of 
their own impotentiality. (Ibid.: 182)
In this statement, Agamben relies on the understanding of the 
human condition characteristic of the philosophical anthropology 
of the 1920s, represented by such authors as Max Scheler, Helmuth 
Plessner and Arnold Gehlen, and highly influential for such philoso-
phers as Heidegger. This strand of thought, which, as we shall see 
in Chapter 6, Agamben gradually distanced himself from, interprets 
the uniqueness of the human condition not in terms of any posi-
tive principle (rationality, conscience, language, etc.) but rather in 
terms of its radical openness and indeterminacy, the separation from 
one’s immediate environment, the ‘neotenic’ incompleteness and 
absence of specialisation. In contrast to animals whose potentiality is 
restricted to the specific possibilities prescribed by their genetic code, 
human being are constitutively lacking in such prescriptions, retain-
ing throughout their lives the possibility of being otherwise than they 
are. Thus, human potentiality is never exhausted in actuality but 
rather ‘passes fully into it [and] preserves itself as such in actuality’ 
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(ibid.: 183). For Agamben, it is precisely this actual existence of the 
possible that defines human freedom:
Here it is possible to see how the root of freedom is to be found in the 
abyss of potentiality. To be free is not simply to have the power to do this 
or other thing, nor is it simply to have the power to refuse to do this or 
other thing. To be free is to be capable of one’s own impotentiality, to 
be in relation to one’s own privation. This is why freedom is freedom for 
both good and evil. (Ibid.: 182–3)
From this perspective, the assessment of the degree of freedom in any 
given society can never be content with assessing potentialities to do 
something, offered to its citizens, but must also take into account the 
potentialities ‘not to’ that remain available to them. For Agamben 
the difference between classical authoritarian systems and contempo-
rary capitalist democracies consists in the fact that the former tended 
to target one’s ‘positive’ potentiality, impeding beings from doing 
what they can (speak freely, protest, associate, revolt, and so on), 
while the latter operate much more insidiously by separating beings 
from their potentiality not to do something. ‘Those who are sepa-
rated from what they can do can, however, still resist; they can still 
not do. Those who are separated from their own impotentiality lose, 
on the other hand, first of all the capacity to resist’ (Agamben 2010: 
44). While prohibition to do something leaves open the possibility 
of transgression, the negation of potentiality ‘not to’ makes freedom 
meaningless, even though it tends to act precisely in the name of its 
augmentation. The perception that everything is possible – that I can 
do this and that – merely conceals one’s subjection to the apparatuses 
that feed on that very potentiality in setting human beings to work 
in actuality: 
The idea that anyone can do or be anything – the suspicion that not only 
could the doctor who examines me today be a video artist tomorrow but 
that even the executioner who kills me is actually, as in Kafka’s Trial, also 
a singer – is nothing but the reflection of the awareness that everyone is 
simply bending him- or her self according to the flexibility that is today 
the primary quality that the market demands from each person. (Ibid.: 
44–5) 
In contrast to this augmentation of possibilities in the name of flex-
ible adaptation to what is, Agamben’s politics of inoperativity seeks 
to restore and radicalise freedom by suspending the operation of the 
apparatuses, thus making room for the potential through opening 
existing realities to new forms of use. By rendering the apparatuses 
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inoperative or, which often amounts to the same thing, by becoming 
inoperative within them, one reclaims one’s potentiality ‘not to’ and 
hence enhances one’s freedom. Thus, potentiality and inoperativity 
are quite simply two sides of the same coin of freedom: to be able 
to do something is not to have to do something (anything) else. ‘The 
only coherent way to understand inoperativeness is to think of it as 
a generic mode of potentiality that is not exhausted in a transitus de 
potentia ad actum’ (Agamben 1998: 62). The inoperative is neither 
the inactive nor the useless but rather consists in the activity that 
restores potentiality to beings and things, making them usable in new 
ways.
Glory
Let us now elaborate this idea of inoperative potentiality through 
a series of examples from various thematic fields of Agamben’s 
work. Indeed, such examples may easily be found in every field that 
Agamben has investigated since the 1970s, making inoperativity the 
central concept that endows Agamben’s work with strong coherence 
despite the dazzling diversity of his concerns. Whether it is a matter 
of investigating the theme of courtly love in the Provencal poetry of 
the twelfth century (Agamben 1993b: 129–31) or the most recent 
biometric technologies (2010: 52–4), the spectre (2010: 37–42) or 
the tick (2004b: 45–8), Kafka’s Joseph K (2010: 20–31) or Orson 
Welles’ Don Quixote (2007b, 93–4), it is always a matter of accentu-
ating the originary status of inoperativity and potentiality and their 
relation to the positive apparatuses that govern our existence. 
Perhaps the most striking example of inoperativity in Agamben’s 
work comes from the sphere of theology and pertains to the idea 
of the ‘glorious body’ after the resurrection. The question that 
preoccupied medieval theologians, including Aquinas, concerned 
the appearance of this glorious body and specifically its organs of 
vegetation and procreation that have no reason for existence after 
the resurrection, such as the stomach, intestines, penis, vagina, and 
so on (2010: 97–103). At first glance, the organs in question would 
appear to be patently useless if the functions that they served were no 
longer practicable in the new condition. Yet their remaining present 
despite becoming useless would contradict the understanding of the 
glorious body as ‘perfect nature’, in which nothing can exist in vain. 
The intricate solution was to divorce the existence of the organs from 
their function: 
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[The] organ or instrument that was separated from its operation and 
remains in a state of suspension, acquires, precisely for this reason, an 
ostensive function; it exhibits the virtue corresponding to the suspended 
operation. Just as in advertisements or pornography, where the simulacra 
of merchandise or bodies exalt their appeal precisely to the extent that 
they cannot be used but only exhibited, so in the resurrection the idle 
sexual organs will display the potentiality or the virtue of procreation. 
The glorious body is an ostensive body whose functions are not executed 
but rather displayed. Glory, in this sense, is in solidarity with inoperativ-
ity. (Ibid.: 98)
Thus the post-resurrection body is inoperative in the sense of the sus-
pension of its functions except the ostensive one. Yet to what extent 
does it also become potential, open to new forms of use? It is here 
that Agamben introduces the idea of glory as the device to limit the 
potentiality of the inoperative by restricting its use to pure exhibi-
tion: ‘The eternally inoperative organs in the bodies of the blessed do 
not represent another use for those organs. There is perhaps nothing 
more enigmatic than a glorious penis, nothing more spectral than a 
purely doxological vagina’ (ibid.: 99). 
This argument parallels Heidegger’s famous distinction between 
the two modes of being: being-ready-to-hand (Zuhandensein), which 
characterises tools or equipment available for use in accordance with 
their function, and being-present-at-hand (Vorhandensein), which 
characterises the same tools when they are broken, lost or otherwise 
unusable, when their presence becomes conspicuous, obtrusive and 
obstinate (Heidegger 1962: 102–7; see also Harman 2002). While 
in the former mode tools are operative in accordance with their pre-
scribed function, in the latter they are inoperative without thereby 
becoming available for any new use; they are conspicuously there 
without being of any use to us. While for Heidegger this mode of 
being characterises beings and things as they become the objects of 
scientific investigation, abstracted and alienated from the world, for 
Agamben this useless inoperativity characterises beings and things 
that are captured and confined within a certain apparatus, where 
either they are removed from use or this use is restricted and regu-
lated. What remains is only the ostensive function fortified by the 
idea of glory. It is precisely glory that immobilises potentiality by 
isolating inoperativity in a special ‘sacred’ sphere where it can be 
marvelled at but never used: 
the sexual organs and the intestines of the blessed are only the hieroglyphs 
or the arabesques that divine glory inscribes onto its own coat of arms. 
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The earthly liturgy, like the celestial one, does nothing other than inces-
santly capture inoperativity and displace it into the sphere of worship. 
(Agamben 2010: 100)
What would be the alternative to this capture? How can one use the 
present-at-hand? With reference to Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s observa-
tions of Neapolitans in the 1920s, Agamben argues for the possibil-
ity for inoperativity to become an ‘opening, the “open-sesame” that 
leads to a new possible use’ (ibid.):
According to Sohn-Rethel, a Neapolitan only begins to really use techni-
cal objects at the moment when they no longer function. An intact thing 
that functions well on its own irritates Neapolitans, so they usually avoid 
it. And yet, by shoving a piece of wood in the right spot, or by making 
a slight adjustment with a smack of the hand at the right moment, 
Neapolitans manage to make their apparatuses work according to their 
desires. (Ibid.: 99)
Thus, rather than subject the inoperative object to the separation 
into a privileged sphere of pure manifestation, this object must be 
explored with regard to the new potentialities that the suspension of 
its canonical functions may open up:
A new use of the body is possible only if it wrests the inoperative function 
from its separation, only if it succeeds in bringing together within a single 
place and in a single gesture both exercise and inoperativity, economic 
body and glorious body, function and its suspension. Inoperativity is not 
inert; on the contrary, it allows the very potentiality that has manifested 
itself in the act to appear. It is not potentiality that is deactivated in inop-
erativity but only the aims and modalities into which its exercise has been 
inscribed and separated. And it is this potentiality that can now become 
the organs of a new possible use. (Ibid.: 102)
What sort of new use may the body be subjected to? Agamben’s exam-
ples of such use include ‘amorous desire and so-called  perversion’, 
‘which use the organs of the nutritive and reproductive functions and 
turn them – in the very act of using them – away from their physi-
ological meaning, towards a new and more human operation’ (ibid.: 
102). Perversion and fetishism as one of its forms are characterised 
by the logic diametrically opposed to that of glorious ostentation: 
whereas in the former case an object acquires glory at the cost of 
losing all its potentiality, in the latter case potentiality is augmented 
through sacrificing all the insignia of glory (or, perhaps, attaining 
real glory for the first time):
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The naked, simple human body is not displaced here into a higher and 
nobler reality: instead, liberated from the witchcraft that once separated 
it from itself, it is as if this body were now able to gain access to its own 
truth for the first time. In this way the mouth truly becomes a mouth only 
if it is about to be kissed, the most intimate and private parts become a 
place for shared use and pleasure, habitual gestures become the illegible 
writing, whose hidden meaning the dancer deciphers for all. The glorious 
body is not some other body, more agile and beautiful, more luminous 
and spiritual; it is the body itself, at the moment when inoperativity 
removes the spell from it and opens it up to a new possible common use. 
(Ibid.: 102–3).3
Let us briefly consider other examples in order to illuminate the 
relation between inoperativity, potentiality and glory. While any 
holiday exemplifies inoperativity in the sense of the suspension of 
work, a particularly good example would be the Sabbath, insofar as 
this holiday celebrates not the activity of divine creation but rather 
its cessation, whereby ‘on the seventh day God abstained from all 
work’. It is to sanctify this divine inoperativity that the observing 
Jews abstain from numerous activities on the Sabbath yet, crucially, 
do not become completely inactive (see Agamben 2011: 239–41). 
The activities proscribed during the Sabbath are those directed 
towards production, construction or some positive function. In 
contrast, festive behaviours, including the consumption of meals, 
are permitted and encouraged. Yet, what makes the behaviours in 
question festive is precisely the suspension or neutralisation of any 
relationship to positive productivity: 
what is done becomes undone, rendered inoperative, liberated and sus-
pended from its ‘economy’, from the reasons and aims that define it 
during the weekdays. If one eats, it is not done for the sake of being fed; 
if one gets dressed, it is not done for the sake of being covered up; if one 
walks, it is not done for the sake of going someplace; if one speaks, it is 
not done for the sake of communicating information. (Agamben 2010: 
111) 
We thus arrive at the formula of inoperative praxis as any action 
liberated from its ‘proper’ or canonical function or telos. 
And yet, similarly to the isolation of the ‘glorious body’ into the 
separate sphere of worship, the celebration may be easily separated 
into a privileged sphere of solemn ritual or liturgy that neutralises 
the possibilities of use that its inoperative character enables. This 
‘recodification’ of inoperativity (ibid.: 112) in terms of glory is well 
illustrated by various secular and religious rituals of acclamation 
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that Agamben analyses in his The Kingdom and the Glory (2011) 
and Highest Poverty (2013). These liturgical rituals, whose model 
is the hymn, are usually devoid of positive signified content other 
than the praise they confer. In this suspension of the signifying or 
communicative function, the hymn serves as a special case of the 
more general phenomenon of poetry, which Agamben approaches as 
‘a linguistic operation that renders language inoperative’ (Agamben 
2011: 250). Poetry takes place when language deactivates its com-
municative function and, as it were, ‘rests within itself, contemplat-
ing its own power of speaking’ (ibid.: 251). The example of the 
poem demonstrates once again that inoperativity is not equivalent to 
inactivity: the poetic use of language evidently involves much more 
‘work’ than our everyday use of language. What is rendered inopera-
tive in poetry is not speaking but its specific function and contents, 
whose suspension amplifies the potentiality for the use of language 
in non-canonical ways. However, specific forms of poetry, such as 
the religious hymn, capture and confine this excess of potentiality in 
the determinate form of the glorification of the divinity (or secular 
authority), where inoperative language is not open to new use but 
solely exhibits its own presence-at-hand:
At the point where it perfectly coincides with glory, praise is without 
content; it culminates in the amen that says nothing but merely assents 
to and concludes what has already been said. [This] turning in the void 
of language is the supreme form of glorification. The hymn is the radical 
deactivation of signifying language, the word rendered completely inoper-
ative and, nevertheless, retained as such in the form of liturgy. (Ibid.: 237)
Play and Profanation
While Agamben only began to theorise inoperativity explicitly in the 
1990s, the logic designated by this concept was central to his earliest 
books of the late 1970s, such as Stanzas and Infancy and History, 
where the relation between inoperativity and glory is addressed 
in terms of the opposition between ritual and play. Drawing on 
the work of Benveniste and Levi-Strauss, Agamben distinguishes 
between ritual, which fixes and structures the chronological time of 
the calendar through its orderly recurrence, and play, which changes 
and destroys it (Agamben 2007a: 77). In contrast to a sacred cer-
emony, which combines the form of the ritual with mythical content, 
play is constituted by the disjunction between the two, transmitting 
either the pure form of the ritual (as a ‘game’) or the mere content 
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of the myth (as ‘word play’). ‘The power of the sacred act lies in the 
conjunction of the myth that tells the story and the rite that repro-
duces and stages it. Play breaks up this unity’ (2007b: 75). In this 
manner, the sphere of play is presented by Agamben as ‘the topsy-
turvy image of the sacred’ (2007a: 77), which ‘frees and distracts 
humanity from the sphere of the sacred without simply abolishing it’ 
(2007b: 76). As we have argued with regard to inoperative praxis, 
play is evidently still a matter of activity and use, yet of a different, 
non-canonical and non-utilitarian one. ‘Children, who play with 
whatever old thing that falls into their hands, make toys out of things 
that belong to the spheres of economics, war, laws and other activi-
ties that we are used to thinking of as serious’ (ibid.: 76) Agamben 
explicitly links this playful mode of use to Benjamin’s interpreta-
tion of Kafka’s Bucephalus the New Attorney, where, as we recall, 
the law that was studied but not practised was the ‘gate to justice’. 
Similarly, ‘the powers of economics, law and politics, deactivated in 
play, can become the gateways to a new happiness’ (ibid.; see also 
Lewis 2013).
Thus, for all its diversion from canonical functions, for Agamben 
play is a very serious matter indeed, functioning as the method of 
arriving at the comic ‘happy ending’. This is even more so given the 
fact that in contemporary societies ‘play is in decline everywhere’ 
(ibid.). While this statement might appear counter-intuitive, given 
the permanent proliferation of television game shows, computer 
and mobile phone games and the generally ‘playful’ turn in social 
communication, Agamben argues that what is often at stake in this 
proliferation is the very opposite of the inoperative intention of play: 
At parties, in dances and at play, [man] desperately and stubbornly seeks 
exactly the opposite of what he could find there: the possibility of reenter-
ing the lost feast, returning to the sacred and its rites, even in the form of 
the inane ceremonies of the new spectacular religion or a tango lesson in 
a provincial dance hall. (Ibid.: 77) 
Just as ritual can be rendered inoperative through play, various 
conventional forms of play can be transformed into joyless rituals 
that function as new forms of liturgy, secular, to be sure, but, in 
Agamben’s terminology, not at all profane.
The difference between the secular and the profane is crucial for 
Agamben’s return to the theme of play in his later work on profana-
tion. Agamben defines profanation as the overcoming of the separa-
tion of an object into a separate, ‘sacred’ sphere that opens it to free 
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use in a myriad of non-canonical ways, augmenting its potentiality 
for use by rendering its prescribed functions inoperative (ibid.: 73–4). 
In this sense, profanation is constitutively opposed to religion and, 
more generally and originally, glory, which ‘removes things, places, 
animals or people from common use and transfers them to a separate 
sphere’ (ibid.: 74). Yet profanation should also be distinguished from 
secularisation, which ‘leaves intact the forces it deals with by simply 
moving them from one place to another’ (ibid.: 77). Whereas secular-
isation relocates the sacred object from one domain to another while 
retaining the principle of its separation from free use, profanation 
dislocates the line that separates the object from the possibility of free 
use. ‘Both are political operations: the first guarantees the exercise of 
power by carrying it back to a sacred model; the second deactivates 
the apparatuses of power and return to common use the spaces that 
power had seized’ (ibid.).
In other words, secularisation maintains the logic of glory that 
contains the inoperativity of beings in a separate sphere but transfers 
this sphere from the divine to the earthly. It is therefore anti-religious 
in its content but not in its form, while profanation targets precisely 
the separating form of religion without necessarily being hostile to 
its content: 
Religio is not what unites men and gods but what ensures they remain 
distinct. It is not disbelief and indifference towards the divine that stand 
in opposition to religion, but negligence, that is, a behaviour that is free 
and ‘distracted’ before things and their use, before forms of separation 
and their meaning. (Ibid.: 75) 
Yet, as the examples of children, fetishists and perverts demonstrate, 
the negligence or distraction concerns not the profaned object itself, 
but rather the conditions defining its use, the conditions that must 
be rendered inoperative to enhance the potentiality of the unconven-
tional use of the object, whereby it becomes what Agamben terms a 
‘pure means’, ‘a praxis that, while firmly maintaining its nature as 
a means, is emancipated from its relationship to an end: it has joy-
ously forgotten its goal and can now show itself as such, as a means 
without an end’ (ibid.: 86).
The contrast between religion and profanation leads Agamben 
to the elaboration of Benjamin’s famous account of capitalism as a 
religion. In Agamben’s reading, capitalism is characterised by a para-
doxical coincidence of absolute profanation and absolute consecra-
tion. The familiar process of ‘all that is solid melting into air’, of the 
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liquidation of traditions, identities and forms of life under the aegis 
of the absolutisation of exchange value evidently marks the moment 
of a thoroughgoing profanation of all things sacred, whereby objects, 
phenomena or practices become pure means. Yet this profanation 
is immediately recuperated by the re-sacralisation of every object 
in the form of the commodity (see Agamben 1993b: 31–62; 2000: 
75–6). The commodity, relegated to the separate sphere of consump-
tion, is withdrawn from the potentiality of free use, since in order to 
be consumed it must first be possessed as property. In contrast, for 
Agamben ‘use is always a relationship with some thing that cannot 
be appropriated; it refers to things insofar as they cannot become 
objects of possession’ (Agamben 2007b: 83). Thus capitalism conse-
crates the objects that it has itself profaned in the form of commodi-
ties, whose use value and even exchange value have been eclipsed by 
the ‘exhibition value’ with which they are endowed in the appara-
tuses of advertising (Benjamin 1968: 225; Agamben 2007b: 90):
If the apparatuses of the capitalist cult are so effective, it is not so much 
because they act on primary behaviours but because they act on pure 
means, that is, on behaviours that have been separated from themselves 
and thus detached from any relationship to an end. In its extreme phase, 
capitalism is nothing but a gigantic apparatus for capturing pure means, 
that is, profanatory behaviours. Pure means, which represent the deacti-
vation and rupture of all separation, are in turn separated into a special 
sphere. (Agamben 2007b: 87–8) 
In this manner, capitalism does not simply profane the sacred or 
sacralise the profane but rather sacralises its own profanation, thereby 
fortifying the reign of modern nihilism, in which the  dissolution of 
traditional forms of life does not lead to creative experimentation 
with their residue but rather leaves humanity suspended in the sheer 
negativity it exposed: ‘The pure means, suspended and exhibited in 
the sphere of the media, shows its own emptiness, speaks only its 
own nothingness, as if no new use were possible’ (ibid.: 87–8). 
This nullification of profanatory potential is exemplified most 
starkly by the apparatus of pornography. In his brief history of 
the pornographic genre Agamben notes the tendency towards the 
transformation of the sexual acts of the models into pure means or 
‘gestures’ that no longer communicate any determinate content. As 
the models in pornographic images increasingly demonstrate to the 
spectator their awareness of his or her gaze, their own expressions 
become brazenly indifferent, ‘showing nothing but the showing 
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itself (that is, one’s absolute mediality)’ (ibid.: 90). It is precisely this 
profane mediality that is recuperated by the apparatus of pornogra-
phy in a representation that may be consumed in masturbatory activ-
ity but never brought to use as such (see Prozorov 2011):
What it captures is the human capacity to let erotic behaviours idle, to 
profane them, by detaching them from their immediate ends. But while 
these behaviours thus open themselves to a different possible use, which 
concerns not so much the pleasure of the partner as a new collective use 
of sexuality, pornography intervenes at this point to block and divert the 
profanatory intention. The solitary and desperate consumption of the 
pornographic image thus replaces the promise of a new use. (Ibid.: 91)
Thus, from the bodies of the resurrected to the feasts of the faithful, 
from church liturgy to the pornographic film, we observe the same 
logic: any object or practice may be rendered inoperative through 
the suspension of its canonical function, yet this inoperativity either 
becomes a gateway to a new use or is confined in a separate sphere, 
exposed and glorified in its sheer presence without the possibility of 
use.4 The strategies of play and profanation that seek to enhance the 
potentiality for use are thus opposed by the strategies of ritualisation 
and glory that neutralise this potentiality by making the inoperative 
sacred. 
The Empty Throne
What is it that makes inoperativity sacred, or, more correctly, what 
is it about the inoperative that leads to its separation into a sacred 
sphere? In his The Kingdom and the Glory Agamben demonstrates 
that in both Judaism and Christianity inoperativity is the attribute 
of none other than God himself, both before creation and after the 
work of creation is done. As our example of the Sabbath shows, ‘it 
is not the work of creation that is considered sacred, but the day on 
which all work ceases. Thus, inoperativity is the name of what is 
most proper to God’ (Agamben 2011: 239). Secondly, as we have 
seen in the example of the glorious body, inoperativity is extended 
to the mode of being of the blessed after the Resurrection, in which 
all activity is ceased. ‘It is what remains after the machine of divine 
oikonomia has reached its completion and the hierarchy of angel 
ministries has become completely inoperative. Paradise not only 
knows no government but also no writing, reading, no theology and 
even no liturgical celebration’ (ibid.: 239). What takes the place of 
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all of the above is glory, ‘the eternal amen in which all works and all 
divine and human words are resolved’ (ibid.: 239).
Thus, what glory simultaneously acclaims and conceals is the 
fact that ‘[at] the beginning and the end of the highest power there 
stands a figure not of action and government but of inoperativity’ 
(ibid.: 242). Moreover, on the basis of his systematic exploration of 
the analogies between divine and earthly government (the method 
that Carl Schmitt (1985a) famously termed ‘political theology’), 
Agamben demonstrates the presence of the very same inoperativity 
at the heart of earthly sovereignty. 
[Glory], both in theology and in politics, is precisely what takes the place 
of that unthinkable emptiness. And yet, precisely this unsayable vacuity 
is what nourishes and feeds power. That means that the centre of the 
governmental apparatus is, in reality, empty and, nevertheless, this inop-
erativity is so essential for the machine that it must at all costs be adopted 
and maintained at its centre in the form of glory. (Agamben 2011: 242) 
This brings us to yet another striking example of inoperativity, 
alongside the resurrected body or the brazen face of the porn star: the 
empty throne, whose adoration has ancient roots going back to the 
Upanishads. In both secular and religious usage the empty throne is 
a prime symbol of power in its own right, not as a seat occupied by 
the sovereign (see Kishik 2012: 23–4). Indeed, in its very inoperativ-
ity the throne precedes the very existence of the sovereign and will 
persist after its demise: 
The throne is a symbol not of regality but of glory. Glory precedes the 
creation of the world and survives its end. The throne is empty, because 
[glory] is in its innermost self-inoperativity and sabbatism. The void is the 
sovereign figure of glory. (Agamben 2011: 245) 
Similarly to the above-discussed figures of the glorious body, the 
religious hymn and the pornographic image, the figure of the empty 
throne captures the inoperativity that characterises the human con-
dition as such in the separate sphere of sovereign power, which, 
ironically, ensures that human beings are, at every moment of their 
existence, at work:
Human life is inoperative and without purpose, but precisely this argia 
and this absence of aim make the incomparable operativity of the human 
species possible. Man has dedicated himself to production and labor, 
because in his essence he is completely devoid of work, because he is the 
Sabbatical animal par excellence. (Ibid.: 245–6) 
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As long as the inoperativity of the human being is isolated and 
restricted to that which is not (or not merely) human, be it God or 
the sovereign, it is possible to subject human beings to various appa-
ratuses that mobilise their existence for various historical tasks.
The governmental apparatus functions because it has captured in its 
empty centre the inoperativity of the human essence. This inoperativity is 
the political substance of the Occident, the glorious nutrient of all power. 
For this reason festival and idleness return ceaselessly in the dreams and 
political utopias of the Occident and are equally incessantly shipwrecked 
there. They are the enigmatic relics that the economic-theological 
machine abandons on the water’s edge of civilization and that each time 
men question anew, nostalgically and in vain. Nostalgically because they 
appear to contain something that belongs to the human essence, but in 
vain because really they are nothing but the waste products of the imma-
terial and glorious fuel burnt by the motor of the machine as it turns and 
that cannot be stopped. (Ibid.: 246)
At first glance, in modern societies the apparatus of glory has been in 
decline since the demise of absolute monarchies, albeit with a notable 
revival during the 1930s in totalitarian regimes. And yet Agamben 
argues that practices of glorification and acclamation survive in con-
temporary democracies in new forms: referendum, public opinion or, 
to recall Guy Debord’s (1994) work that was a major influence on 
Agamben’s thought, the ‘society of the spectacle’, in which commodi-
ties assume the mediatic form of an image. 
What was confined to the spheres of liturgy and ceremonials has become 
concentrated in the media and, at the same time, through them it spreads 
and penetrates at each moment into every area of society, both public and 
private. Contemporary democracy is a democracy that is entirely founded 
upon glory, that is, on the efficacy of acclamation, multiplied and dissemi-
nated by the media beyond all imagination. (Agamben 2011: 256) 
Irrespectively of whether the logic of acclamation at work is 
 ‘conservative’ in its presupposition of the substantial unity of the 
acclaiming ‘people’ or ‘liberal’ in the dissolution of the people in 
social communication, we observe the same principle of government 
by acclamation or consent, which establishes states of consensus that 
reproduce our subjection to the apparatuses of government. The 
question that defines Agamben’s politics is whether it might be pos-
sible to stop this machine and affirm the inoperativity of the human 
condition outside the apparatuses of glory that isolate it in the 
spheres of religion or sovereignty, nationalism or public opinion, etc. 
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While examples of a captured, confined and glorified inoperativity, 
separated from every possibility of use, are indeed abundant in both 
historical and contemporary politics and religion, it is rather more 
difficult to conceive of concrete exemplars of inoperativity that is not 
restricted to a particular sphere but rather generalised throughout 
the social realm. It is as if the inoperative could only attain posi-
tive appearance by being subjected to yet another operation, that of 
manifestation, acclamation or glorification. How can we envision 
a pure means that is not immediately sacralised, a non-signifying 
speech that does not glorify, an emptiness that is not represented 
by the throne? While we shall analyse Agamben’s response to this 
question in various domains of his thought in the remainder of the 
book, at this point it would be helpful to complement the sweeping 
genealogical and political-theological arguments with a discussion of 
a concrete subject of inoperative praxis, a literary figure that embod-
ies the fundamental orientation of Agamben’s political thought.
Bartleby
Having analysed a series of examples of inoperativity in Agamben’s 
work, let us conclude this chapter by addressing what is arguably the 
most well-known and controversial paradigm of inoperative praxis 
in his entire textual corpus, the protagonist of Hermann Melville’s 
(1986) novella Bartleby the Scrivener. Bartleby has become a privi-
leged figure in contemporary continental philosophy as an object of 
commentaries by, among others, Deleuze (1997), Derrida (1995), 
Hardt and Negri (2000) and Žižek (2006) (see Deines 2006). While 
all these authors found something to affirm in this intriguing charac-
ter, Agamben arguably transformed him into an emblem of his entire 
philosophy.
Bartleby, a scribe at a Wall Street legal office, abruptly begins to 
refuse the requests and demands of his superior with a blank formula 
‘I would prefer not to’, forgoing any explanation of this refusal. The 
preference ‘not to’ gradually spreads from secondary tasks to his 
main work of copying, ultimately extending to his refusal to leave 
the premises of his office after being fired and his refusal to eat in the 
prison where he ends up for vagrancy. Bartleby’s preference ‘not to’ 
is striking in its absolute passivity: his refusal of the authority of his 
superior or the police is not accompanied by any attempt to assert 
some alternative preference, to resist or to escape his confinement, in 
which he eventually perishes. Bartleby does not refuse something in 
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favour of something else but rather affirms a simple absence of pref-
erence as such. His refusal is thus a refusal of nothing in particular or 
perhaps a refusal of all things particular. In Gilles Deleuze’s reading, 
Bartleby is 
the man without references, without possessions, without properties, 
without qualities, without particularities: he is too smooth for anyone 
to be able to hang any particularity on him. Without past or future, he 
is instantaneous. I PREFER NOT TO is Bartleby’s chemical or alchemi-
cal formula, but one can read inversely I AM NOT PARTICULAR as 
its indispensable component. (Deleuze 1997: 74; see also Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988: 369–73)
Defined neither by any particularity nor any ‘insipid generality’ 
(Agamben 1993a: 2), Bartleby is what Deleuze terms an ‘original’, 
a singular being that simultaneously affirms the possibility of a new 
kind of universality: 
To give birth to the new man or the man without particularities, to 
reunite the original and humanity by constituting a society of brothers 
as a new universality. If man is the brother of his fellow man, it is not 
because he belongs to a nation or because he is proprietor or shareholder, 
but only insofar as he is Man, when he has no consciousness of himself 
apart from the proprieties of a ‘democratic dignity’ that considers all par-
ticularities as so many ignominious stains that arouse anguish and pity. 
(Deleuze 1997: 84–5) 
Yet, the ‘new universality’ in question is not obtained by subsuming 
particular identities under general laws but is constituted by a battle 
on two fronts: ‘against the particularities that pit man against man 
and nourish an irremediable mistrust; but also against the Universal 
or the Whole, the fusion of souls in the name of great love or charity’ 
(ibid.: 87). As we shall argue in detail in the following chapter, the 
political community that Agamben envisions is precisely a commu-
nity of originals or singularities who have nothing either particular 
or general about them, who neither affirm a particular trait as an 
exclusive criterion for membership nor subsume all such traits under 
a pseudo-universal identity. Yet Bartleby does not seem to be a good 
example of any communitarian praxis. Although Deleuze calls him 
‘a new Christ or the brother to us all’ (ibid.: 90), Bartleby does not 
affirm brotherhood or promise salvation; he neither overturns the 
existing order in the manner of the Russian proletariat nor estab-
lishes a new order elsewhere in the manner of the American ‘univer-
sal immigration’. In fact, Bartleby does not do anything at all that 
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could be construed as politically or socially significant. It is therefore 
not in his actions that his importance to Agamben, Deleuze and other 
continental philosophers must be sought, but solely in his being. 
‘Pure, patient passivity, as Blanchot would say. Being as being, and 
nothing more’ (ibid.: 71).
Agamben elaborates and complicates this formula with the help 
of a technical term from the philosophy of the Skeptics, ou mallon 
(no more than). In his ‘pure, patient passivity’, Bartleby inhabits a 
suspended state on the threshold ‘between Being and Nothing’; he 
exists ‘no more’ than he does not (Agamben 1999b: 256). While this 
mode of being appears to be a privation, it accords with Agamben’s 
concept of potentiality discussed earlier in this chapter. ‘What shows 
itself on the threshold between Being and non-Being, between sen-
sible and intelligible, between word and thing, is not the colourless 
abyss of the Nothing but the luminous spiral of the possible. To be 
able is neither to posit nor to negate’ (Agamben 1999b: 257; empha-
sis original). Dwelling on the threshold between Being and Nothing 
in the mode of ‘no more than’ is not a matter of choosing being over 
nothing or nothing over being but of affirming one’s being-able by 
suspending its exhaustion in the act. By neither positing nor negat-
ing but simply preferring not to, suspending the operation of all the 
apparatuses that seek, obstinately and vainly, to govern his exist-
ence, Bartleby affirms the intimate co-belonging of potentiality and 
inoperativity. 
This approach separates the idea of potentiality from the themes 
of will and necessity that have obscured its meaning throughout the 
history of philosophy: 
[P]otentiality is not will, and impotentiality is not necessity. To believe 
that will has power over potentiality, that the passage to actuality is 
the result of a decision that puts an end to the ambiguity of potentiality 
(which is always potentiality to do and not to do) – this is the perpetual 
illusion of morality. (Ibid.: 254) 
This illusion is traced by Agamben to medieval theology, which 
distinguished between potentia absoluta, God’s potentiality to do 
anything whatsoever, and potentia ordinata, by which God can only 
do what is in accordance with his will. 
[Will] is the principle that makes it possible to order the undifferentiated 
chaos of potentiality. A potentiality without will is altogether unrealiz-
able and cannot pass into actuality. Bartleby calls into question precisely 
this supremacy of the will over potentiality. If God (at least de potentia 
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ordinata) is truly capable only of what he wants, Bartleby is capable only 
without wanting, he is capable only de potentia absoluta. (Ibid.: 255) 
This dissociation of ‘absolute potentiality’ from will does not thereby 
resign it to non-existence, whereby the possible becomes impossible. 
What is at stake is rather precisely the passage of potentiality into 
actuality as potentiality, the real existence of possibility as such.
[Potentiality] does not remain actualized of a lack of will. One could say 
of Bartleby that he succeeds in being able (and not being able) absolutely 
without wanting it. Hence the irreducibility of his ‘I would prefer not to’. 
It is not that he does not want to copy or that he does not want to leave 
the office; he simply would prefer not to. The formula that he so obsti-
nately repeats destroys all possibility of constructing a relation between 
being able and willing, between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. 
This is the formula of potentiality. (Ibid.: 255)
Why does Agamben go to such lengths to affirm the paradoxical and 
counter-intuitive idea of ‘being capable without wanting’? While 
the theological distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia 
ordinata appears arcane, Agamben’s argument is crucial for under-
standing his politics of inoperativity. The limitation of potentiality by 
will (potentia ordinata) produces a familiar image of politics as the 
voluntarist project of affirming some specific possibilities over others, 
exhausting potentiality in the new vision of actuality, a ‘better world’ 
or a ‘bright future’. In contrast, the radical dissociation of potential-
ity from will makes it possible to conceive of a politics that renders 
the existing order of things inoperative not in order to replace it 
with an actual alternative from the past or the future. Instead, this 
politics would venture to restore potentiality to all that has not been 
actualised, the possible worlds that have been willed out of existence 
and demand to be restored to their possibility (Agamben 2005b: 39). 
This is not a matter of the creation of something new but of what 
Agamben terms the ‘decreation’ of reality, whereby ‘what could not 
have been but was becomes indistinguishable from what could have 
been but was not’ (Agamben 1999b: 270). Decreation evidently 
does not refer to the destruction of the world (and it is notable that 
Bartleby refrains from destructive actions as much as he does from 
productive ones), but rather to its return to its potentiality not to be, 
whereby it exists in the ‘no more than’ mode, on par with the infinite 
plurality of possible worlds as something whose existence is in no 
way necessary, as something that can not be: ‘the actual world is led 
back to its right not to be; all possible worlds are led back to their 
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right to existence’ (ibid.: 271).5 This dwelling in pure potentiality 
constitutes what Agamben terms Bartleby’s ‘experiment de contin-
gentia absoluta’ (ibid.: 261). 
What are we to make of Bartleby’s experiment? The reason why 
Agamben’s reading of Bartleby has led to so many confusions and 
misreadings is his idiosyncratic use of paradigms, whereby the exem-
plary function is often assigned to extreme, excessive or hyperbolic 
cases. As we have discussed, a paradigm is an example that stands 
out from the ensemble which it nonetheless illuminates, its particular 
denotation suspended to enable its exemplary function. Yet, while 
‘to suspend’ is a good paradigm of a regular verb in the English lan-
guage because it shares key characteristics with other such verbs, can 
we say the same of Bartleby and the inoperative political community 
that Agamben affirms? Evidently, in his extreme passivity, his ema-
ciated, catatonic and anorexic state, Bartleby is not a typical repre-
sentative of this community though he might certainly be among its 
members. The same goes a fortiori for two more famous paradigms 
that we shall address in detail in Chapter 4: homo sacer and the 
Muselmann that are held to exemplify the condition of the subject of 
biopolitical sovereignty. While it is certainly possible to find analo-
gies or structural similarities between Bartleby and the various sub-
jects of inoperative and profanatory politics who seek a new use of 
their lives, bodies and faculties, for example body artists, fetishists, 
lovers, children or experimental scientists, it appears that Bartleby’s 
stance (just as the homo sacer’s peril or the Muselmann’s suffering) is 
so extreme as to disable the paradigmatic function. Bartleby certainly 
is a subject of inoperative politics, yet this does not mean that its 
other subjects resemble or must resemble Bartleby: why could not the 
subject of profanation that renders an apparatus inoperative to open 
whatever is confined in it to a free and common use actually prefer 
this profanation to the continuing sacralisation of the beings in ques-
tion?6 At stake here is not the resonance of the figure of Bartleby with 
Agamben’s concept of inoperativity, which is beyond doubt: Bartleby 
does not express any particular identity, vocation or tasks but deac-
tivates all of them, does not venture to transform the order of things 
but rather to suspend it, does not engage in voluntarist revolt but 
rather practises radical immobility without a positive preference, and 
so on. The question is simply whether this hyperbolic example suc-
ceeds in its function of elucidating a wider ensemble of subjects and 
practices or stands alone as an extreme case whose extension to the 
wider domain is controversial or outright dubious. 
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Agamben’s critics have interpreted his paradigmatic use of Bartleby 
as an indication of his excessive radicalism and pessimism, which 
only finds an elusive spark of redemption in utter abjection and 
suffering, with which it is preoccupied to such an extent that some 
critics termed his approach ‘pornographic’ (Bernstein 2004; see also 
La Capra 2007, Hegarty 2005, Mills 2008: 136; cf. Prozorov 2011). 
According to these accounts, if there is such a thing as ‘Bartleby-
politics’ (cf. Žižek 2006: 342–3, 381), it must be a politics that is 
from the outset resigned to failure (Power 2010; Whyte 2009). In 
the remainder of this section we shall address Alain Badiou’s critique 
of Agamben’s ‘politics of weakness’, which specifically singles out 
Bartleby as the example of what is wrong with Agamben’s politics. 
In his Logics of Worlds Badiou contrasts his own affirmative project, 
characterised by a militant activism in pursuit of universal truths, 
with Agamben’s valorisation of weakness.
[Agamben’s] recurrent theme is being as weakness, its presentational 
poverty, power preserved from the glory of its act. Likewise, in politics, 
the hero is the one brought back to its pure being as a transitory living 
being, the one who may be killed without judgment, the homo sacer of 
the Romans, the muselmann of the extermination camp. Agamben, this 
Franciscan of ontology, prefers, to the affirmative becoming of truths, the 
delicate, almost secret persistence of life, what remains to one who no 
longer has anything; this forever sacrificed ‘bare life’, both humble and 
essential, which conveys everything of which we – crushed by the crass 
commotion of powers – are capable of in terms of sense. (Badiou 2009: 
558–9)
This interpretation of Agamben is easily understandable from the 
activist-militant perspective of Badiou’s politics of truth and is shared 
by a number of other critics sharing this orientation.7 However, the 
evident differences may obscure a more subtle yet also more fun-
damental proximity between the two authors. After all, Badiou’s 
‘being’ is also characterised by a certain ‘presentational poverty’, 
which is testified by Badiou’s recourse to the void (the empty set) 
as the ‘proper name of being’ (Badiou 2005a: 52–9). Moreover, 
Badiou’s politics is characterised by the ascent of ‘pure being’ to 
appearance within positively structured ‘worlds’ that ruptures their 
transcendental order in the manner that resonates with Agamben’s 
deactivation of historical apparatuses of government (Badiou 2009: 
357–80). Expressing themselves in utterly different idioms, Agamben 
and Badiou arguably share the ontological understanding of politics 
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as the process of the affirmation of pure being against the historically 
contingent apparatuses of government.
The key difference between the two authors thus pertains not to 
being but to action, Agamben affirming inoperativity and Badiou 
calling for the militant activity of the subject. Yet, as we have argued 
in this chapter, Agamben’s inoperativity is not equivalent to mere pas-
sivity but rather consists in a specific kind of activity, which, insofar 
as it subtracts one’s existence from the positive hold of the appara-
tuses of government, affirming its potentiality before and beyond any 
actualisation, definitely resonates with the actions of Badiou’s subject 
that brings the inexistent objects of his world to maximal existence 
within it (see Badiou 2005a: 391–409; 2009: 321–4, 451–76). We 
must therefore understand the difference between Agamben and 
Badiou as primarily a difference in style, tonality or, most precisely, 
mood, in the methodological sense espoused in this book. It is not so 
much that Agamben affirms weakness while Badiou affirms strength, 
but that in contrast to Agamben Badiou remains tied to the tragic 
paradigm of politics and, specifically, to the tragic hero, which 
accounts for his distaste for the key figures of Agamben’s thought, 
particularly Bartleby. 
In Logics of Worlds Badiou picks Bartleby as an example of 
the negation of a truth by its subject in the form of betrayal: ‘One 
can, like the office clerk Bartleby in Melville’s eponymous novella, 
“prefer not to”. But then a truth will be sacrificed by its very subject. 
Betrayal’ (Badiou 2009: 400). It is indeed possible to betray a truth, 
just as, for Agamben, it is possible to close oneself off from one’s 
inoperative potentiality and enter the state of the ‘deficit of existence’ 
that, similarly to Badiou (2001a: 71), he bluntly calls ‘evil’ (Agamben 
1993a: 43). But what does Bartleby have to do with any of it? The 
fact is that Bartleby did not betray anything or anyone, since his pref-
erence not to was his truth that he actually upheld faithfully until his 
death. Moreover, this truth is not so far from Badiou’s own idea of 
truth as indiscernible, generic and universal (2005a: 327–54) – recall 
that for both Agamben and Deleuze, Bartleby is a personification of a 
singular life beyond all particular predicates, which points to a ‘new 
universality’ of ‘originals’. 
Be that as it may, Badiou’s own examples of political subjects are 
furthest away from Bartleby: Spartacus, the French Communards, 
Mao, and so on (2009: 24–7, 51–7, 64–5, 493–503). Badiou offers 
grand examples from the history of emancipatory and revolutionary 
politics (slave uprising, peasant revolt, proletarian revolution), which 
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are all based on the transhistorical invariant that he terms ‘the com-
munist hypothesis’ of radical equality (Badiou 2010). In contrast, 
Agamben’s political subjects tend to be rather less than grand and 
heroic, even as they might also traverse some of these grand-political 
sequences: Bartleby, Kafka’s Joseph K and K the land surveyor 
(Agamben 2010, 20–35), Tiananmen protesters (1993a: 85–6), Anna 
Akhmatova (1999b: 177–8), and so on. Yet what paradoxically 
aligns Badiou with Agamben is the fact that all of his grand-political 
sequences have ended in failure, be it in the form of defeat, betrayal 
or the perversion of original goals. Despite the best intentions of 
Spartacus, the Communards or the Russian revolutionaries, grand 
emancipatory politics ended in various versions of the tragic logic 
that Agamben seeks to overcome: a move from a happy beginning 
to a sorrowful end, in which the subjective innocence of political 
subjects ends up overshadowed by the objective tragic consequences 
of their actions. 
There is, however, an important exception to Badiou’s commit-
ment to tragic politics, which is none other than Badiou himself as 
a political subject. Badiou’s own micro-political engagement in the 
now-defunct Organisation Politique (OP) (Badiou 2001a: 95–119; 
Hallward 2003: 43–5, 227–42) was characterised by action at a 
distance from the state, the refusal to take part in elections and 
the renunciation of all figures of political representation. Badiou’s 
Organisation was completely uninterested in instituting a new politi-
cal system but was solely concerned with undermining the existing 
order on the basis of the axiomatic affirmation of equality. This 
approach is quite different from Spartacus, Mao or any other heroic 
leaders of constituent power that Badiou discusses in his works on 
politics. Indeed, in its combination of utter radicalism and practical 
modesty, axiomatic tone and strategic ineffectiveness, Badiou’s own 
politics is, dare we say, somewhat Agambenian. While as a philoso-
pher of politics Badiou prefers grand examples of tragic instances 
of emancipatory and revolutionary politics, in his own activity as a 
political subject he is a lot like Bartleby, repeatedly ‘preferring not 
to’ run in elections, read mainstream press, act in accordance with 
any managerial rationality or the imperative of profit, etc. (Badiou 
2008: 43–50).
Despite the decidedly insignificant role that the OP played in 
‘grand’ French politics, its strategic weakness did not appear to 
bother Badiou in the slightest, instead animating his commitment to 
cultivating a distance to all systemic and strategic politics. Similarly, 
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Agamben’s ‘weak’ subjects seem to have internalised failure to such 
an extent that they ironically manage to succeed in their doomed 
ventures against all odds. Since their task is not the production of 
a new order, apparatus or world but the affirmation of potentiality 
subtracted from every actual positive form, their victory is wholly 
contained in their ‘I can’ as such. Thus, true to the comic mood of 
his philosophy, Agamben does not share the widespread pessimistic 
reading of the ending of Bartleby: 
The creature is finally at home, saved in being irredeemable. This is why 
in the end the walled courtyard [of the prison] is not a sad place. There is 
sky and there is grass. And the creature knows perfectly well ‘where it is’. 
(Agamben 1999b: 271) 
The last sentence alludes to Bartleby’s reply to the narrator who tries 
to rouse him from his passivity by reminding him that he is in the 
Tombs, a Manhattan jail that is also, ironically, known as the Halls 
of Justice: ‘I know where I am.’
What does this typically Agambenian elliptic finale actually 
mean? The first thing to note is that in these lines Bartleby appears 
as a ‘creature’, whose relevant surroundings are strictly natural (‘sky 
and grass’) – a living being not subsumed by any of the apparatuses 
he struggled to evade, including the apparatus of the prison which 
can only confine someone who would prefer to get out, which is of 
course not Bartleby’s preference. Thus, Bartleby stands precisely for 
the Ungovernable that remains when the apparatuses are suspended 
and the living being emerges as such, not in its originary natural 
purity, which is no longer attainable, but in a necessarily scarred 
or wounded state. Recalling our discussion of Agamben’s reading 
of Morante in Chapter 1, we are dealing with an experience that is 
certainly tragic (Bartleby’s imprisonment, Akhmatova’s son’s con-
finement in the camps, the peril of homo sacer, the degradation of 
the Muselmann) but obstinately resists tragedy from within tragedy, 
leading to a reversal that is comic, even if, as in the case of Bartleby, 
it comes at the price of the subject’s own being. 
While the example of Bartleby is indeed best grasped as hyper-
bolic rather than paradigmatic, it illuminates most starkly the 
ethico-political principle at the heart of the logic of inoperativity: 
the apparatuses of government ought to be resisted and deactivated 
not merely because of some specific or positive potentialities that 
they restrict, limiting our preferences to be or do something, but pri-
marily because of the generic potentiality they capture and confine, 
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our preference not to be or do something, which is the condition of 
any possible experience of freedom. It is because the apparatuses 
capture our potentiality for inoperativity and mobilise our existence 
for their positive projects of government that they must themselves 
be rendered inoperative, their expropriating and dominating force 
deactivated. Inoperativity is thus not merely the end or telos of 
Agamben’s politics, i.e. something to be recovered or rediscovered as 
the outcome of political praxis, but is also its method, insofar as the 
originary inoperativity that defines the human condition as potential 
can only be reclaimed for free use by rendering inoperative the plu-
rality of the apparatuses that set human beings to work. In the fol-
lowing chapters we shall see how this method is deployed in the key 
domains of Agamben’s politics.
Notes
1. See Franchi 2004 for the more detailed genealogy of the concept. See also 
Murray 2010: 44–8; De la Durantaye 2009: 18–20; Mills 2008: 120–3. 
2. Thus Agamben’s inoperosita has a much wider reference than Georges 
Bataille’s concept of désoeuvrement, which refers to the ‘disengaged’ 
negativity that could never be recuperated by the dialectic and reab-
sorbed into the positive order of things. For Bataille (2001), inoperative 
experiences of this kind include various extreme and excessive experi-
ences of eroticism, violence, luxury and so on. Nothing could be further 
from Agamben’s concept of inoperativity, which is entirely at odds with 
any pathos of extremity but pertains solely to the deactivation of the 
‘work’ involved in the most mundane areas of our existence. The pathos 
of sovereign negativity is entirely alien to Agamben, who considers it 
both useless and tasteless. On the differences between Agamben and 
Bataille see Agamben 1998: 61; 2005b: 124; 2000: 7.
3. See Clemens 2010 on the importance of the category of fetishism to 
Agamben’s work, not only in terms of substance but also in terms of 
method. See also Chiesa and Ruda (2011: 372) for a similar argu-
ment with relation to perversion. Agamben’s preoccupation with non- 
conventional forms of use certainly does exemplify a fetishist disposition, 
which is for him a necessary precondition for any genuinely experimental 
and innovative politics. A new world is possible not ex nihilo but by 
subjecting what is to a new kind of use. Agamben has shown interest 
in perversion and fetishism from his earliest work onwards; see, for 
example, Agamben 1993b: 146–7.
4. Chiesa and Ruda (2011: 171) choose to distinguish between the ‘nega-
tive’ inoperativity manifested in the apparatuses of glory, the state of 
exception and so on, and the ‘positive’ inoperativity of the messianic 
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reappropriation of potentiality. Yet it is important to recall that it is the 
same inoperativity that is at stake in both cases, the originary inoperativ-
ity of the human condition. What may be negative and positive is rather 
the relation one establishes to it, which may be that of sacralisation or 
profanation.
5. While it is crucial to Agamben’s thought, the concept of decreation is 
used less frequently than that of inoperativity. Aside from the reference 
to decreation in the essay on Bartleby, the term only appears in a 1998 
essay on the work of the contemporary artist Cy Twombly (Agamben 
2006). In this essay Agamben interprets Twombly’s sculpture as a 
caesura that manifests within the work of art its ‘inactive core’, irreduc-
ible to artistic practice. The gesture of decreation points to the possibil-
ity of art entering a standstill, ‘almost thunderstruck, falling and risen 
at every moment’ (Agamben 2006: 15). Agamben borrows the concept 
of decreation from Simone Weil’s political thought (Weil 1952: 78–83; 
see De la Durantaye, 2009: 23), yet whereas Weil used it to designate 
a process of desubjectivation, liberation from the self that at the same 
time opens up to the world, Agamben’s use is somewhat different. His 
idea of decreation pertains to a dual process of the reversal of modal 
categories, whereby what is necessary becomes contingent and may even 
be relegated to inexistence, while what was impossible becomes possible: 
‘what happened and what did not happen are returned to their originary 
unity in the mind of God’ (Agamben 1999b: 270). In the terms of Pauline 
messianism, in a decreated world what was something comes to nought 
while what did not exist comes to existence. Decreation does not mark 
the birth of a new world but the ‘slight adjustment’ in this world here that 
renders the existing apparatuses of its government inoperative, making 
the world potential again. 
6. We shall return to this problem in the concluding chapter of this book, 
where we identify Agamben’s refusal of the very question of will as the 
most problematic aspect of his political thought.
7. See also Negri 2012, Power 2010, Chiesa 2009, Nedoh 2011. While 
we shall show that Badiou’s criticism is often misdirected, his designa-
tion of Agamben’s approach as ‘Franciscan’ is arguably correct. In fact, 
Agamben has recently devoted a whole book to Franciscan monasticism 
(Agamben 2013), tracing in its techniques and practices the model for 
a mode of inoperative existence that he terms ‘form-of-life’, which we 
shall address in detail in Chapter 4. For a more positive assessment of 
Agamben’s notion of decreation see Sumic 2011.
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Chapter 3 
Speaking the Unspeakable:  
Inoperative Language
In the following four chapters we shall elaborate this ethos at the 
key sites of Agamben’s politics: language, statehood, history and 
humanity. We shall begin with language, which might appear a 
somewhat counter-intuitive starting point for investigating politics. 
Nonetheless, it is precisely in his early works on language, culminat-
ing in the 1982 book Language and Death, that Agamben developed 
many of the arguments subsequently elaborated in the Homo Sacer 
series and the latter can hardly be understood in isolation from 
the former. Neither the logic of the sovereign ban nor the concept 
of bare life is intelligible without first engaging with Agamben’s 
account of the experience or the event of language that transforms 
the creature, the ‘living being’, into a speaking being. Thus, prior 
to analysing Agamben’s most famous and controversial political 
claims we shall dwell on the ontological level and pose the question 
of the being of language. We shall first outline Agamben’s isola-
tion of the dimension of speakability or communicability that is at 
work in every speech act yet is itself devoid of any signification. It 
is this event of language as simultaneously potential and inopera-
tive that both conditions the possibility of speech and itself remains 
unspoken in it, functioning as the ineffable or negative foundation 
of language. We shall then proceed to Agamben’s confrontation 
with this logic of negative foundation in Language and Death, 
where it is generalised from a strictly linguistic puzzle or paradox 
to an ethico-political predicament of human existence that has only 
been fully unveiled in the modern condition of nihilism. We shall 
discuss Agamben’s attempt to overcome this predicament at the site 
of language in an analysis of his notion of infancy and his extension 
of this solution to the realm of the political community, defined 
in terms of whatever being and modelled on the experience of the 
inoperative potentiality of language. In the remainder of the chapter 
we shall address the political implications of this understanding of 
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community, specifically its universal character and its criticism as 
utopian and unrealisable.
The Thing Itself
In the preceding chapter we have outlined the formal logic of 
inoperativity and elaborated it in a series of paradigms. Yet there 
remains a question of what the content of the inoperative is. Since, 
as we have argued, inoperative praxis does not destroy the thing 
but rather suspends its canonical function and enables its free use, 
this content cannot be void, yet neither can it consist in any positive 
predicate of the object or practice, since it is precisely the latter that 
are deactivated. Evidently, the sole content of the inoperative is the 
sheer existence of a thing or a phenomenon. An unusable tool has 
lost its recognisable functions, its relations to other tools, its place 
in the overall context of the workshop but it still exists as an object, 
for which a new use can be found. A law that is no longer applied 
retains its semantic content even when wholly devoid of force. A 
body whose physiological functions have been suspended is nonethe-
less there as an object of ostentation or a new, perverse use. Thus it 
is precisely inoperativity that grants us access to the essence of the 
phenomenon, which, as it is for Heidegger (1962: 67), is entirely 
contained in sheer existence. Thus, the inoperativity of a thing gives 
us access to the thing itself, yet this thing itself is not some hidden 
essence of the thing but rather the sheer facticity of its existence, 
attested to by language. 
Agamben’s idea of the thing itself was developed in a series of 
articles from the early 1980s onwards, of which the two most impor-
tant are ‘The Thing Itself’ and ‘The Idea of Language’. In the former 
text, Agamben reinterprets the theory of forms in Plato’s Seventh 
Letter, focusing on the ‘thing itself’ as the fifth element of all thought 
besides the name, referent, the denoted object and true knowledge 
(Agamben 1999b: 31). In the Letter Plato is rather elusive about this 
fifth element, claiming that it ‘does not admit of verbal expression’ 
but may be ‘suddenly brought to birth in the soul’ when one has 
‘dwelled for a long time close to it’ (Plato cited in Agamben 1999b: 
29). While this evasive presentation gave rise to the interpretation of 
the thing itself as something esoteric or outright mystical, Agamben 
offers a different interpretation that is at once simple, almost literal, 
and highly intricate. Rather than being something that transcends 
language, the thing itself only exists within language even if, for now, 
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it remains unspeakable within it. In the terms that we shall encounter 
repeatedly in the remainder of the book, it is included in language 
(i.e. it is nothing extra-linguistic) but solely in the mode of its exclu-
sion (i.e. as unspeakable). 
Yet what is this unspeakable thing? In Agamben’s complex exege-
sis which we shall not reproduce here (see Agamben 1999b: 31–7) 
he arrives at a striking conclusion: the thing itself is nothing other 
than the thing’s own ‘being-said in language, which language can 
only presuppose but never express’ (ibid.: 32). While a linguistic 
statement tells us something about the thing it speaks of (e.g. ‘the 
rose is red’ predicates a colour to the rose), it simultaneously effaces 
the fact of its speaking of it, transforming it into an ineffable pre-
supposition. ‘Sayability itself remains unsaid in what is said and in 
that about which something is said, [and] knowability itself is lost in 
what is known and in that about which something is known’ (ibid.: 
33). Indeed, if we were to try to bring this ‘sayability’ to speech by 
transforming it into a name, to which predicates may be assigned and 
about which discourse is possible, we would only succeed in ‘hypo-
thesising’ it, turning the thing itself into a thing like any other: 
[The] thing itself is not a thing; it is the very sayability, the very open-
ness at issue in language, which, in language, we always presuppose and 
forget, because it is at bottom its own oblivion and abandonment. The 
presuppositional structure of language is the very structure of tradition; 
we presuppose, pass on and thereby – according to the double sense of 
the word traditio – betray the thing itself in language, so that language 
may speak about something. The effacement of the thing itself is the sole 
foundation on which it is possible for something like a tradition to be 
constituted. (Ibid.: 35)
The significance of this claim cannot be overestimated. What 
Agamben targets here is nothing less than the logic of the constitu-
tion of any apparatus, linguistic or otherwise. For any positive order 
to be constituted and sustained as a ‘tradition’, something must be 
betrayed and this something is the sheer speakability and knowabil-
ity of the thing caught up in it. This theoretical constellation provides 
with an initial matrix that will be gradually elaborated in the theory 
of sovereign power and bare life in Homo Sacer. 
If the thing itself remains unsaid in actual discourse and a dis-
course about it is only possible by transforming it into a thing, 
what could possibly be done to overcome this structure of tradition/
betrayal? For Agamben, the task of philosophy is to 
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come with speech to help speech, so that, in speech, speech itself does 
not remain presupposed, but instead comes to speech. At this point, the 
presuppositional power of language touches its limit and its end; language 
says presuppositions as presuppositions and, in this way, reaches the 
unpresupposable and unpresupposed principle that, as such, constitutes 
authentic human community and communication. (Agamben 1999b: 35) 
The stakes of Agamben’s ontological investigation of language are 
thus evidently raised: it is no longer a matter of addressing a problem 
proper to the particular domain of the linguistic, but, since human 
beings are conventionally defined as speaking beings, a matter of 
accounting for the conditions of possibility of the ‘authentic human 
community’. Agamben’s wager is that if we succeed in bringing 
speakability to speech and removing the ineffable from language 
we will be able to conceive of a human community that is similarly 
devoid of presuppositions and hence of exclusions and restrictions 
that throughout history have produced conflict and violence. 
Yet what kind of discourse would be adequate to the task of 
bringing speakability to speech? In the article ‘The Idea of Language’ 
Agamben addresses the discourse of revelation, arguing that what is 
revealed in it is never any particular content about the world, lan-
guage or whatever else but rather the sheer fact ‘that the world is, 
that language exists’ (ibid.: 41; emphasis original). Thus revelation 
seeks precisely to reveal within language the thing itself that remains 
unspoken in it. In Agamben’s interpretation this is the meaning of 
the famous prologue to the Gospel of John: ‘in the beginning was 
the word and the word was God’. If the word is in the beginning, it 
cannot presuppose or refer to anything beyond or before itself but 
only reveals itself as devoid of any presupposition or foundation: 
‘the proper sense of revelation is therefore that all human speech 
and knowledge has as its root and foundation an openness that infi-
nitely transcends it’ (ibid.: 41). What is at stake in revelation is thus 
the experience of language as such, not in the sense of meaningful 
speech but in the sense of its sheer existence as a ‘voice that, without 
signifying anything, signifies signification itself’ (ibid.: 42). It is this 
non-signifying voice that, in Agamben’s reading, was equated with 
God in the Gospel of John and that in the aftermath of the ‘death of 
God’ in modern nihilism reveals itself as the pure event of language:
For the first time we are truly alone with language, abandoned without 
any final foundation. We are the first human beings who have become 
completely conscious of language. For the first time, what preceding 
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generations called God, Being, Spirit, unconscious appear to us as what 
they are: names of language. (Ibid.: 45–6)
This unprecedented consciousness of language is both an extremely 
dangerous and a radically promising situation, in full accordance 
with the ‘Hölderlin principle’ of the simultaneous growth of danger 
and saving power. The danger of the complete unveiling of language 
consists in the nihilist reduction of this unveiling to pure Nothingness 
that would then function as the final negative presupposition of lan-
guage and human existence: ‘[nihilism] interprets the extreme revela-
tion of language in the sense that there is nothing to reveal, that the 
truth of language is that it unveils the Nothing of all things’ (ibid.: 
46). Here Agamben interprets nihilism in the Heideggerian vein: 
nihilism is not merely the affirmation of the Nothing (for example, 
the foundational status of the non-signifying voice) but the secondary 
negation or nullification of this Nothing, whereby the nothing-as-
foundation becomes converted into mere absence of foundation (cf. 
Heidegger 1961: 217).
Agamben’s own response to the unveiling of language does not 
seek to overcome nihilism in a facile and vain manner by re-founding 
language on some positive presupposition – any attempt at such 
negation of nihilism would itself be supremely nihilistic. Instead, 
he affirms the possibility of appropriating the presuppositionless 
character of language as the ‘non-foundation’ of all human commu-
nity and praxis.1 In the following section we shall address the logic 
of this appropriation of the negative foundation in an analysis of 
Agamben’s Language and Death.
The Voice
Language and Death is a short yet remarkably dense text that illumi-
nates the ontological background to Agamben’s subsequent turn to 
explicitly political issues in The Coming Community and the Homo 
Sacer series. Similarly to the articles analysed in the previous section, 
in this book Agamben targets the presuppositional structure of lan-
guage that resigns it to the logic of negative foundation, whereby 
the foundation of language (or community, social praxis, and so 
on) is found in something excluded from or unspeakable within it. 
Agamben argues that this negativity is not the effect of late-modern 
efforts to overcome metaphysics by, for example, Heidegger or 
Derrida, but rather its fundamental feature that has only fully come 
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to light in the conditions of modern nihilism. Similarly to the idea of 
inoperativity discussed in the previous chapter, the logic of negative 
foundation is both originary for the Western tradition and contem-
porary in its ultimate unveiling under the conditions of nihilism. 
Language and Death begins relatively innocuously with an analy-
sis of the function of indicative pronouns in Hegel (diese or ‘this’) and 
Heidegger (da or ‘there’), demonstrating the centrality of negativity 
for the two philosophers even on the terminological level. When we 
use the pronoun ‘this’ to refer to any given object, the object itself 
is never fully reached by us but only approximately grasped by an 
abstract pronoun that, moreover, has no concrete reference of its 
own but depends entirely on the situation of discourse. By the same 
token, the pronoun da in Heidegger’s famous notion of Dasein refers 
to the ‘there’ into which one is always thrown and in which one 
exists as one’s own possibility, the ‘ownmost’ possibility being one’s 
own death, and is entirely devoid of all positive content. Rather than 
refer, belatedly and vainly, to the unnamed object, the sole reference 
of these two pronouns is to the instance of discourse when they are 
enunciated: ‘indication is the category within which language refers 
to its own taking place’ (Agamben 1991: 25). 
Agamben elaborates this paradoxical status of pronouns with 
reference to the work of such twentieth-century linguists as Roman 
Jakobson and Emile Benveniste, who famously described deictic 
pronouns as ‘indicators of the utterance’ or ‘shifters’ whose sole 
reference is to the very existence of discourse (ibid.: 23–5). Shifters 
articulate the passage from language as a sign system to actual speech 
or, in Agamben’s terminology, from the semantic to the semiotic. 
Thus pronouns and other shifters refer to the thing itself that, as we 
have seen, consists in the sheer speakability or being-called: ‘prior to 
the world of meanings, they permit the reference to the very event 
of language, the only context in which something can be signified’ 
(ibid.: 25).
This function of shifters leads Agamben to assert the intimate 
co-belonging of linguistics and metaphysics, which will prove highly 
important for his subsequent direct transfer of his argument to the 
terrain of community and politics. The linguistic utterance, i.e. the 
act of putting language into action in speech, corresponds exactly 
with the metaphysical concept of being: 
That which is always already indicated in speech without being named 
is, for philosophy, being. The dimension of meaning of the word ‘being’, 
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whose eternal quest and eternal loss constitute the history of metaphysics, 
coincides with the taking place of language; metaphysics is that experi-
ence of language that, in every speech act, grasps the disclosure of that 
dimension and in all speech experiences above all the ‘marvel’ that lan-
guage exists. (Ibid.: 25) 
Thus, Agamben is able to recast Heidegger’s ontological difference 
between being and beings as the difference between the pure taking 
place of language and the signified content of this experience. What 
transcends particular contents of speech is nothing but the event of 
language coming to speech as such: ‘the opening of the ontological 
dimension (being, the world) corresponds to the pure taking place of 
language as an originary event, while the ontic dimension (entities, 
things) corresponds to that which, in this opening, is said and signi-
fied’ (ibid.: 26).
Yet what does it mean to indicate the instance of discourse? 
Evidently, the utterance is only indicated by the fact of being spoken, 
i.e. its existence is attested to by the voice that speaks it. Yet, the 
concept of the voice at work here is rather more complicated than 
mere sound (phone). Mere natural or animal sound can never indi-
cate the instance of human discourse, unless it is supplemented and 
thereby negated by the ‘intention to signify’ that precedes every con-
crete act of signification. What takes the place of voice as sound is a 
fictitious concept that Agamben terms the Voice, now capitalised to 
accentuate its difference from voice as mere natural sound. The Voice 
is characterised by a double negativity. Firstly, as the indicator of the 
taking-place of language, it is characterised by the removal of the 
voice as natural sound (phone) and the anticipation of signification 
(logos) and is thus located in the gap between the having-been and 
the not-yet. This is why it can only be posited as fictitious: as neither 
sound nor language, it is never really there. Secondly, for this very 
reason the Voice cannot itself be spoken in a discourse whose exist-
ence it indicates (ibid.: 84). Thus Agamben concludes that 
language is and is not the voice of man. If language were immediately the 
voice of man, as braying is the voice of the ass and chirping the voice of 
the cicada, man could not experience the taking place of language or the 
disclosure of being. But if, on the other hand, man radically possessed no 
voice (not even a negative Voice), every shifter and every possibility of 
indicating the event of language would disappear equally. (Ibid.: 84–5)
For Agamben, it is this ‘originary negativity’ of the Voice that is at 
work in all Western metaphysics, functioning as the resolution of the 
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problem of the relation between physis and logos, nature and culture: 
‘Man is the living being who removes himself and preserves himself at 
the same time – as unspeakable – in language; negativity is the human 
means of having language’ (ibid.: 85; emphasis original). By the same 
token, the relation between human nature and social or political life, 
which we shall address in the following chapter, has in the Western 
political tradition been construed in terms of the simultaneous nega-
tion of natural life (zoe) as a condition for acceding to political life 
(bios) and the entry of this natural life into the political order in the 
negated form that Agamben terms ‘bare life’. Even in more special-
ised fields of knowledge such as ontology or linguistics it is easy to 
recognise analogues to the Voice in the form of respectively Being 
as the transcendence of beings and the phoneme as the insignificant 
particle that makes signification and discourse possible (Agamben 
2007a: 66–7). Every human experience is stuck in negativity and 
thus remains close to death: ‘to experience death as death signifies, in 
fact, to experience the removal of the voice and the appearance, in its 
place, of another Voice, which constitutes the original negative foun-
dation of the human word’ (Agamben 199: 86). In the final chapter 
of Language and Death, the proximity of all experience to death 
stops being a theoretical matter and acquires decidedly ominous 
overtones that would only be strengthened in the Homo Sacer books. 
Agamben traces the operation of the logic of negative foundation in 
the practice of sacrifice in primitive societies, whereby a radically 
ungrounded violent action, usually murder, becomes converted into 
an unspeakable foundation of a positive social order, grounding the 
existence of particular communities and traditions (ibid.: 104–6). If 
the Voice originally dwells in the negative place of death, it should 
not be surprising that in concrete social practices death will come to 
take the place of the Voice. 
It is now clear that the stakes of Agamben’s enterprise in Language 
and Death far exceed the narrowly exegetic task of accounting for 
the status of pronouns in Hegel and Heidegger but rather pertain to 
the fundamental ontopolitical logic of Western culture that founds 
human existence on the negation of human nature. The ‘thing itself’ 
at work in language, its sheer communicability prior to every act of 
signification, is in this logic rendered ineffable and transformed into 
a mystical foundation of actual speech acts, particular communities 
and forms of life – mystical insofar as it is informulable in the posi-
tive discourses that it founds. Thus, any attempt to break the link 
between language and death must proceed through the liquidation of 
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every figure of the Voice, ‘eliminating the unsayable from language’ 
(Agamben 2007a: 4) or the ‘liquidation of the mystical’ (1991: 91). 
‘Only if language no longer refers to any Voice […], is it possible for 
man to experience a language that is not marked by negativity and 
death’ (ibid.: 95). The final pages of Language and Death thus lay 
out the programme that Agamben’s more explicitly political writings 
will subsequently take up: 
A completed foundation of humanity in itself should signify the definitive 
elimination of the sacrificial mythologeme and of the ideas of nature and 
culture, of the unspeakable and the speakable, which are grounded in it. 
In fact, even the sacralisation of life derives from sacrifice: from this point 
of view it simply abandons the naked natural life to its own violence and 
its own unspeakableness, in order to ground in them every cultural rule 
and all language. The ethos, humanity’s own, is not something unspeak-
able or sacer that must remain unsaid in all praxis and human speech. 
Neither is it nothingness, whose nullity serves as the basis for the arbitrar-
iness and violence of social action. Rather, it is social praxis itself, human 
speech itself, which have become transparent to themselves. (Ibid.: 106)
If one is looking for a concise summary of Homo Sacer, one need not 
look any further. Yet, prior to considering this and other explicitly 
political texts in detail, let us first address the way Agamben attempts 
the ‘definitive elimination’ of the logic of negative foundation at 
the original site of language. Admittedly arcane, these ideas will 
be helpful for grasping the movement of Agamben’s thought from 
ontology, linguistics and poetry to politics.
Infancy 
If the logic of negative foundation is at work in the entire ontopoliti-
cal tradition of the West, including the critical attempts to overcome 
it, how is it to be confronted? What would an experience of language 
devoid of the presuppositional structure of negative foundation look 
like? How is it possible to bring the ineffable ‘thing itself’ to speech 
without consigning it to negativity?
If the negative foundation of the Voice is produced by the 
‘removal’ or negation of the ‘animal voice’ or natural sound, then 
a self-evident solution would be to refrain from this negation and 
return to the natural immediacy of language akin to the braying of 
the ass or the chirping of the cricket. The comic overcoming of our 
tragic dwelling in negativity and in proximity to death would then 
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end by the reversal of the constitutive practice of anthropogenesis 
or the formation of the human being, whereby language would be 
posited immediately as the voice of the human being, akin to the 
natural sounds emitted by animals. Indeed, as Agamben claimed in 
The Sacrament of Language, a late work that revisits the main con-
cerns of Language and Death 
it is perhaps time to call into question the prestige that language has 
enjoyed and continues to enjoy in our culture, as a tool of incomparable 
potency, efficacy and beauty. Considered in itself, it is no more beautiful 
than birdsong, no more efficacious than the signals insects exchange, no 
more powerful than the roar with which the lion asserts his dominion. 
(Agamben 2009a: 71) 
Nonetheless, the problem with any claim for the return to the 
originary condition, be it that of language or community, is that 
it ignores the irrevocable loss of the origin: we are always already 
thrown into language marked by a scission between the Voice and 
speech, the natural sound always already removed. Moreover, it is 
this very removal that makes it possible for human beings to stand 
in the disclosure of being and hence pose the ontological question in 
first place. ‘We can only think if language is not our voice, only if we 
reach our own aphonia at its very bottom’ (Agamben 1991: 108). 
To seek to return to the voice before the Voice would be to sacrifice 
the very capacity to access the event of language, let alone bring it 
to speech. It is the negative structure of language itself that makes 
properly human action and experience possible by opening up the 
void between language and speech where the human subject emerges. 
It is therefore within this negative structure that the ethico-political 
resolution to the problem of negativity must be sought. 
The decisive element that confers on human language its peculiar virtue 
is not in the tool itself but in the place it leaves to the speaker, in the fact 
that it prepares within itself a hollowed out form that the speaker must 
always assume in order to speak. The human being is that living being 
that, in order to speak, must say ‘I’, must ‘take the word’, assume it and 
make it his own. (Agamben 2009a: 71)
While in such later texts as The Open that we shall consider in 
Chapter 6 Agamben would rethink this privilege accorded to human 
beings, in Language and Death and other works of the 1980s 
it remains a crucial mark of the difference between animals and 
humans that does not permit any simple return to the animal voice. 
Instead of the nostalgic approach that vainly calls for a return to the 
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origin that we never had or could not possibly remember ever having, 
Agamben opts for a different understanding of the origin. The ‘tran-
scendental origin’ has been a key concept in Agamben’s methodology 
since the 1978 book Infancy and History (2007a) and found its most 
sustained treatment in the 2009 essay ‘Philosophical Archaeology’ 
(2009b). In these texts the origin is no longer understood as a cause 
chronologically separate and prior to the object but rather as some-
thing constitutive of and coextensive with it. 
What we must renounce is merely a concept of origin cast in a mould 
already abandoned by the natural sciences themselves, one which locates 
it in a chronology, a primary cause that separates in time a before and an 
after. Such a concept of origins is useless to the human sciences whenever 
what is at issue is not an ‘object’ presupposing the human already behind 
it, but is instead itself constitutive of the human. The origin of a ‘being’ of 
this kind cannot be historicized because it is itself historicizing, and itself 
founds the possibility of there being any history. (Agamben 2007a: 56)
Instead of the chronological concept of the origin Agamben affirms 
the dimension of ‘transcendental history’ as the zone of indistinction 
between the diachronic and the synchronic, whereby the origin is not 
something that has occurred once in the past but rather that which 
keeps occurring in the present and thereby renders intelligible that 
of which it is the origin. To return to the examples of Language and 
Death, the removal of the animal voice that founds human language 
was not a datable past event that happened once and is now con-
signed to memory or oblivion; on the contrary, it keeps happening 
over and over, in every act of speech. Agamben’s favourite example 
of the transcendental origin is the Indo-European root, ‘reinstated 
through philological comparison of the historical languages, a his-
torically unattested state of the language, yet still real’ (ibid.: 57; see 
also Agamben 2009b: 109–10). Other examples include ‘the child of 
psychoanalysis exerting an active force within the psychic life of the 
adult, or the big bang which is supposed to have given rise to the uni-
verse but continues to send toward us its fossil radiation’ (Agamben 
2007a: 57).2 
In Agamben’s early work on language the paradigm of such a 
transcendental origin is the experience of infancy. In the conclusion 
to Language and Death, Agamben speaks elliptically of ‘infantile 
dwelling in language’ (1991: 92) as an alternative to the nihilistic 
and lethal logic of the Voice. What does ‘infancy’ stand for in this 
context? In an earlier collection of essays, Infancy and History, 
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Agamben defined infancy as the experience of the human being’s 
entry into language, which logically presupposes its not-having 
language at that point (hence, in-fancy, ‘not speaking’). While this 
condition evidently characterises the human infant at a certain devel-
opmental stage, the idea of the transcendental origin leads Agamben 
away from the specifically neo-natal experience of the acquisition of 
language towards the generalisation of infancy as the threshold of 
every act of speech, the experience of not-having language to begin 
with and having to enter into language as a condition of becoming 
a subject, which Agamben defines as the enunciator, the one who 
says ‘I’. 
If subjectivity is linguistically produced and if language is not 
given from the outset, then it is precisely infancy, the condition 
immediately prior to the entrance into language, that offers us the 
‘originary’ experience of being human that need not be sought in the 
receding depths of childhood as yet another version of the mystical 
foundation. It is only human language that is not immediately given 
to its speakers – animals are, in Agamben’s early anthropocentric 
interpretation, always already inside language and hence incapable 
of entering it: ‘Man, instead, by having an infancy, by preceding 
speech, splits this single language and, in order to speak, has to 
constitute himself as the subject of language – he has to say “I”’ 
(Agamben 2007a: 59). Thus only human language is split between 
the semiotic dimension of a closed and self-referential system of signs 
existing prior to the speaker and the semantic dimension of actual 
discourse.3 It is this split that accounts for the already discussed 
scission between nature and culture or history: if one were always 
already within language, one would be always united with one’s 
nature and there would literally be no place where the discontinu-
ity of history could enter. Thus, contrary to the traditional belief 
since Aristotle, a human being is not an animal possessing language 
but rather an animal originally deprived of it and having to enter it, 
thereby effecting the transition from the semiotic into the semantic. 
Agamben does not define the human condition in terms of plenitude 
or ‘added value’ (animal plus language) but rather in terms of lack, 
as the originary being-without-language that must be overcome 
through a subjectivating practice of entry into language.
Yet, in a typical Agambenian reversal, this lack ultimately is con-
verted into a new kind of plenitude, not an actual plenitude of pos-
sessing more than the animal but the plenitude of potentiality that 
the animal lacks as such. Indeed, we may easily recognise the concept 
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of potentiality addressed in the previous chapter in the logical struc-
ture of the experience of infancy. The human being does not possess 
language as such but rather a faculty of language, a potentiality for 
speech that logically presupposes its obverse, the potentiality not to 
speak, to remain in infancy. The passage from language to discourse 
and from a natural being to a human subject remains radically 
contingent and hence a matter of freedom, which is not grounded 
in any positive aspect of the human condition, but, somewhat para-
doxically, in the possibility not to become human, to remain outside 
discourse. 
Insofar as infancy marks the contingent passage of language into 
discourse, the point at which language exists in the mode of the pure 
intention to signify without any actual signification, the potentiality 
of (not) speaking that pertains to the ‘infant’ subject has its correlate 
in the inoperativity of language itself, whose signifying function is 
suspended and which, at this moment, refers only to itself, to the 
‘pure fact that one speaks, that language exists’ (2007a: 6). Agamben 
terms this simultaneous experience of potentiality and inoperativity 
of language experimentum linguae, ‘in which the limits of language 
are to be found not outside language, in the direction of its referent, 
but in the experience of language as such, in its pure self-reference’ 
(2007a: 5–6). Evidently, such an experiment takes place whenever 
our use of language is not exhausted by its signified content, i.e. 
when the communicative function of language is rendered inop-
erative in the act of speech that does not thereby fall silent, but in 
accordance with our discussion of the relation between inoperativ-
ity and potentiality in Chapter 2, is opened up to new forms of use. 
Evidently, poetry serves as the best example for such an experimental 
use of language that explores its potentialities beyond the signifying 
function (Agamben 2011: 234–9; see more generally 2009a: 43–61, 
93–101). 
Yet it is important to emphasise that the poetic experimentation 
with language remains only one particular example of the experi-
mentum linguae, whose significance is far more general. The experi-
ence of language as such, prior to and beyond all signification, is not 
only accessible in particular types of speech acts but in literally every 
act of speaking by reflecting on and problematising the sheer poten-
tiality of signification that conditions it. If infancy has as its locus 
the threshold between the semiotic and the semantic, the threshold 
where language comes to life, then this coming to life may be expe-
rienced by occupying and dwelling, however momentarily, on this 
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threshold. It is this experience of occupying the threshold of speech 
that provides a resolution of the problem of negative foundation. The 
thing itself, the sheer existence of language, is no longer included in 
it in the negative mode of exclusion, but is brought to speech in the 
very passage from language to discourse, the originary experience 
of language which has nothing esoteric or mystical about it but is 
available to all speaking beings in every act of speech. In the place of 
the Voice, the place of negativity and death, now stands the human 
being that has appropriated this space as its ethos and the site of its 
freedom. 
It is somewhat paradoxical that the example Agamben chooses 
to illustrate the exclusively human phenomenon of infancy belongs 
to the animal realm. The axolotl, a Mexican albino salamander, 
remains in the neotenic or infant condition throughout its life, main-
taining for its entire duration the characteristics typical only for the 
larval stage of amphibians alongside normally adult ones (Agamben 
1995: 95). While the axolotl is, for Agamben, an exception among 
animals, who are otherwise tied to a genetic code and the finite possi-
bilities inscribed in it, this exceptionality is the rule for human beings, 
even if it remains concealed by the apparatuses of government, law 
or culture that expropriate our potentiality and tie us to particular 
environments, codes, functions and specialisations. This potentiality 
may nonetheless be reclaimed by rendering these apparatuses inop-
erative, whereby the human being appears as such, in its ‘transcen-
dentally originary’ status as an eternal infant 
ecstatically overwhelmed, cast out of himself, not like other living beings 
into a specific adventure or environment, but for the first time into a 
world. He would be truly listening to being. His voice still free from any 
genetic prescription, and having absolutely nothing to say or express, 
sole animal of its kind, he could, like Adam, name things in his language. 
(Ibid.: 96–7) 
This invitation to reclaiming infancy must appear particularly tempt-
ing, since the sole alternative consists in continuing to dwell in 
proximity to negativity and death for no reason. The condition of 
modern nihilism has thoroughly desacralised every mystical version 
of the unspeakable foundation so that all that remains as the negative 
foundation is simply nothing, not an alluring and tempting Nothing 
that we could marvel at but a mere nullity devoid of any possible sig-
nificance. Yet, in a characteristic comic reversal, Agamben suggests 
that this experience of nullity is the condition of possibility of the 
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overcoming of nihilism and the human appropriation of the nothing-
ness of its foundations as its ethos:
Perhaps in the age of absolutely speakable things, whose extreme nihil-
istic furour we are experiencing today, the age in which all the figures of 
the Unspeakable and all the masks of ontotheology have been liquidated, 
or released or spent in words that merely show the nothingness of their 
foundation; the age in which all human experience of language has been 
redirected to the final negative reality of a willing that means nothing – 
perhaps this age is also the age of man’s in-fantile dwelling in language. 
(Ibid.: 92; emphasis original)
In the condition of modern nihilism the choice we are facing is 
between sticking to the mysticism of the ineffable, whose vacuity has 
been completely exposed, and the inoperative potentiality attained 
in the experimentum linguae. By opting for the latter, by occupying 
the place of the Voice with our own infancy we do not merely access 
a new, more fundamental and originary experience of language but, 
insofar as it is the faculty for language that distinguishes the human 
being, a different mode of being human, a new understanding of the 
human community. In the remainder of this chapter we shall focus 
on the implications of Agamben’s experimentum linguae beyond the 
sphere of language proper.
Whatever Being
We have seen that Agamben’s theorisation of the experience of 
language operates with a systematic analogy between language 
and community. Just as language may be brought to speech as self-
referential and presuppositionless, so the community that Agamben 
invokes in his ‘language-oriented’ works of the 1980s and comes to 
theorise explicitly in the 1990 book The Coming Community, is con-
ceived as devoid of any presuppositions or predicates:
[Only] because man finds himself cast into language without the vehicle 
of a voice, and only because the experimentum linguae lures him, gram-
marless, into that void and that aphonia, do an ethos and a community of 
any kind become possible. So the community that is born of the experi-
mentum linguae cannot take the form of a presupposition, not even in 
the purely ‘grammatical’ form of a self-presupposition. The first outcome 
of the experimentum linguae, therefore, is a radical revision of the very 
idea of Community. The only content of the experimentum is that there is 
language; we cannot represent this, by the dominant model in our culture, 
as a language. It is, rather, the unpresupposable non-latency in which men 
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have always dwelt and in which, speaking, they move and breathe. For all 
the forty millennia of Homo Sapiens, man has not yet ventured to assume 
this non-latency, to have the experience of his speaking being. (Agamben 
2007a: 10)
This statement is a good illustration of the logic of comic affirmation 
reconstituted in the previous chapters. On the one hand, the ‘experi-
ment’ that Agamben proposes is a matter of a radical overcoming of 
the way the elementary human faculty of having language has been 
treated in philosophy, culture and speech itself. On the other hand, in 
accordance with the messianic logic of a ‘slight adjustment’, what is 
at stake in the experiment is not the revelation of any esoteric wisdom 
but the sheer fact of there being language at all, the fact that for all 
its apparent self-evidence has not been brought to speech as such 
for the forty millennia of human existence. An unkind commentator 
might counter that if during forty thousand years no one bothered 
to bring the sheer speakability of language to speech, it is probably 
because it is so trivial as not to merit talking about. Yet, for Agamben 
this non-signifying experience turns out to be extremely significant, 
not merely because of what it reveals to us about language itself but 
because of its implications for rethinking the politics and ethics of 
human life as such. Recalling Wittgenstein’s famous statement that 
the most appropriate expression for the miracle of the existence of 
world is the existence of language, Agamben adds that if this is so, 
then ‘the correct experience for the existence of language is human 
life, as ethos, as ethical way. The search for a polis and an oikia befit-
ting this void and unpresupposable community is the infantile task of 
future generations’ (ibid.: 11).
Just as Agamben treats language as more than a language (a 
particular sign system) but rather addresses it in its sheer being (the 
inoperative potentiality of signification), so it is possible to speak 
of a political community that goes beyond particular communities, 
for example states, nations or peoples, which, just as individual lan-
guages, get very little attention from Agamben. Instead, Agamben 
focuses on two elementary ‘facts’, factum loquendi and factum plu-
ralitatis, the fact of language and the fact of multiplicity or plurality, 
that the respective sciences of language and politics both presuppose 
and efface as negative foundations.
We do not have the slightest idea of what either a people or a language 
is. It is well known that linguistics can construct a grammar – that is, 
a unitary system with describable characteristics that could be called 
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language – only by taking the factum loquendi, a fact that is still inac-
cessible to science – for granted. [In turn,] political theory must presup-
pose, without the ability to explain it, the factum pluralitatis – with 
which I would like to indicate the simple fact that human beings form a 
 community – whereas linguistics must presuppose, without questioning 
it, the factum loquendi. The simple correspondence between these two 
facts defines modern political discourse. (Agamben 2000: 66)
Just as the factum loquendi is negated and maintained in this negated 
state as the foundation of particular languages, so the factum 
pluralitatis, which refers to the sheer existence of the multiplicity 
of (human) beings with no criterion of belonging or exclusion, is 
converted into the ineffable foundation for multiple communities 
structured precisely according to these criteria. And yet the phenom-
enon of nihilism, already well familiar to us, makes sure that these 
particular communities can no longer maintain the illusions of either 
consistency or closure. For Agamben, the ultimate symptom of the 
falsity of all particular communities or ‘peoples’ is their dependence 
on the power of the state: ‘All well-meaning chatter notwithstanding, 
the idea of a people today is nothing other than the empty support of 
state identity and is recognized only as such’ (ibid.: 67). Just as the 
people without a state makes no sense and has no rights, so a lan-
guage lacking ‘state dignity’ (Catalan, Basque, Gaelic) is treated as a 
dialect or a jargon. Yet this only means that in the absence of state 
support, ‘all peoples are Gypsies and all languages are jargons’ (ibid.: 
68), there being nothing in particular languages and communities 
themselves to authorise any greater dignity. In Agamben’s reading, 
then, particularism in language and politics only serves to subject the 
potentiality of human existence to apparatuses and traditions that 
are already devoid of all sense:
The plurality of nations and the numerous historical languages are the 
false callings by which man attempts to respond to his intolerable absence 
of voice: or, if one prefers, they are the attempts, fatally come to nothing, 
to make graspable the ungraspable, to become – this eternal child – an 
adult. Only on the day when the original infantile openness is truly, diz-
zyingly taken up as such, will men be able finally to construct a history 
and language that are universal and no longer deferrable, and stop their 
wandering through traditions. This authentic recalling of humanity to the 
infantile soma is called thought – that is, politics. (Agamben 1995: 98)
In this manner, Agamben’s philosophy of language is directly and 
immediately converted into political thought, or, rather into ‘thought 
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as politics’. If the factum loquendi can be brought to speech in any 
speech act whatsoever in the experience of infancy, then the factum 
pluralitatis, which lies at the foundation of every particular commu-
nity, may also be ‘taken up as such’ as the sole substance of a com-
munity that has abandoned all presuppositions: 
There can be no true human community on the basis of a  presupposition 
– be it a nation, a language, or even the a priori of communication of 
which hermeneutics speaks. What unites human beings among themselves 
is not a nature, a voice or a common experience in a signifying language; 
it is the vision of language itself and therefore the experience of language’s 
limits, its end. A true community can only be a community that is not 
presupposed. (Agamben 1999b: 47; emphasis original) 
Agamben’s explicit theorisation of this community begins with the 
introduction of two key notions: ‘being-thus’ and ‘whatever being’. 
While both concepts continue to puzzle many commentators, our 
preceding discussion makes them instantly recognisable as ontologi-
cal equivalents of the ‘thing itself’ of language. Whatever being is a 
being that appears solely in its being, subtracted from all its positive 
predicates, be they gender, colour, profession, political or sexual 
preferences. Since, in Kant’s famous expression, ‘being is not a real 
predicate’ (Kant 2008 [1781]: 504; cf. Heidegger 1998: 337–63, 
1962: 127), the subtraction of a being from all real predicates leaves 
it with nothing but its being itself, the sheer facticity of its existence. 
Exposure, in other words being-such-as, is not any of the real predicates 
(being red, hot, small, smooth, etc.), but neither is it other than these 
(otherwise it would be something else added to the concept of a thing and 
therefore still a real predicate). That you are exposed is not one of your 
qualities, but neither is it other than them (we could say, in fact, that it is 
none-other than them). (Agamben 1993a: 96)
We must emphasise that in their exposure ‘whatever beings’ do not 
discard or destroy their positive predicates, just as the ecstatic charac-
ter of the existence of Dasein in Heidegger consists in ‘exiting’ from 
itself without ‘abandoning’ itself (Heidegger, 1995: 365). Yet even 
though these beings retain their predicates, they are no longer defin-
able through them: being-thus is ‘neither this nor that, neither thus 
nor thus, but thus, as it is, with all its predicates (all its predicates 
is not a predicate)’ (Agamben 1993a: 93). In other words, whatever 
beings undergo neither a deprivation (of the old identity) nor a trans-
formation (into a new one), but solely the exposure of the sheer fact 
that they are in the absence of any identification of what they are. 
PROZOROV 9780748676200 PRINT.indd   77 04/12/2013   15:07
agamben and politics
78
By virtue of this becoming inoperative of all particular identities, the 
members of this community share nothing else but the very fact of 
their being, their being-as-they-are, whatever they are. 
In 1986 Jean-Luc Nancy, a philosopher perhaps closest to 
Agamben among contemporary continental thinkers, published a 
book entitled Inoperative Community (1991). Although Agamben’s 
The Coming Community, published four years later, does not 
refer explicitly to Nancy’s work, there are numerous parallels with 
Nancy’s argument, particularly with regard to the idea of inoperativ-
ity as the key to the overcoming of the dangers of exclusion, violence 
and totalitarianism that the very notion of community became asso-
ciated with during the twentieth century. Both Nancy and Agamben 
emphasise the need to separate the idea of community from anything 
like a political project that would realise its essence by dominat-
ing, excluding or eliminating the inessential, the false or the alien. 
Evidently the community of whatever being, whose members’ posi-
tive identities are deactivated, can only be inoperative, since there is 
no longer anything in which its ‘work’ or ‘task’ could be grounded. 
For both Agamben and Nancy, this inoperative condition marks not 
the end but the very beginning of ethical life, which, to be worthy of 
the name, must be entirely dissociated from any teleological tasks 
and identitarian predicates. 
There is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological 
destiny that humans must enact or realise. This is the only reason why 
something like ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or 
had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experi-
ence would be possible – there would be only tasks to be done. (Agamben 
1993a: 42) 
The only possible ethical injunction that could be formulated in the 
inoperative community is to persist in ‘being (one’s own) potential-
ity, of being (one’s own) possibility’ rather than to actualise (and 
hence exhaust) this potentiality in the form of a positive identity, 
which would be equivalent to a passage into a ‘deficit of existence’ 
(ibid.: 44). 
The immediately political stakes of this ethics of inoperative 
potentiality are made explicit in ‘Tiananmen’, the moving concluding 
fragment of The Coming Community: 
Whatever singularity, which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its 
own being-in-language, and thus rejects all identity and every condi-
tion of belonging, is the principal enemy of the State. Wherever these 
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singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common, there will be 
a Tiananmen, and sooner or later tanks will appear. (Ibid.: 86) 
For Agamben, what is absolutely threatening to the state, what the 
state ‘cannot tolerate in any way’ is not any particular claim for 
identity, which can always be recognised or conceded, but rather 
the possibility of human beings co-belonging in the absence of any 
identity: ‘A being radically devoid of any representable identity 
would be absolutely irrelevant to the State’ (ibid.: 85). Contrary to 
the Hegelian emphasis on the struggle for recognition that contin-
ues to define most contemporary political theories, the key political 
problem for Agamben is not the recognition of an identity but rather 
the affirmation of the radical heterogeneity or non-identity between 
the state (or any other apparatus of government) and the inoperative 
community of whatever beings:
The novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle 
for the conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State 
and the non-State (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between 
whatever singularity and the State organization. This has nothing to do 
with the simple affirmation of the social in opposition to the State that 
has often found expression in the protest movements of recent years. 
Whatever singularities cannot form a societas, because they do not 
possess any identity to vindicate any bond to belonging for which to seek 
recognition. (Ibid.: 86)
Thus Agamben posits as the key antagonism of contemporary 
politics a conflict between the governmental logic of the state and 
other apparatuses that capture human existence and transform its 
potentiality into a set of positive identities and the generic ‘what-
ever community’, whose only foundation is the factum pluralitatis 
of being-in-common and which never attains an institutional form. 
This antagonism may therefore not be formulated in the classical 
terms of the friend-enemy distinction, posited by Schmitt (1976) as 
the essence of the political. While the latter distinction presupposes 
a strong degree of symmetry between friend and enemy, which must 
be homologous or commensurable figures for their enmity to make 
sense, the antagonism between apparatuses and the inoperative com-
munity is radically asymmetric, pitting the indiscernible community 
of whatever being against the apparatuses, whose very modus oper-
andi consists in discernment and identification (see Prozorov 2009c). 
Moreover, the community of whatever being does not seek inclusion 
into or recognition by these apparatuses, not even the formation 
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of the alternative apparatus of its own, but rather affirms its non-
recognition of itself in the apparatuses that capture it. While in the 
Hegelian logic only the universalisation of recognition may guarantee 
political pacification under the aegis of the ‘universal homogeneous 
state’, for Agamben the possibility of peace rather lies in something 
like a universalised non-recognition:
[There] is not and can never be a sign of peace, since true peace would 
only be there, where all the signs were fulfilled and exhausted. Every 
struggle among men is in fact a struggle for recognition and the peace that 
follows such a struggle is only a convention instituting the signs and con-
ditions of mutual, precarious recognition. Such a peace is only and always 
a peace amongst states and of the law, a fiction of the recognition of an 
identity in language, which comes from war and will end in war. Not the 
appeal to guaranteed signs or images but the fact that we cannot recog-
nise ourselves in any sign or image: that is peace in non-recognition. Peace 
is the perfectly empty sky of humanity; it is the display of non-appearance 
as the only homeland of man. (Agamben 1995: 82)
The parallel with the experience of language permits us to under-
stand this somewhat surprising claim: just as in Infancy and History 
and Language and Death the ethos of human beings was located 
not in some particular signified content but in the pure potentiality 
for signification that carries no determinate content, so the political 
ethos (dwelling place or ‘homeland’) of humanity is similarly not this 
or that form of community or mode of organisation, characterised 
by reciprocal recognition, the assignment of rights and duties and the 
specification of responsibilities but rather the being-in-common of all 
human beings irrespective of all of the above. The universality of the 
coming community is not the universality of the Hegelian-Kojèvian 
‘universal homogeneous’ state, arrived at through the painstaking 
mediation of particularities in the struggle for recognition. Instead, 
it is the universality immediately attained by subtraction from all 
particularity and the suspension of the struggle for recognition: once 
there is no particularity to recognise, the struggle loses its point (cf. 
Prozorov 2013b). 
Generic Universality
Agamben’s understanding of universality is complex and deserves 
to be addressed in some detail. As we have done throughout this 
chapter, we may grasp Agamben’s concept of the universal with the 
help of his studies of language – in this case, the idea of a ‘universal 
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language’. Agamben was particularly influenced by Benjamin’s early 
essay ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’ (Benjamin 
1978: 314–32), where Benjamin discusses the idea of a pure lan-
guage irreducible to any actually existing particular languages. While 
the latter remain subjected to the communicative function (that is 
the ‘work’ of language) and hence are reduced to mere signs, pure 
language would be strictly self-referential, no longer mediated by 
meaning, a language ‘that does not mean anything but simply speaks’ 
(Agamben 1999b: 54). It would therefore signify nothing but its own 
existence and refer only to its own communicability, to its ‘thing 
itself’ that Benjamin terms ‘expressionless word’ (cited in Agamben 
1999b: 53). For both Benjamin and Agamben, all languages express 
this communicability, yet in every particular language it remains 
crowded out by particular signified content:
All historical languages, Benjamin writes, mean pure language. It is what 
is meant in every language, what every language means to say. On the 
other hand, however, it itself does not mean anything; it does not want to 
say anything, and all meaning and all intention come to a halt in it. We 
may thus say that all languages mean to say the word that does not mean 
anything. (Agamben 1999b: 53)
Similarly, particular human communities (nations, states, cultures) 
seek to express the sheer factum pluralitatis of human multiplicity, 
which nonetheless remains ineffable in them, concealed by particular 
positive content of these communities that serves as the condition 
of belonging to them and exclusion from them. Yet the univer-
sal community that the factum pluralitatis affirms does not itself 
express anything, has no determining predicate or positive content, 
but simply exposes the being-in-common of all beings. Just as the 
universal language extinguishes all linguistic meaning but simply 
speaks, the universal community liquidates every determinate aspect 
of belonging and simply exists.
How can this expressionless, non-signifying universality become 
accessible? Evidently, it is not a matter of an actual establishment or 
production of the universal, be it a language or a community. Neither 
Benjamin nor Agamben advocate the establishment of a positive uni-
versal language, a new Esperanto, since any such language would be 
taken up by the signifying function, its universality thereby negated 
as a negative foundation of a new linguistic hegemony. Yet neither is 
it a matter of simply positing pure language as an ever-receding Ideal 
or regulative idea not subject to actualisation. Similarly, Agamben’s 
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‘coming community’ is neither an actually existing positive entity 
(the sum total of all human beings, the state of all states, and so on) 
nor a vapid idea of the forever deferred unification of humanity. 
Just as universal language only works in and through particular lan-
guages, rendering them inoperative and undermining their signifying 
function, the universal community is accessible only within a myriad 
of particular ones as the subtraction from their particularities, the 
unworking of their identities and the deactivation of their vocations. 
From this perspective, Agamben’s political thought clearly belongs 
to what might be termed the ‘new universalist’ turn in continen-
tal thought that also characterises, in different ways, the work of 
Badiou, Nancy, Rancière and Žižek (see Prozorov 2009c; 2013). 
After decades of discredit in (post)structuralist philosophies of dif-
ference, continental philosophy has increasingly come to reassess 
and rehabilitate the notion of universality. Of course, this reassess-
ment should be distinguished from a simple reaffirmation of familiar 
liberal-cosmopolitan or Marxist universalisms. Perhaps, in order not 
to be confused with any such reaffirmation, Agamben has consist-
ently resisted the label of universalism, unlike other participants in 
this turn, such as Badiou, who has enthusiastically adopted it. A brief 
consideration of the debate between Agamben and Badiou on the 
universalism of St Paul, the object of their two books, would help us 
clarify Agamben’s stance on universalism.
In his 1997 book St. Paul: The Foundation of Universalism Badiou 
offers a stinging critique of the contemporary terrain of particular-
istic ‘identity politics’, which he views as a necessary complement of 
the pseudo-universality of capitalism and seeks to overcome with a 
radically universalist politics of truth, the paradigm of which he finds 
in Pauline epistles. Badiou reinterprets Pauline texts from his own 
ontological perspective, finding in Paul the examples of his categories 
of the event, intervention, fidelity and truth. Bracketing off the nar-
rowly religious content of Paul’s epistles and dismissing it brusquely 
as a ‘fable’ (Badiou 2001b: 4), Badiou reconstructs something like 
a formal model of Pauline universalism, arising from the event of 
Christ’s resurrection, which is important solely as a starting point for 
the procedure that it launches:
Paul’s general procedure is the following: if there has been an event, and 
if truth consists in declaring it and then in being faithful to this declara-
tion, two consequences ensue. First, since truth is evental, it is singular. 
It is neither structural, nor axiomatic, nor legal. No available generality 
can account for it, nor structure the subject who claims to follow in its 
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wake. Consequently, there cannot be a law of truth. Second, truth being 
inscribed on the basis of a declaration that is in essence subjective, no 
preconstituted subset can support it; nothing communitarian or histori-
cally established can lead its substance to the process of truth. Truth is 
diagonal relative to every subset; it neither claims authority from, nor 
constitutes any identity. It is offered to all, or addressed to everyone, 
without a condition of belonging being able to limit their offer or this 
address. (Badiou 2001b: 14)
Thus the truth that Paul affirms is a singular universality, an effect 
of the rupture of the event in a given world that carries universally 
valid consequences that cannot be restricted by any conditions of 
belonging. The ‘body of truth’, constituted by the subjective fidelity 
to the event, does not, in Paul’s famous words, discern between Jews 
and Greeks, men and women, free persons and slaves, and so on. The 
Christian subject is constituted by one’s intervention into the situa-
tion that declares the occurrence of the event and one’s subsequent 
fidelity to it. The subject of truth is wholly indifferent to the par-
ticular words or situations in which the subjective process unfolds, 
remaining ‘subtracted from the organization of subsets prescribed by 
the State’ (ibid.: 15).
Agamben’s The Time that Remains, published in Italian three 
years after the publication of Badiou’s book, explicitly rejects the 
designation of Pauline messianism as universalist. In Agamben’s 
reading, rather than offer a truth ‘for all’ (the conventional under-
standing of universalism), Paul rather affirms the non-coincidence of 
‘all’ with themselves, whereby the particularistic division into Jews 
and Greeks, men and women, and so on is divided once more accord-
ing to a new criterion, the distinction between ‘flesh’ (apparent, 
superficial belonging valid only in the eyes of the law) and ‘breath’ 
(genuine belonging on the basis of fidelity). We thus end up with a 
figure of the ‘remnant’ that does not fit in the opposition of Jews and 
non-Jews, a ‘non-non-Jew’ who is not under the positive law of a 
particular community but rather under the law of the Messiah. 
At this point one can measure the distance that separates the Pauline 
operation from modern universalism – when something like the humanity 
of man is taken as the principle that abolishes all difference or as the ulti-
mate difference beyond which further division is impossible. (Agamben 
2005b: 52) 
While Badiou’s reading of Paul emphasises his indifference to differ-
ences, whereby particularities become tolerated as the sites traversed 
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by universality, which must always be affirmed locally within a situ-
ation (Badiou 2001b, 98–9), Agamben goes beyond what appears to 
him to be a mere benevolent or condescending ‘tolerance’: what the 
Pauline division does is render the operations of the law and other 
apparatuses that establish and sustain difference inoperative so that 
[all] that is left is a remnant and the impossibility of the Jew or the Greek 
to coincide with himself, without ever providing [one] with some other 
identity. You see why it makes no sense to speak of universalism with 
regard to Paul, at least when the universal is thought of as a principle 
above cuts and divisions and the individual as the ultimate limit of each 
division’ (Agamben 2005b: 53) 
The problem, nonetheless, is that the universal is not thought that 
way by Badiou. As a singularity that is not anticipated, prescribed 
by or subsumed under any law, it is clearly not ‘above’ cuts and divi-
sions, but rather itself consists in the subtractive cut that separates 
one from the identities prescribed by the positive order that Badiou 
terms ‘the state of the situation’. Secondly, as a subjective process 
that does not pre-exist the declaration of the event, universality 
cannot be localised within any particular subset, be it a group or an 
individual. Badiou’s ‘for all’ is not identical to what Agamben terms 
‘modern universalism’, which posits a difference (humanity) that 
abolishes all differences, but rather consists in the subtraction from 
all differences that resembles the messianic division that produces 
the figure of the remnant. Badiou’s political subject, subtracted from 
its ‘intra-worldly’ determinations, is best grasped precisely as a ‘non-
non-Jew’ (Greek, man, woman, and so on), the second negation 
negating the first and making it irrelevant. 
Thus the differences between Badiou and Agamben on the ques-
tion of universalism appear to be overstated. Interestingly, this is 
also the view of Badiou himself, who, as we have seen in the previ-
ous chapter, is otherwise quite explicit about his disagreements with 
Agamben:
[I] know that Agamben’s reading of Paul is very different from mine, but 
is this difference really a contradiction? I ask because, in fact, the ques-
tion of separation belongs to the question of universalism. There is not, 
in my view, necessarily a contradiction between the two. In Paul there is 
an interplay between separation and universalism. For Paul, there is cer-
tainly a kind of separation necessary for his universalism because we have 
separated ourselves from the old man. We have, out of this separation, 
a newness of life. But it remains a universalism because there is no limit 
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to this separation, there is no closure. Instead, [Paul] proposes something 
that is open to everybody, a collective determination, the realization of 
a separation in a universal field. So, naturally, there is, for Paul, in the 
process of universalism, something like division but this is a division 
internal to the subject itself. So I perfectly understand that universalism 
can take the form of a separation. There is always something like an 
intimate division when universalism takes the form of a separation. But 
there is never the pure opposition of universalism and separation because 
there is something like the becoming-separate of a universalism. (Badiou 
2005c: 39–40) 
We may therefore conclude that while Agamben’s insistence on the 
difference of his construction of Pauline messianism from ‘modern 
universalism’ is certainly understandable, Badiou’s singular univer-
salism is much closer to his own reading, particularly in the wider 
context of Agamben’s writings on the universal language and its 
correlate in the open and non-exclusive community of whatever sin-
gularities. Indeed, just as Agamben’s ‘coming community’, Badiou’s 
community ‘without conditions of belonging’ that subtracts itself 
from all particular ‘communitarian’ and ‘historically established’ 
forms consists entirely in the factum pluralitatis of the being-in-
common of the sheer multiplicity of beings. Similarly, Agamben’s 
notion of ‘whatever being’ is strictly analogous to Badiou’s more 
technical concept of the ‘generic’ subset of the situation emerging in 
the practices of fidelity to the event. The generic subset is indiscern-
ible within the situation, i.e. it cannot be individualised by any of its 
positive predicates. 
[It] contains a little bit of everything [but] only possesses the properties 
necessary to its existence as multiple in its material. It does not possess 
any particular, discerning, separative property. At base, its sole property 
is that of consisting as pure multiple, of being. Subtracted from language, 
it makes do with its being. (Badiou 2005a: 371) 
As we have seen, the same logic of the subtraction from all positive, 
particular content underlies Agamben’s experimentum linguae and 
its political correlate of the community of whatever being.
While in our interpretation Agamben’s political thought clearly 
belongs to the new universalist turn in continental philosophy, we 
must reiterate that this universalism is fundamentally heterogeneous 
to the more familiar hegemonic or imperialist forms. Just as universal 
language is not to be attained by forcibly changing the ways people 
communicate and making them all speak some new language, so a 
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universal community is never attained by unification or integration 
of particular communities but rather by subtraction, separation and 
division that traverse every subject, be it an individual or a group. 
Agamben’s universalism does not merely not contradict pluralism 
but rather proceeds through a thoroughgoing pluralisation that 
leaves nothing identical with itself. 
The Thick of It
In conclusion, let us consider the criticism of this generic reinter-
pretation of community that is as easy to anticipate as it is difficult 
to counter. Isn’t the idea of a radically non-exclusive community 
defined by no positive predicate and sharing nothing than exposed 
existence so hopelessly utopian as to be politically vacuous? This is 
indeed the approach of many of Agamben’s critics (Passavant 2007; 
Toscano 2011; Chiesa and Ruda 2011; Sharpe 2009), for whom 
the very transfer of ideas from linguistics or ontology to politics is 
problematic. It might be all very well to affirm the pure experience of 
language in poetry or contemplate the appearance of things in their 
being, but what is the political significance of the being-in-common 
of humanity, a fact as self-evident as it is apparently useless? Even 
if we were to agree with this understanding of community, where 
would it take us in the world that continues to be structured by par-
ticular communities, just as our speech still possesses some signified 
content?
An Agambenian response to this accusation would, not surpris-
ingly, be based on Hölderlin’s dictum introduced in Chapter 1: 
‘where danger grows, grows also saving power’. Agamben’s interpre-
tation of our current predicament as an epoch of nihilism, character-
ised by the devaluation of all values, the exhaustion of all teleologies, 
the vacuity of all vocations, logically entails not only that the pure 
experiences of language and existence, factum loquendi and factum 
pluralitatis, that have been concealed by the logic of negative foun-
dation, are now coming to light. It also entails that they are the only 
things that are coming to light in the times devoid of revelation and 
characterised by the utmost vanity and banality of speech: 
when the ethical connection that united words, things and human actions 
is broken, this in fact promotes a spectacular and unprecedented prolif-
eration of vain words on the one hand, and, on the other, of legislative 
apparatuses that seek obstinately to legislate on every aspect of that life 
on which they seem no longer to have any hold. (Agamben 2009a: 71) 
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While Agamben’s paradigms tend to focus on its more morbid and 
violent aspects of politics (refugee camps, anti-terrorist legislation, 
biometrics, surveillance, and so on), his general interpretation of the 
contemporary situation is rather less dramatic, emphasising less the 
violence than the senselessness of the apparatuses of government in 
the age of nihilism. The proliferation of ‘vain words’ and ‘legisla-
tive apparatuses’ that seek and fail to capture life is furthest away 
from the image of the malevolent or out-of-control Leviathan that 
Agamben is often accused of invoking. While it was indeed the thesis 
about the concentration camp as the paradigmatic space of modern 
politics that made Agamben famous, his general diagnosis of modern 
politics as destined to nihilism and his resolution of the problem of 
nihilism through the reappropriation of inoperativity and poten-
tiality are not tied to the paradigm of the camp and, furthermore, 
would arguably be least suitable for a politics structured according to 
such a paradigm: it is difficult to see how play, profanation or even 
Bartleby’s cultivated apathy would be effective political strategies in 
the camp or, more generally, in a violently repressive regime akin to 
Nazism or Stalinism, in which political action as such becomes an 
impossibility (cf. Arendt 1973: 437–59, 468–74). While the camp 
and the phenomenon of totalitarianism evidently emerge in the age of 
modern nihilism, they are too extreme to exemplify modern nihilism 
as such. Since Agamben’s above-discussed preference for hyperbolic 
examples accounts for numerous misunderstandings and excessive 
criticism of his affirmative solutions,4 a more ‘typical’ example of 
contemporary nihilistic politics of vain words and ceaselessly legislat-
ing apparatuses would be helpful for appreciating the effectivity of 
his politics of inoperativity. 
A good paradigm of Agamben’s account of the nihilism of con-
temporary politics is offered by the British satirical television series 
The Thick of It (2005–12), created by Armando Iannucci, which 
depicts the inner workings of a department of the UK government 
and its relations with the party spin doctors, the opposition and 
the media. The political world constructed in the series is entirely 
devoid of any sense: neither the government nor the opposition 
demonstrates anything like a positive transformative or regulatory 
agenda and the praxis of government is revealed as a mix of ad 
hoc measures designed for often miscalculated media effects, nice-
sounding yet utterly meaningless ‘initiatives’ and ridiculous blun-
ders arising from the ineptitude of everyone involved in the running 
of things. While the inner workings of the department, staffed by a 
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succession of possibly well-meaning but hopelessly maladroit min-
isters and morally dubious advisors, exemplify Agamben’s thesis on 
the ultimately ‘anarchic’, i.e. ontologically unfounded character of 
all apparatuses of government (2011: 62–7), the sovereign function 
of the negative foundation of the political order is presented, in a 
parodic form, by the government’s Director of Communications, 
Malcolm Tucker, whose task is to oversee the department’s activi-
ties and correct its all too frequent blunders through media spin. Yet 
while he is universally feared in the manner of Hobbes’s Leviathan 
who keeps ‘all in awe’, the violence that Tucker exercises largely 
takes the form of verbal abuse in the form of exceptionally eloquent 
swearing and threats that keep the system running, albeit running 
on empty. 
The brilliance of the The Thick of It does not merely consist in the 
parodic desublimation of the activity of government, which loses all 
trace of transcendence, seriousness or importance. Iannucci makes an 
important step forward in depicting the world of government as not 
merely incapable of redeeming its promises, whatever they are, but 
as itself badly in need of redemption: the ministers, the advisors, the 
secretaries and, ultimately, the fearsome Malcolm Tucker himself, 
are manifestly miserable in the apparatus that they sustain and in 
which they are themselves caught up. To recall Agamben’s reading 
of Kafka, addressed in Chapter 1, the only happy ending we could 
imagine for the series is the redemption of the ‘anonymous crowd of 
judges, lawyers and guardians indiscriminately packed together in 
dusty corridors or stooped beneath oppressive ceilings’ (Agamben 
1995: 85). Whenever we encounter the criticism of Agamben’s alleg-
edly excessive criticism of contemporary politics, his insufficient 
appreciation of democracy or the rule of law, we would do well to 
recall the world of The Thick of It and ask ourselves if there is any 
point in letting this travesty go on. 
What would it mean to stop the machine of vain words and 
impotent government? Nihilism apparently resigns us to speech that 
has nothing to say and praxis that has nothing to do. Yet this very 
evacuation of linguistic and political content makes the ‘infantile’ 
community of whatever being not only an attractive but also a real-
istic option; after all, it is not like there was anything else around, 
aside from vain words and apparatuses gone mad in the desire to 
regulate for no reason. In full accordance with Hölderlin’s maxim, it 
is the utter destitution wrought by nihilism that makes ontically pos-
sible the community whose ever-present ontological potentiality was 
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always (for the proverbial forty millennia!) covered over by particu-
lar languages and communities: 
[For] the first time it is possible for humans to experience their own lin-
guistic being – not this or that content of language, but language itself. 
Contemporary politics is this devastating experimentum linguae that all 
over the planet unhinges and empties traditions and beliefs, ideologies 
and religions, identities and communities. (Agamben 1993a: 82) 
The experiment of rendering language and community inoperative is 
already at work in modern nihilism; the question is rather whether 
the inoperativity unveiled in it is opened to free and profane use that 
enhances the potentiality of human existence or is separated into a 
new sacred sphere and subjected to the glorification of its own nullity 
and senselessness. Agamben’s political thought is thus not a utopian 
discourse on the brighter future entirely divorced from the present, 
but an affirmation of the possibilities already at work in this present, 
the injunction to seize them and the warning about the dangers of 
not doing so. 
If instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already 
improper and senseless form of individuality, humans were to succeed in 
belonging to this impropriety as such, in making of the proper being-thus 
not an identity and individual property but a singularity without identity, 
a common and absolutely exposed singularity – if humans could, that 
is, not be thus in this or that particular biography but be only the thus, 
their singular exteriority and their face, then they would for the first time 
enter into a community without presuppositions and without subjects. 
(Agamben 1993a: 64; emphasis original)
It is from the perspective of this choice between sticking to the 
exhausted tradition and the reappropriation of the potentialities that 
it confines and feeds on that we must re-engage with the familiar 
image of Agamben as a shrill and hyperbolic critic of the Western 
political tradition. As we have seen, Agamben’s affirmative vision of 
the coming community is derived by analogy with the pure experi-
ence of the existence of language and its universality is obtained 
immediately without passing through particular communities, be 
they states, nations or other political entities populating the Western 
tradition. Why, then, does Agamben spend so much effort at the 
painstaking genealogies of this tradition, tracing the minute details in 
the histories of sovereignty, government or the economy? Agamben’s 
relation to the Western political tradition is similar to Benjamin’s 
famous description of his relation to theology as that of the blotting 
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pad to ink: ‘It is soaked through with it. But if it were up to the blot-
ting pad, there would be no more ink’ (Benjamin cited in Agamben 
1999b: 58). Agamben’s affirmation of a community of whatever 
being that renders inoperative the plurality of particular communi-
ties and their apparatuses only takes up the traditions in which these 
communities have functioned so as to be able to find ways to render 
them inoperative. If it were ‘up to’ Agamben, particularistic com-
munities organised into states founded on the logic of sovereignty 
would simply vanish into thin air, sucked into the void, into which 
their sense and content have already disappeared. Yet, as it is not up 
to Agamben, since even the apparatuses running on empty cannot 
be simply wished away, his affirmation of the community based on 
factum pluralitatis must necessarily traverse the existing political 
landscape, absorbing the tradition that governs it like the blotting 
pad does the ink, but always from the perspective of the commu-
nity of whatever being that this tradition presupposes and betrays. 
It is to Agamben’s deactivation of this tradition that we turn in the 
 following chapter.
Notes
1. While in this book we shall frequently resort to the notion of reap-
propriation to describe Agamben’s political strategy, this term might 
appear problematic in the context of his philosophy. This is due to its 
etymological link with the notions of ‘the proper’ and ‘property’, both 
of which are quite alien to Agamben’s lexicon, in which it is rather the 
‘common’ (or ‘improper’) and ‘use’ (as opposed to possession) that figure 
prominently (see 1999b: 201–4; 2013: 123–43). At the same time, the 
idea of appropriation and particularly re-appropriation or re-claiming 
is central to Agamben’s affirmative politics, which, as we have seen, 
seeks to wrest away the originary inoperativity and potentiality of 
human existence from their capture and confinement (ex-propriation) in 
historically contingent apparatuses of government. The notion of reap-
propriation is thus a legitimate designation of Agamben’s strategy, as 
long as we bear in mind that, firstly, what is reappropriated in it is not 
the proper (identity, task or voice) but the irreducibly common, indeed 
universal, attribute of existence, and, secondly, that the reappropriation 
of inoperativity and potentiality cannot by definition be grasped in terms 
of possession or property but pertains solely to their return to free use. 
See Agamben (2013: 123–43) for a detailed discussion of the notion of 
use in the context of Franciscan monasticism as the key aspect of a form 
of life beyond both law and property.
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2. The affirmation of the origin as transcendental, i.e. irreducible to a 
chronological moment in the past and instead functional and observable 
at any moment in the present is not specific to Agamben’s work but is a 
key characteristic of Italian philosophy in general. In Roberto Esposito’s 
reading (2013: 22–3, 25–8), Italian philosophy differs from its English, 
French or German counterparts in refusing the gesture of a radical break 
with the origin, the cleaning of the slate, whereby philosophical thought 
severs itself from everything natural, mythical or irrational to establish 
itself as a new beginning on secure, if artificial, foundations. In contrast, 
Italian philosophy has tended to maintain itself in close relation with the 
‘pre-philosophical’ substrate of tradition, nature or life that is impossible 
to separate from philosophy proper but which remains at work within 
philosophy despite remaining heterogeneous to it. The same logic can 
be traced in the approach of Italian philosophy to history and politics, 
which, contrary to its Hobbesian or Cartesian counterparts, has been 
marked by the attention to which various ostensibly natural or vital 
elements persist within historical and political orders that purport to 
extricate themselves from them (ibid.: 49–58).
3. The attention to this split between the semantic and the semiotic char-
acterises Agamben’s work in its entirety. The most recent example is the 
theory of signatures (2009b: 33–79) that has become the key methodo-
logical innovation in his late works (see, for example, Agamben 2011: 
3–4). In a historical account of the idea of signatures from Paracelsus to 
Foucault, Agamben defines them as neither concepts nor signs but rather 
as a force that ‘makes the mute signs of creation efficacious and expres-
sive’ (2009b: 43). ‘Signs do not speak unless signatures make them speak’ 
(ibid.: 61). Thus, at a most general level a signature is what transforms 
the semiotic dimension of a system of signs into signifying speech, hence 
its structural locus is the experience of infancy, in which language begins 
to exist for the first time. Another example from Agamben’s later work 
is his theory of the oath (2009a), which he interprets as the condition 
of possibility of effective signification, whereby the semiotic content of 
language is endowed with additional performative efficacy in the acts of 
speech. Signatures, oaths and other performative utterances take place in 
the gap between the semiotic and the semantic, without which language 
would be asubjective and immediately effective, devoid of the possibility 
of perjury, blasphemy or falsity and hence devoid of all potentiality. 
4. A somewhat similar criticism has been offered by Paul Passavant (2007), 
in whose argument Agamben operates with a contradictory concept of 
the state, split between a neo-Marxist account of the state as a gov-
ernmental structure ultimately determined by the capitalist economy 
and a neo-Schmittian account of the state as the autonomous subject 
of biopolitical sovereignty. As a result, his affirmative politics allegedly 
becomes incoherent, since it is not clear which state it is supposed to 
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target. Agamben has responded to this criticism in his The Kingdom and 
the Glory (2011), which links the two paradigms of the state, sovereign 
and governmental or economic. In this book, sovereignty, which was dis-
cussed in Homo Sacer and State of Exception as a mode of power in its 
own right, is presented as the constitutive outside or negative foundation 
of positive governmental or economic orders. Agamben interprets gov-
ernment as a ‘bipolar’ system, in which the transcendence of sovereignty 
and the immanence of the economy perpetually refer to each other: in the 
absence of economic government, sovereign power would be incapable 
of producing positive effects, while in the absence of the transcendent 
locus of sovereignty, the immanent activity of government would lack a 
foundation. Thus, the contradiction between sovereignty and economic 
government does not yield two different concepts of the state but must 
be located within the concept of the state itself as the problematic and 
fragile attempt to reconcile transcendence and immanence, negativity 
and positivity, being and action. As Agamben demonstrates in the final 
chapters of The Kingdom and the Glory, such a reconciliation between 
inoperative sovereignty and the unfounded work of government in the 
Western tradition takes the form of glory, which, as we have seen in 
Chapter 2, conceals this inoperativity by the perpetual labour of its 
acclamation: the ‘economic’ state perpetually feeds on the inoperativity 
of the ‘sovereign’ one, which is in turn only a product of the prior expro-
priation of the general inoperativity of all human beings (2011: 241–6).
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Chapter 4 
How to Play with the Law:  
Inoperative Statehood
The analysis of Agamben’s concept of political community as mod-
elled on the experience of the inoperative potentiality of language 
has laid the groundwork for the engagement with his best-known 
political texts in the Homo Sacer series. As we shall demonstrate in 
this chapter, these texts only become fully intelligible on the basis 
of Agamben’s critique of the logic of negative foundation and his 
programme for the reappropriation of human potentiality. Yet these 
works are also marked by a complex and erudite re-engagement with 
the classic works of political philosophy, from Hobbes to Foucault. 
We shall first address Agamben’s reinterpretation of Foucault’s 
notion of biopolitics and Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty, tracing 
his fusion of the two into the idea of biopolitical sovereignty, whose 
object and product is bare life, the exact correlate of the notion 
of the Voice in the philosophy of language. We shall then discuss 
Agamben’s resolution of the problem of sovereignty that, in accord-
ance with the general logic of inoperativity, does not take the form of 
either the takeover or the destruction of the state but rather consists 
in the deactivation of its ordering power. This is what Agamben, 
following Benjamin, terms the real state of exception, i.e. the reap-
propriation of the inoperativity of the law from its confinement in 
the sphere of sovereignty as a general condition of human existence 
without any relation to the law or the state. The chapter concludes 
with the discussion of Agamben’s notion of form-of-life as the resto-
ration of bare life to its own potentiality. 
Biopolitics: Old or New?
The first volume of Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life, is 
initially presented by Agamben as an attempt to ‘correct’ or ‘com-
plete’ Foucault’s theory of biopolitics (Agamben 1998: 9). This 
theory, outlined at the end of the first volume of Foucault’s History 
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of Sexuality (1990a) and developed in a series of lecture courses of 
the late 1970s (2007, 2008), traces the transformation of the mode 
of power relations in early modern Europe. In his genealogies of the 
prison and sexuality, Foucault observes the emergence of the tech-
nologies of power that are heterogeneous to the traditional concepts 
of law and sovereignty and are concerned with normalisation rather 
than prohibition. He argues that modernity has not been about the 
liberation from or the weakening of state power, but rather brought 
about the intensification, multiplication and diversification of power 
relations beyond the sphere of the state proper. The monarchical 
power of the sovereign that consisted in the right to decide life and 
death, to take life or let live was transformed into a ‘power over life’, 
a power ‘to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ (Foucault 
1990a: 138). The correlate of this process in the field of knowledge 
has been the development of modern social science in the systematic 
investigation of historical, demographic and social processes within 
the context of governmental administration, a form of knowledge 
that differed from both earlier ethical and prudential modes of think-
ing about politics as an art of good life and the Machiavellian advice 
to the prince grounded in the idea of autonomy of political reason. 
The development of power over life took two distinct forms. 
The first type of power relations focused on the body as a machine, 
aiming to optimise its functioning and increase its efficiency and 
capacity for control. Foucault calls this disciplinary technique of 
producing ‘docile bodies’ (1977: 135) the anatomo-politics of the 
human body. The second form of power, termed biopolitics of the 
population (1990a: 135), has as its object of knowledge and action 
the broad range of processes of life that refer to human collectivities, 
the ‘population’ with its birth, death and fertility rates, its condi-
tions of life and labour, its movements and transformations. In this 
manner, ‘natural life’ enters the domain of state power as an object 
of political action: ‘for millennia, man remained what he was for 
Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political 
existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence 
as a living being into question’ (ibid.: 143). It is precisely to Aristotle 
that Agamben returns in order to correct and complete Foucault’s 
diagnosis.
Agamben starts from the distinction between two terms for ‘life’ 
in Ancient Greek: ‘zoe, which expressed the simple fact of living 
common to all living beings (animals, men or gods) and bios, which 
indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group’ 
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(Agamben 1998: 1). From this perspective, to speak of ‘a zoe politike 
of the citizens of Athens would have made no sense’ (ibid.: 1), since 
politics only pertained to bios as qualified forms of life, while zoe in 
the sense of natural or reproductive life was excluded to the domain 
of the oikos or home (cf. Dubreuil 2008). In these terms, the advent 
of biopolitics (which it would be more correct to term ‘zoopolitics’) 
would consist in the entry of zoe into bios, or, in Agamben’s already 
famous phrase, the entry of both terms into a ‘zone of irreduc-
ible indistinction’ (ibid.: 9). While agreeing with Foucault that this 
indistinction defines the loosely defined ‘modern’ period (from the 
late eighteenth century onwards), Agamben nonetheless questions, 
firstly, the reduction of biopolitics as such to a historically novel 
phenomenon and, secondly, its heterogeneity to sovereign power. 
While Foucault’s theory of biopolitics unfolded in the context of his 
attempt to abandon the ‘juridico-discursive’ model of power as nega-
tive, repressive and centred on the figure of the sovereign, with law as 
its main instrument, Agamben explicitly starts out from the need to 
establish the ‘intersection between the juridico-institutional and the 
biopolitical models of power’ (ibid.: 6) and finds such an intersection 
in the figure of bare life. 
While we shall return to the concept of bare life throughout 
this chapter, at this point it is important to strictly differentiate it 
from zoe as natural life (Mills 2008: 64; Murray 2010: 61; De la 
Durantaye 2009: 202–5; Kishik 2012: 102). While Agamben’s text 
sometimes slips into the identification of two terms (1998: 6), in the 
logic of his argument bare life does not precede politics but is rather 
its product, a result of the inclusion of zoe into bios that cannot be 
identical to zoe itself. Rather than being natural, bare life is in a sense 
always denatured as a result of its inclusion into the political order, 
even if, as Agamben argues, this inclusion originally took the form 
of exclusion that left zoe at the margins of the polis, ‘outside but yet 
belonging’. To risk a simplistic formula, bare life is what happens to 
zoe when it is included in the bios. Since this inclusion is originary 
and not merely a modern invention, it cannot amount to anything 
like a ‘new’ form of power. Instead of positing biopolitics as the suc-
cessor to sovereign politics or at least the indicator of its transforma-
tion, Agamben argues that biopolitics, and bare life as its object, are 
produced by sovereign power: 
the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – 
if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the 
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production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign 
power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as sovereign power. 
(Ibid.: 6; emphasis original)
This statement clearly runs contrary to Foucault’s analysis and has 
given rise to criticism of Agamben’s work as ‘ahistorical’ and ‘ontolo-
gizing’ (see Connolly 2007; Passavant 2007; Toscano 2011). The 
most famous of the critics of Agamben’s approach to biopolitics was 
perhaps Jacques Derrida, a philosopher with whom Agamben has 
critically engaged throughout his career and whose differences from 
Agamben we shall return to in this book (see De la Durantaye 2009: 
184–91; Mills 2008: 44–6; Murray 2010: 29–32; Thurschwell 2005). 
In his final seminar, The Beast and the Sovereign (2009), Derrida sub-
jected Agamben’s understanding of biopolitics to a stinging critique, 
arguing that Agamben overstates the stability of the conceptual dis-
tinction between bios and zoe in the Antiquity so as to strengthen his 
claim about their subsequent entry into the zone of indistinction. If the 
distinction was never strictly observable to begin with, then its weak-
ening or collapse could not be posited as the fundamental threshold 
of modernity, which it is for both Foucault and Agamben (perhaps 
more so for the former, given his interest in specifically modern tech-
niques of power). In Derrida’s derisive reading, Agamben perpetually 
oscillates between two mutually exclusive claims: the originary or 
‘ancient’ status of biopolitics and its irreducibly modern character:
[If] biopolitics is an arch-ancient thing, why all the effort to pretend to 
wake politics up to something that is supposedly ‘the decisive event of 
modernity’? In truth, Agamben, giving nothing up, like the unconscious, 
wants to be twice first, the first to see and announce, and the first to 
remind: he wants both to be the first to announce an unprecedented and 
new thing, what he calls this ‘decisive event of modernity’ [the birth of 
biopolitics], and also to be the first to recall that in fact it’s always been 
like this, from time immemorial. He is the first to tell us two things in one: 
it’s just happened for the first time, you ain’t seen nothing yet, but nor 
have you seen, I’m telling you for the first time, that it dates from year 
zero. (Derrida 2009: 330)
In the conclusion to the seminar Derrida makes an uncharacteristi-
cally blunt statement regarding Aristotle and his definition of man 
as zoon politikon, which is supposed to end any dispute about the 
status of biopolitics:
What Aristotle says is that man is that living being who is taken by poli-
tics: he is a political living being, and essentially so. In other words, he is 
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zoo-political, that’s his essential definition, that’s what is proper to him, 
idion; what is proper to man is politics: what is proper to the living being 
that man is, is politics, and therefore man is immediately zoo-political, in 
his very life, and it’s obvious that already in Aristotle there’s thinking of 
what is today called ‘zoopolitics’ or ‘biopolitics’. Which does not mean, 
of course, that Aristotle had already foreseen, thought, understood, 
analysed all the figures of today’s zoopolitics or biopolitics: it would be 
absurd to think so. But as for the biopolitical or zoopolitical structure, it’s 
put forward by Aristotle, it’s already there, and the debate opens there. 
(Derrida 2009: 349)
The sole problem with this statement is that Agamben (though 
admittedly not Foucault!) ultimately says the same thing. While 
Derrida spends pages ridiculing Agamben’s desire to have it both 
ways, to have biopolitics as both modern and ancient, from the 
very beginning of Homo Sacer Agamben actually separates the two 
dimensions quite clearly: 
Biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biologi-
cal life at the centre of its calculations, the modern State therefore does 
nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare 
life, thereby reaffirming the bond between modern power and the most 
immemorial of the arcana imperii. (Agamben 1998: 6)
As we shall demonstrate in more detail below, the logic at work in 
Agamben’s argument is exactly the same as the one encountered 
above in his analysis of inoperativity and its revelation under modern 
nihilism: it is only in modern nihilism that the fundamental ontologi-
cal feature of the human condition, its ‘absence of work’, has been 
illuminated. Agamben’s argument is therefore closer to Derrida’s 
than to Foucault’s original attempt to posit a break, however tenta-
tive and incomplete, between the era of sovereign power and the age 
of biopolitics. What is at stake for Agamben is rather the specific 
mode of the implication of zoe in bios, which in the times of Aristotle 
(and the subsequent dozen centuries) was that of exclusion but in 
modernity became that of indistinction. 
What characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoe 
in the polis, which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact 
that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calcu-
lations of state power. Instead, the decisive fact is that the realm of bare 
life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – 
gradually begins to coincide with the political realm and exclusion and 
inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter into a 
zone of irreducible indistinction. (Ibid.: 9)
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This is where Agamben famously formulates the paradox of sover-
eignty in terms of ‘inclusive exclusion’, which should be perfectly 
familiar to us from the preceding chapter. The mode of implication 
of zoe in bios is exactly the same as that of phone in logos, i.e. the 
former serves as the negative foundation of the latter:
The question ‘In what way does the living being have language?’ cor-
responds exactly to the question ‘In what way does bare life dwell in 
the polis?’ The living being has logos by taking away and conserving its 
own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life 
be excluded, as an exception, within it. Politics therefore appears as the 
truly fundamental structure of Western metaphysics, insofar as it occu-
pies the threshold on which the relation between the living being and the 
logos is realized. There is politics because man is the living being who, in 
language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the 
same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive 
exclusion. (Ibid.: 8)
There is thus no contradiction between the claim that biopolitics is 
as old as sovereignty (since the logic of negative foundation marks 
their originary articulation) and the claim that the ascent of biopoli-
tics to prominence marks the decisive event of modernity (or, more 
specifically, of modern nihilism). Biopolitics is indeed as old as 
the hills, yet in modern times something new has happened and is 
happening to it, i.e. the coming to light of its negativity due to the 
expiry or devaluation of all positive projects under the condition of 
nihilism. 
From this perspective, we should reconsider the criticism of 
Agamben’s reinterpretation of Foucault’s concept of biopolitics as 
dehistoricising and ontologising. However damaging in the contem-
porary intellectual context dominated by various forms of historical 
nominalism, these charges seem to bang on an open door, insofar as 
Agamben explicitly rethinks the inclusive exclusion of life into the 
polis as an ontological operation irreducible to particular historical 
rationalities of government. While Foucault was primarily interested 
in those rationalities themselves, in their positive difference from 
sovereign modes of rule, what interests Agamben in the problematic 
of biopolitics is the overall constellation whereby life is captured in 
political rationalities. While the forms of this capture certainly vary 
historically and the period from the late eighteenth to early nine-
teenth century might indeed form an important threshold for this 
change (as Foucault and the post-Foucauldian scholarship contends), 
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the fact of this capture has evidently been there long before Western 
liberalism, the appearance of statistics, the invention of the popula-
tion and other relevant categories, and so on (see Ojakangas 2012). 
It is therefore not very productive to read the difference between 
Foucault and Agamben as a ‘debate’ in which one is expected to take 
sides; this is rather a difference of perspective and different perspec-
tives suit different research problems. 
The analysis of Agamben’s philosophy of language and commu-
nity in the previous chapter permits us to understand his move away 
from the canonical Foucauldian problematic. Insofar as Agamben 
affirms a strict homology between the oppositions of phone/logos 
and zoe/bios and, consequently, the notions of Voice and bare life, 
biopolitics is ipso facto as old as human language. The critics of 
‘dehistoricisation’ are therefore ultimately incorrect: what Agamben 
traces is indeed a historical event, albeit the one that took place long 
before European modernity or, for that matter, the Greek polis, but 
could be dated back to forty millennia ago (Agamben 2007a: 9), i.e. 
the emergence of the human being as a speaking being. And yet, as 
we have argued in our discussion of the transcendental origin, this 
event of anthropogenesis is not simply a one-off historical happen-
ing but rather keeps on taking place in every act of speech. Insofar 
as the entry of life into politics is strictly analogous to the entry of 
the human being into language, Agamben is furthest away from 
dehistoricising biopolitics; if anything, he makes it historical through 
and through, coextensive with the history of humanity as such. Just 
as the entry of the human being into language makes history pos-
sible by removing the natural ‘voice of man’, the inclusive exclusion 
of bare life into the polis launches politics as a historical process, in 
which various forms of bios are constructed on the basis of bare life 
as negated zoe.
The Sovereign Ban
Let us now elaborate the way bare life functions as the negative 
foundation of political orders. Since, as Agamben argues, the produc-
tion of bare life as the biopolitical body is the originary activity of 
sovereign power, we must investigate the character of that power as 
well. It is here that Agamben complements Foucault, who famously 
rejected the very problematic of sovereignty in his call to ‘cut off 
the head of the king in political thought’ (1990a: 89), with the 
reinterpretation of one of the most controversial political theorists 
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of the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt. Due to his association with 
the Nazi party in the first years after its victory, Schmitt remains a 
controversial and frequently reviled thinker, often called ‘The Crown 
Jurist of the Third Reich’ (see McCormick 1997; Scheuerman 1999; 
Ojakangas 2006; Slomp 2009). Nonetheless, one can only ignore 
Schmitt’s political thought at one’s own peril, since its (often eso-
teric) influence extends far beyond the historical context of interwar 
European fascism. In his theories of the political as the friend–enemy 
distinction, of sovereignty as the decision on exception, his studies of 
the crisis of parliamentary democracy and the collapse of the inter-
state order (1976, 1985a, 1985b, 2003) Schmitt undertook nothing 
less than a fundamental revaluation of the entire Western politi-
cal tradition, and while his conclusions may be discomforting, his 
insights can hardly be ignored. 
In Homo Sacer Agamben takes up and elaborates Schmitt’s theory 
of sovereignty, illuminating its paradoxical character. For Schmitt 
(1985a: 1), ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ or, in more 
contemporary juridical language, has the power to institute a state 
of exception or emergency, suspending the existing juridico-political 
order. This means that the sovereign is simultaneously inside the 
legal order (it is indeed only sovereign in that order and never ‘as 
such’ or ‘in itself’) and outside it, since its power remains effective 
even when the validity of the existing legal or constitutional norms 
is suspended. Schmitt’s notion of the sovereign exception thus dem-
onstrates that the exception is never wholly external to that which 
it takes exception to, i.e. the normal order, but is in fact included 
into it in the paradoxical mode of the ‘internal other’ or ‘constitutive 
outside’. Insofar as the sovereign’s power extends to suspending the 
very order that it constitutes and sustains, it logically follows that 
the sovereign decision could never be subsumed under any positive 
law, norm or system of rules. The sovereign remains a borderline or 
threshold figure at the limit of order, at the opening to whatever is 
outside or beyond it. Yet this opening to the outside remains essential 
for the very existence of the interiority of order:
The most proper characteristic of the exception is that what is excluded in 
it is not, on account of being excluded, absolutely without relation to the 
rule. On the contrary, what is excluded in the exception maintains itself 
in relation to the rule in the form of the rule’s suspension. The rule applies 
to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. The state 
of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situ-
ation that results from its suspension. (Agamben 1998: 17–18)
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Similarly undecidable is the belonging of the exception to the spheres 
of right and fact: insofar as it is not subsumed under the rule, it 
appears to be an extra-juridical fact, yet since it only exists by means 
of the suspension of the rule, it can never be purely factual. 
In its archetypal form, the state of exception is therefore the principle of 
every juridical localization, since only the state of exception opens the 
space, in which the determination of a certain juridical order and a par-
ticular territory first becomes possible. (Ibid.: 19) 
Paradoxically, it is only through the construction of the zone of 
anomie at the heart of the legal order that this order may establish its 
connection to the life that it governs (Agamben 2005a: 51).
Recalling the context of world politics in the aftermath of the 
publication of Homo Sacer, which was characterised by the explicit 
invocation of exceptional measures by the US government after 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, it is easy to understand 
why Agamben’s reading of sovereign exceptionalism would attract 
attention. Yet it is crucial to emphasise that, similarly to Schmitt, 
Agamben does not interpret exceptional measures as an unfortunate 
remnant of or relapse into authoritarian rule in modern democracies, 
but rather as a constitutive principle that sustains these democracies 
themselves. Contrary to the critics of the US government after 9/11 
who demanded the return to normal, domestic- or international-law-
based instruments of policy, Agamben argued that the hope of any 
such ‘return’ is illusory, since the normal is constituted and sustained 
by the exception which remains at work within it. Even when excep-
tional or emergency measures are not actualised in policies, they 
remain potentialities of state action and may indeed be more effective 
as potentialities, capable of regulating conduct by the sheer threat 
of their actualisation. Doing away with exceptionalism through 
the fortification of the norm is at best futile and at worst counter- 
productive, since what is simultaneously fortified is the capacity to 
act on the basis of the norm’s suspension.
Agamben uses Nancy’s term ‘ban’ (Nancy 1993: 43–4) to describe 
this relationship of inclusive exclusion. What is caught up in the ban 
is nothing but life itself, in two senses: a life that is exposed to the 
violence of the power that suspends the law, and the law that by 
virtue of its suspension itself becomes indistinguishable from life. 
The life that is caught up in the state of exception is not simply ‘let 
be’ as irrelevant to power but is rather abandoned to its continuing 
force yet stripped of the protections that its positive norms may have 
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afforded (Agamben 1998: 28). This is precisely the situation at which 
life becomes bare. Perhaps ‘bared life’ would be a better term for the 
object caught up in the sovereign ban, since it would emphasise the 
violent aspect of being stripped of all protections and abandoned 
to the force of law whose positive content has been suspended 
and which is therefore, in Agamben’s influential formula, ‘in force 
without significance’ (ibid.: 51).
Let us consider this formula in more detail. What does it mean to 
say that in the state of exception the law remains in force without 
significance? In The Time that Remains Agamben offers three char-
acteristics of this condition. Firstly, it entails an ‘absolute indeter-
minacy between inside and outside’, whereby ‘the law includes that 
which it rejected from itself’ (Agamben 2005b: 105), so that there is 
no longer any outside of the law. In this manner, the law coincides 
with reality itself through its auto-suspension. Secondly, in the state 
of exception it is impossible to distinguish between observance and 
transgression of the law. Perfectly innocent actions, like walking, 
smiling, holding hands or dancing, may be found to be transgressive, 
insofar as the law no longer applies in defining transgression, just as 
ostensibly transgressive, illegal or violent acts may be found to be in 
accordance with the suspended law, if they are politically expedient, 
such as in the case of mob violence against political protesters. ‘The 
law, inasmuch as it simply coincides with reality, is absolutely unob-
servable, and unobservability is the originary figure of the norm’ 
(ibid.: 105). Finally, insofar as its positive content is suspended and 
its application is unobservable, the law ends up ‘absolutely informu-
lable’ (ibid.: 106), no longer accessible in terms of a prescription or 
a prohibition. Agamben relies on the example of the status of the 
Weimar Constitution after the suspension of its key articles by the 
Reichstag Fire Decree of 28 February 1933. These articles, dealing 
with personal and civil liberties, were simply suspended without 
being replaced with new regulations, making it impossible to differ-
entiate between the licit and the illicit. 
Thus the state of exception cannot be defined in terms of the full-
ness of positive powers granted to or assumed by the sovereign: it is 
not a ‘pleromatic state of the law, as in the dictatorial model, but a 
kenomatic state, an emptiness and standstill of the law’ (Agamben 
2005a: 48). And yet, insofar as in Schmitt’s theory the state of excep-
tion remains a sovereign prerogative, this state of emptiness remains 
annexed to the law as the condition of the very possibility of its appli-
cation to life. It is this paradoxical condition of the ‘incorporated 
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void’ that Agamben terms the ‘original political relation’ that founds 
political communities as we know them. Dismissing every attempt at 
a social contract theory or the efforts to ground communities in any 
criterion of belonging or even, as Schmitt does, in the conflict between 
friend and enemy, Agamben confidently transfers to the political 
domain his ontological insight discussed in the previous chapter: the 
sole foundation of Western politics is negative. In order to elucidate 
the significance of this claim let us address Agamben’s critique of sov-
ereign power in his commentary on the author most strongly associ-
ated with the modern concept of sovereignty, Thomas Hobbes.
State of Nature
Agamben confronts the Hobbesian figure of the state of nature early 
on in the first part of Homo Sacer, devoted to the reconstitution of 
the logic of sovereignty (1998: 15–29). He questions the familiar 
thesis of the temporal antecedence and spatial exteriority of the 
state of nature to the Commonwealth. According to this reading, 
the state of nature as the state of war of every man against every man 
is a pre-political condition, which is negated in the formation of the 
Commonwealth through the surrender of everyone’s natural rights 
to the sovereign. In contrast, for Agamben the state of nature is not a 
precondition of the institution of sovereignty that recedes into obliv-
ion once the civil order is established, but rather it ‘survives’ within 
this order in the form of the state of exception, in which sovereign 
power finds full manifestation: 
[Sovereignty] presents itself as the incorporation of the state of nature in 
society, or, if one prefers, as a state of indistinction between nature and 
culture, between violence and law, and this very indistinction constitutes 
specifically sovereign violence. The state of nature is therefore not truly 
external to nomos but rather contains its virtuality. Exteriority – the law 
of nature and the principle of the preservation of one’s own life – is truly 
the innermost centre of the political system and the political system lives 
off it in the same way that the rule, according to Schmitt, lives off the 
exception. (Ibid.: 35–6) 
Thus, the Hobbesian state of nature may no longer be treated as a 
pre-political condition but, as the state of exception, becomes the 
epitome of the political as such. ‘The state of nature is not a real 
epoch chronologically prior to the foundation of the City, but a prin-
ciple internal to the City, which appears at the moment the City is 
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considered tanquam dissoluta, “as if it were dissolved”’ (ibid.: 105). 
Agamben’s claim is hardly a deformation of Hobbes’s own argu-
ment, which, after all, never maintained an absolute spatiotemporal 
disjunction between the two conditions. Indeed, aside from the refer-
ence to the ‘savage people of America’, Hobbes’s famous examples 
of life in the state of nature do not concern any ancient or prehistoric 
condition but are resolutely contemporary: 
let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey he armes 
himselfe and seeks to go well-accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks 
his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he 
knows there bee Lawes, and publike officers, armed, to revenge all inju-
ries shall bee done him. (Hobbes 1985 [1651]: 186–7) 
These examples invoke the dangers perceived and acted upon by 
individuals who actually live in the Commonwealth under the 
protection of the sovereign. Yet they are nonetheless deployed to 
gain the readers’ adherence to the thesis about the ‘nasty, brutish 
and short’ (ibid.: 186) character of life in a wholly different condi-
tion, defined by the absence of the sovereign. If the state of nature 
is best illustrated by examples from our everyday existence in the 
Commonwealth, it can hardly be considered a real historical condi-
tion preceding its foundation.
Indeed, even in Hobbes’s own argument the state of nature is not 
presented as a real historical condition. While Agamben has been 
read as ‘dehistoricizing the Hobbesian construction’ of the state of 
nature (Rasch 2007: 101), this construction can hardly be dehistori-
cised because it was never historical to begin with. As Foucault has 
demonstrated, the ‘war of every man against every man’ that charac-
terises the state of nature is manifestly not a real historical condition, 
but a self-consciously fictitious construct, deployed rhetorically to 
legitimise the existence of the state:
[What] Hobbes calls the war of every man against every man is in no 
sense a real historical war, but a play of presentations that allows every 
man to evaluate the threat that every man represents to him, to evaluate 
the willingness of others to fight, and to assess the risk that he himself 
would run if he resorted to force. Sovereignty is established not by the fact 
of warlike domination, but, on the contrary, by a calculation that makes 
it possible to avoid war. For Hobbes, it is a nonwar that founds the State 
and gives it its form. (Foucault 2003: 270)
Contrary to the familiar image, Hobbes was neither a natural-
ist nor an essentialist, who posited a pre-political state of nature 
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that subsequent criticism would then reveal to be fictitious. On the 
contrary, what Hobbes did is consciously produce a fiction, whose 
only semblance to reality is uncannily provided by the exceptional 
moments of the dissolution of the social order or the dangers that 
persist even in the ordered Commonwealth. While the criticism that 
Hobbes anticipated (1985 [1651]: 186–8) accuses him of passing 
the fiction (the concept of state of nature) for reality (an actual pre-
political stage), the situation is exactly the opposite. By generalising 
the experiences of the crisis of the civil order and synthesising them 
into an originary condition of human existence, Hobbes turns reality 
into fiction, i.e. transforms the reality of the state of exception into 
a fiction of the state of nature, in which the sovereign violence that 
characterises the state of exception is cast as a ubiquitous feature of 
relations between human beings. It is precisely this operation that 
permits Hobbes to banish from the ‘City’ what is originally born in 
the City itself. 
In contrast, Agamben’s goal is to restore the state of nature to 
its status of the product of sovereign power, a contingency that is 
an effect of sovereign decision as opposed to a contingency that 
calls for sovereign decision. Thus, what Agamben does is not dehis-
toricise Hobbes’s state of nature, but rather restore reality to this 
ahistorical figure by dismantling the spatiotemporal distinction 
between the state of nature and the Commonwealth and recasting 
the state of nature as a ‘principle internal to the City’. The state of 
nature is constituted by the sovereign decision that, by treating the 
civil state as dissolved, suspends the operation of its internal laws 
and norms that define it as bios and thereby reduces the existence 
of its population to ‘bare life’. In this condition, the Covenant is 
treated as void and the subject is simultaneously abandoned by the 
sovereign, i.e. left without his protection, and abandoned to the 
sovereign’s unlimited exercise of violence. In this manner, the ficti-
tious condition of war of all against all gives way to a real, if no less 
terrifying, condition of the exposure of each and all to the sover-
eign violence arising from the suspension of the law. As Agamben 
reminds us (1998: 35), ‘in Hobbes the state of nature survives in the 
person of the sovereign who is the only one to preserve its natural 
ius contra omnes’. Insofar as we establish that the state of nature is 
not an antecedent epoch, its ‘survival’ in the figure of the sovereign 
must be treated as a metaphor that assists Hobbes in the legitima-
tion of sovereign violence manifested most explicitly in the right to 
punish:       
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[It] is manifest that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he or 
they that represent it) have to Punish, is not grounded on any concession 
or gift of the Subjects. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that 
right; but onely in laying down their, strengthened him to use his own, 
as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not 
given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set 
him by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and 
of warre of every one against his neighbour. (Hobbes 1985 [1651]: 354; 
emphasis added) 
Yet what does it mean for this right to be ‘left’ to the sovereign if we 
reject the idea of the temporal antecedence of the state of nature? 
What we are dealing with here is not a residue from a pre-political 
era but rather a remainder that is temporally coextensive with the 
political order in the manner of Agamben’s figure of the transcenden-
tal origin. Every legal system necessarily inscribes within itself some-
thing that is radically heterogeneous to it and cannot be represented 
in its terms, the ‘nothingness’, from which the sovereign decision 
‘emanates’ in Schmitt’s famous formulation (Schmitt 1985a: 12). 
Similarly, Agamben argues that 
[t]his space devoid of law seems to be so essential to the juridical order 
that it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in 
order to ground itself the juridical order necessarily had to maintain itself 
in relation with an anomie. (Agamben 2005a: 51) 
Thus, at the heart of any normative system there resides the ineradi-
cable potentiality of its self-suspension, whereby the rights ‘given’ 
to the sovereign (as well as rights given by him to the subjects) are 
rendered inoperative by the realisation of the originary right that 
was ‘left’ to the sovereign. The state of nature is thus nothing other 
than the inoperative ‘being-in-potentiality’ of the law (Agamben 
1998: 35), its already familiar potential not to be, i.e. ‘it is what 
remains of law if law is wholly suspended’ (Agamben 2005a: 80). 
The Hobbesian state of nature is not a prehistoric condition that we 
have long abandoned for the civil state, but rather a real and contem-
porary condition of being abandoned by this state, of being captured 
in the sovereign ban.
The stakes of this discussion of the status of the state of nature far 
exceed any historico-philological concerns. If, as the facile reading 
goes, Hobbes’s sovereign saves us from the war of all against all in 
the state of nature and protects us by preventing any relapse into 
that state, then, as William Rasch notes, ‘the political, however 
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temporary and flawed it may be, is cherished because it establishes 
the hope of civil peace. [The] principle of sovereignty is conse-
quently seen as a necessarily imperfect but nevertheless still neces-
sary solution to a perpetual problem’ (Rasch 2007: 102; emphasis 
original). However, if we concur with Agamben that ‘the problem 
that Hobbes thinks he solves is in reality the product of the politi-
cal space he creates’ (ibid.: 102; emphasis original), then the line 
of reasoning, espoused by the philosophers of the political from 
Hobbes to Schmitt and beyond, becomes incongruous if not outright 
obscene. If the state of nature is the product of the political, then the 
flaws and imperfections of the political, including the periodic or 
perpetual relapses into the state of exception, can by definition no 
longer be justified as ‘lesser evils’ in comparison with the ‘return’ to 
the state of nature, since they are nothing but this return itself, the 
secure Commonwealth being entirely indistinct from the perilous 
sovereign ban. 
Abandoned Life
Having outlined the formal logic of the sovereign ban, whereby the 
juridical order incorporates within itself the potentiality of its own 
suspension, let us now address the form of life confined in this ban. 
Perhaps the most famous of all Agamben’s paradigms is the figure 
of homo sacer in Roman law that exemplifies the subject caught up 
in the ban. According to Pompius Festus, a ‘sacred man’ is one who 
has been ‘judged on account of a crime’ and may not be sacrificed, 
yet may be killed without committing homicide (Agamben 1998: 
71). Homo sacer is thus excluded from both human law (as a being 
that can be killed with impunity) and divine law (as a being that 
cannot be given over to the gods). Yet, in an already recognisable 
twist, Agamben interprets this exclusion as simultaneously inclusive: 
‘homo sacer belongs to God in the form of unsacrificeability and is 
included in the community in the form of being able to be killed’ 
(ibid.: 72). This subject is included in the political order as wholly 
exposed to the potentiality of violent death that, moreover, carries 
no sacrificial sense whatsoever but is perfectly senseless.1 Homo sacer 
is thus the embodiment of bare life produced in the sovereign ban 
and may be grasped in terms of the inversion of the definition of the 
sovereign: ‘the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are 
potentially homines sacri, [while] homo sacer is the one to whom all 
mean act as sovereign’ (ibid.: 84). 
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At first glance, the figure of homo sacer has as little contempo-
rary relevance in Western democracies as the figure of the sovereign 
existing on the outer limits of the law. Yet, in Agamben’s argument, 
modern democracy did not abandon either the logic of sovereignty 
or bare life as its object, but rather ‘shattered it and disseminated 
it into every individual body, making it what is at stake in political 
conflict’ (ibid.: 124). While the complicated genealogy of this process 
is beyond the scope of our book, we may simply recall such land-
mark events as the writ of habeas corpus in late seventeenth-century 
England, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
in 1789, the rapid increase in the number of refugees and the state-
less in the aftermath of World War I, the rise of humanitarianism 
and the discourse of human rights in the post-World War II period, 
and so on. Every step in the democratic dissemination of sovereignty 
throughout the social body was accompanied by the subjection of 
individual bodies as ‘bare lives’. 
[The] principle of nativity and the principle of sovereignty are now irrevo-
cably united in the body of the ‘sovereign subject’ so that the foundation 
of the new nation-state may be constituted. What lies at the basis of the 
modern state is not man as a free and conscious political subject, but, 
above all, man’s bare life, the simple birth that as such is invested with the 
principle of sovereignty. (Ibid.: 128) 
The sovereign and homo sacer may well coexist in the same person 
who may be both the bearer of inalienable human rights and the 
object of governmental interventions that put its very existence at 
stake: ‘[he] who will appear as the bearer of rights and the new sov-
ereign subject can only be constituted as such through the repetition 
of the sovereign exception and the isolation of bare life in himself’ 
(ibid.: 128). The sovereign subject of rights becomes the abject bearer 
of bare life whenever the recognition of these rights by the state is 
suspended in the state of exception, which, as we have seen, remains 
a potentiality of every existing political order. 
The emblematic case here is that of refugees and the stateless who, 
having lost or forgone the citizenship of their states without gaining 
the citizenship of another state, find themselves abandoned by the 
law to purely arbitrary sovereign violence. Agamben follows Hannah 
Arendt in interpreting the plight of the refugees as the proof of the 
vacuity of the very idea of human rights. Refugees are perfect corre-
lates of the ‘rights of man’, since they are by definition deprived of all 
rights other than human rights. Yet rather than benefit from the only 
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rights for which they are eligible, they are abandoned to the power 
that does not recognise them as subjects of rights and, for this reason, 
as properly ‘human’ (see Arendt 1973: 267–302; Agamben 1998: 
126–34; 2000: 16). The figure of homo sacer is thus not an archaic 
remnant from the dark ages of autocracy but is only fully coming 
into its own with the democratic dissemination of sovereignty. Just as 
democracy can easily collapse into totalitarianism,2 so the sovereign 
freedoms and rights of the sovereign subject can always be converted 
into subjection to sovereign power.
The abandonment of the homo sacer to sovereign violence finds 
its institutional form in the concentration camp, which Agamben, 
famously and scandalously, termed ‘the nomos of the modern’ (1998: 
166). Since this thesis has given rise to numerous misunderstandings 
and facile criticism of ‘jarringly disconcerting claims’, ‘wild state-
ments’ and ‘unregulated decisions’ (see respectively LaCapra 2007: 
133; Laclau 2007: 22; Norris 2005: 273), it is important to be clear 
about what Agamben intended with it. It is evidently not a matter 
of saying that we all live in concentration camps or are all equally 
likely to end up in them any time soon, even though we ought not to 
forget that camps of all kinds (refugee camps, special prisons, deten-
tion centres, correctional facilities, rehab centres, deportation facili-
ties, and so on) are indeed becoming everyday reality for increasing 
numbers of people worldwide. Similarly to the notion of homo sacer, 
the camp is one of the hyperbolic paradigms whose problematic status 
in Agamben’s work we addressed in the discussion of Bartleby. If the 
‘state of exception comes more and more to the foreground as the fun-
damental political structure and ultimately begins to become the rule’, 
then the nomos, i.e. the fundamental spatial order, of modern politics 
must reflect this shift topologically: ‘today it is not the city but rather 
the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West’ 
(Agamben 1998: 181). If the exception is everywhere becoming the 
rule, then it is not surprising that the paradigm of such a politics must 
be a space in which the indistinction of the rule and the exception, 
norm and fact, law and life, is absolute and the curse of bare life as the 
negative foundation of politics becomes fully transparent.
[The] camp is the structure in which the state of exception is realized 
normally. The sovereign no longer limits himself to deciding on the 
exception on the basis of recognizing a given factual situation (danger 
to public safety). The camp is a hybrid of law and fact, in which the two 
terms have become indistinguishable. Whoever entered the camp moved 
in a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, 
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licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridi-
cal protection no longer made any sense. Insofar as its inhabitants were 
stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp 
was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, 
in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation. 
(Ibid.: 170–1)
Thus the camp is the materialisation of the state of exception in its 
most regular or normal form, of the exception-as-rule, which, in 
Agamben’s reading, is the tendency of contemporary world politics. 
While the claim that the camp is the nomos of modernity would 
evidently be unwarranted if it was read as an attempt to subsume all 
topologies of modern social or political life (e.g. parliaments, facto-
ries, universities, hospitals, and so on) under the model of the camp, 
it is not entirely illegitimate as a paradigm of modern politics, since 
it illuminates the structure of the indistinction between the exception 
and the rule in the most stark and unadulterated manner. It is not 
that all modern political spaces are camps but rather that the camp 
illuminates most starkly what all these spaces may become if the ten-
dency towards the indistinction of the exception and the rule is fully 
actualised in them. Any institutional space, structured according to 
the principle of the ban, is a variation of the model of the camp, irre-
spectively of whether mass atrocities are committed there or not (yet).
It is from the same perspective that we should consider the third 
controversial paradigmatic figure that Agamben presents in Homo 
Sacer and develops in detail in the sequel to that work, Remnants 
of Auschwitz: the Muselmann. In the Nazi concentration camps 
the Muselmänner were those inmates who were so weakened and 
decrepit both physically and mentally that they were perceived as 
the ‘living dead’, occupying the limit between humanity and inhu-
manity. The Muselmann exemplifies most starkly the often obscured 
difference between bare life and natural life: there is nothing natural, 
animal or instinctual left in the Muselmann, his ‘nature’ being taken 
away from him along with his ‘reason’, ‘dignity’ or any other feature 
of the positive order of bios. And yet the Muselmann remains alive, 
precisely in the sense of bare life obtained by the progressive subtrac-
tion of every possible qualification that leaves one alive ‘as such’, in 
one’s pure being (Agamben 1999c: 41–86). Similarly to the Voice in 
Agamben’s philosophy of language, which is a purely negative figure 
obtained by the ‘removal’ or negation of natural or animal sound, 
bare life is removed as much from nature as it is from culture. 
The horror of the camps consists precisely in the fact that they 
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managed to produce, as a real existence, what has hitherto remained 
an obscene fiction, a life wholly devoid of any attributes. Agamben 
refers to this real existence of bare life as ‘survival’, interpreting it 
as the main effect of the biopolitical capture of life in the state of 
exception: ‘biopolitics [operates] on the disjunction between the 
organic and the animal, realizing the dream of a vegetative life that 
indefinitely survives the life of relation, a non-human life infinitely 
separable from human existence’ (ibid.: 154). Whereas for Foucault 
sovereign power consists in making die and modern biopolitics 
consists in making live, Agamben’s sovereign biopolitics must be 
grasped as ‘making survive’: ‘biopower’s supreme ambition is to 
produce, in a human body, the absolute separation of the living being 
and the speaking being, zoe and bios, the inhuman and the human’ 
(ibid.: 156). The production of this separation evidently cannot be 
grasped in terms of any instrumental rationality or functional logic. 
It is not a matter of biopolitics producing a positive form of life cor-
relative with the principles of a certain political ideology, such as a 
liberal, socialist or fascist subject. The separation at work in ‘making 
survive’ is so extreme as to ultimately separate the Muselmann as 
its product from the very power that made him or her such, making 
power itself powerless before a being that has become indifferent to 
everything. The Muselmann is the embodiment of the perversity of 
biopolitics in the condition of nihilism where the exception becomes 
the rule and the machine of government is running on empty, no 
longer distinguishing between making die and making live, between 
friends and enemies, but ceaselessly and senselessly strips life of all 
forms and predicates, ending up with a bare life that can no longer 
even suffer the violence it is subjected to. 
The three figures of bare life, homo sacer and the Muselmann are 
often equated or treated as homologous, which leads to the criti-
cism of Agamben as allegedly equating well-off citizens of Western 
democracies with concentration camp inmates (cf. Ojakangas 2005; 
De la Durantaye 2009: 210–11). It is important to stress that the 
three terms differ in terms of both conceptual scope and the intensity 
of their connotations. Evidently, bare life is the most general term 
of all and embraces not merely the lives of ostensible victims but 
also sovereigns themselves, from Roman emperors to Hitler, whose 
authority (auctoritas) (Agamben 2005a: 74–88; 1998: 172–3, 184) 
was inscribed in their very bodies, supplementing and exceeding the 
formal powers (potestas) conferred by the law. Other examples of 
bare life include comatose patients, doctors experimenting on their 
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own bodies, the bandit or the exiled, and so on (Agamben 1998: 
181–6). The Muselmann is only the most extreme and hyperbolic 
example of bare life, a life from which everything positive has been 
stripped and all that exists is permanent exposure to death in a space 
of confinement: ‘[it] is the final biopolitical substance to be isolated 
in the biological continuum. Beyond the Muselmann lies only the gas 
chamber’ (Agamben 1999c: 85). Homo sacer may then be under-
stood as an errant figure between the extremes of the more ‘benign’ 
modes of bare life (such as body artists, experimental scientists, 
romantic outcasts) and the Muselmann as its negative limit. Unlike 
the camp inmate, the original Roman homo sacer was not confined 
and remained free despite his exclusion and exposure; the literal de-
formation of life that is actualised for the Muselmann remains only 
potential for homo sacer. This is why it would be obscene to say that 
‘we are all Muselmänner’, which Agamben never said, but it makes 
sense to claim, as Agamben does repeatedly, that ‘we are all virtually 
homines sacri’ (Agamben 1998: 115).
Towards a Real State of Exception
The topology of the state of exception is in Agamben’s argument the 
quasi-transcendental condition of Occidental politics, characterising 
all Western political orders from the ancient times onwards (for a 
critique see, for example, Laclau 2007; Fitzpatrick 2005; Deranty 
2008). What does vary historically is the precise status of the state of 
exception within the order that it founds. In Agamben’s reading, the 
political history of the West is marked by the gradual expansion of 
the state of exception from a circumscribed area within the political 
order, which manifested itself in concrete occasions of public tumult, 
the death of the ruler, anomic feasts, and so on (Agamben 2005a: 
65–73) to the entire domain of nomos itself: 
[W]hat happened and is still happening before our eyes is that the ‘juridi-
cally empty’ space of the state of exception (in which the law is in force 
in the figure of its own dissolution, and in which everything that the 
sovereign deemed de facto necessary could happen) has transgressed its 
spatiotemporal boundaries and now, overflowing outside them, is start-
ing to coincide with the normal order, in which everything again becomes 
possible. (Agamben 1998: 38) 
As long as the exception as the constitutive outside of the political 
order remained marginal, its foundational role could be concealed 
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beneath the veneer of the positive norms instituted by the state, 
violated only as a matter of ‘emergency’ or ‘necessity’. Yet, in 
Agamben’s argument, starting from World War I (which, for him, is 
the decisive event of European, and subsequently global, nihilism), 
the exception and the rule have become increasingly difficult to dis-
tinguish (1998: 37–8; 2004b: 76–7). Examples of this indistinction 
are numerous, ranging from the expansion of administrative regula-
tion in all spheres of life that sidelines parliamentary procedures of 
law-making to wars and military operations undertaken in blatant 
disregard of international law. Following Benjamin’s famous claim in 
his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ about the state of exception 
becoming the rule (1968: 257), Agamben argues that contemporary 
world politics is characterised by the tendency towards the coinci-
dence of the exception and the rule in the apparatus that can only be 
compared to a ‘killing machine’:
[As] long as the two elements (law and anomie) remain correlated yet 
conceptually, temporally and subjectively distinct, their dialectic can 
nevertheless function in some way. But when they tend to coincide in 
the single person, when the state of exception, in which they are bound 
and blurred together, becomes the rule, then the juridico-political system 
transforms itself into a killing machine. The normative aspect of law can 
thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a government 
violence that – while ignoring international law externally and producing 
a permanent state of exception internally – nevertheless still claims to be 
applying the law. (Agamben 2005a: 86–7)
In an already familiar rhetorical strategy Agamben invokes the image 
of an apparatus of law under the condition of nihilism, in which all 
positive content of the law is exhausted and all that remains is its 
pure force, indistinguishable from sheer violence and yet confined 
into a separate, pseudo-sacred sphere of legality. Just as in the con-
dition of nihilism the Voice as the negative foundation of language 
ultimately assumes centre-stage in voiding speech of all meaningful 
content and leaving it with the quasi-mystical communication of the 
Nothing itself, so the law entirely consumed by the exception is a 
machine that keeps running on empty without any positive produc-
tivity other than the consumption of the lives it captures within itself. 
Yet, if the problem has a familiar ring, then so must the solution. 
Let us first consider two apparently self-evident but ultimately false 
solutions to the problem of the sovereign ban. The first consists in 
the perfection of the legal system in order to banish every trace of the 
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exception from it: if the problem with the law is the potentiality of its 
suspension, why not make such a suspension impossible? Agamben 
is scathing about every attempt to resolve the problem of the state of 
exception by bringing it 
back within its spatially and temporally defined boundaries in order to 
then reaffirm the primacy of a norm and of rights that are themselves ulti-
mately grounded in it. From the real state of exception in which we live, 
it is not possible to return to the state of law. (Ibid.: 87) 
The legal-positivist argument that characterised the liberalism of 
Schmitt’s time as well as many of its contemporary descendants 
is convincingly refuted by Agamben’s radicalisation of Schmitt’s 
decisionism, which demonstrates the dependence of the rule on the 
exception, whereby every positive right is conditioned by the sover-
eign’s ‘preservation’ of the right to punish. Any search for a more 
effective, ‘exception-proof’ legal system, a perfect bios without the 
inclusive exclusion of zoe, is entirely in vain. Modern nihilism is not 
a matter of the exception somehow escaping its ‘proper’ confines and 
running amok but rather of the illumination of its constitutive status 
for every form of order. 
On the other hand, neither is it possible to return from the ban to 
a pre-political state of nature, a zoe not yet degraded by its negation 
in the bios. If the state of nature were temporally antecedent to sov-
ereign power, then it could at least be envisioned, however naively, 
as a site of possible redemption. Nonetheless, there is no passage 
back from bios to zoe and any attempt at such passage only throws 
us back into the state of exception and the production of bare life. 
There are not first life as a natural biological given and anomie as the state 
of nature and then their implication in law through the state of excep-
tion. On the contrary, the very possibility of distinguishing life and law, 
anomie and nomos, coincides with their articulation in the biopolitical 
machine. (Ibid.: 88) 
Moreover, Agamben’s account of human subjectivation in language 
that we have addressed in the previous chapter clearly demonstrates 
the impossibility of any return to natural existence. The entrance of 
the human being into language necessarily involves the ‘expropria-
tion’ of all its pre-linguistic experience as a living being, the removal 
of the natural phone as a condition for the acquisition of logos. In 
exactly the same manner, the political existence of humanity is from 
the outset accompanied by the ‘removal’ or crossing out of zoe, 
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whose inclusive exclusion as a negative foundation of the politi-
cal order makes impossible any ‘return to nature’ other than in the 
form of an obscene and degrading ‘dehumanisation’ practised in the 
concentration camps and other loci of the state of exception. Thus, 
it is impossible to break out of the state of exception through an 
unequivocal valorisation of either bios or zoe, which leads Agamben 
to assert the ultimate futility of maintaining this dualism:
[Every] attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin 
with the clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the clas-
sical distinction between zoe and bios, between private life and political 
existence, between man as a simple living being at home in the house and 
man’s political existence in the city. There is no return from the camps to 
classical politics. In the camps, city and house became indistinguishable, 
and the possibility of differentiating between our biological body and our 
political body was taken from us forever. (Agamben 1998: 188)
Yet if this is so, then the state of exception appears almost immu-
table. It is at this point that Agamben deploys his already familiar 
‘comic’ move of finding the ‘saving power’ in the conditions of 
utmost danger, hopelessness or despair. We have no hope of evading 
the state of exception by opting for the uncontaminated normativ-
ity of bios or the pure naturalism of zoe. The only solution to the 
problem of the political is to be found within the state of exception 
and consists in rendering inoperative the entire ‘killing machine’ of 
biopolitical sovereignty: 
if it is possible to attempt to halt the machine, this is because between vio-
lence and law, between life and norm there is no substantial articulation. 
Alongside the movement that seeks to keep them in relation at all cost, 
there is a countermovement that, working in a reverse direction in law 
and in life, always seeks to loosen what has been artificially and violently 
linked. (Agamben 2005a: 86) 
Following Benjamin, Agamben terms this countermovement ‘the real 
state of exception’, as opposed to the ‘fictive’ state of exception that 
remains connected to the law and appropriated by the sovereign. 
This real state of exception would be the precise equivalent of the 
experimentum linguae that speaks the sheer facticity of language and 
the community wholly contained in the factum pluralitatis. In the 
biopolitical lexicon introduced in this chapter, such a state of excep-
tion would evidently consist in rendering inoperative every form of 
bios so as to reclaim and reaffirm the bare life produced and caught 
up in it. 
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In Homo Sacer the path toward the real state of exception is envi-
sioned in terms of a radical distancing from the law: 
Only if it is possible to think the Being of abandonment beyond every idea 
of the law (even that of the empty form of law’s being in force without 
significance) will we have moved out of the paradox of sovereignty 
towards a politics freed from every ban. (Agamben 1998: 59) 
This admittedly arcane claim must be understood in the context of 
Benjamin’s seminal essay ‘Critique of Violence’ in which he distin-
guished between law-preserving and law-establishing violence as two 
forms of ‘mythic’ violence. Law-preserving violence pertains to the 
order of ‘constituted power’ and consists in legal, para- or extra-legal 
measures that sustain the existing law and order of things. Law-
establishing violence pertains to the dimension of ‘constituent power’ 
and serves to institute a new form of order, which makes it ipso facto 
impossible to subsume under the existing norms and laws (Benjamin 
1978: 277–300). 
Agamben reinterprets the problem of the relation between the 
anarchic and revolutionary violence of constituent power and the 
stabilising and ordering violence of constituted power in the context 
of his theory of potentiality, discussed in Chapter 2. While the prior-
itisation of actuality over potentiality would logically entail the com-
plete exhaustion of constituent power in the constituted order that 
it establishes, the affirmation of constituent power is only thinkable 
on the basis of the assertion of the ontological primacy of potential-
ity. Antonio Negri, Agamben’s critical interlocutor since the 1970s, 
ventures precisely such an affirmation, separating constituent power 
as creative and revolutionary power of the multitude from the consti-
tuted power of the state or any other structure of authority. 
[Constituting] power is the act of choice, the punctual determination 
that opens a horizon, the radical enacting of something that did not exist 
before and whose conditions of existence stipulated that the creative act 
cannot lose its characteristics in creating. Sovereignty, on the other hand, 
arises as the establishment – and therefore, as the end – of constitut-
ing power, as the consumption of the freedom brought by constituting 
power. (Negri cited in Agamben 1998: 43)
Negri’s argument belongs to the long series of attempts of the 
radical-democratic tradition to theorise constituent power in the 
manner that prevents its exhaustion in the constituted order to 
which it gives rise, the tradition whose twentieth-century paradigms 
PROZOROV 9780748676200 PRINT.indd   116 04/12/2013   15:07
117
how to play with the law: inoperative statehood 
include Trotsky’s ‘permanent revolution’ and Mao’s ‘uninterrupted 
revolution’ (Agamben 1998: 41–2). While Negri wishes to dissociate 
the potentiality of constituent power from the ‘actualising’ force of 
sovereignty, Agamben rather finds the ontological structure of sov-
ereignty precisely in the Aristotelian concept of potentiality, which, 
as we recall, is always potentiality not to be. While the conventional 
reading of sovereignty as supreme law-giving power emphasises 
the ‘positive’ dimension of potentiality (‘I can’), to be worthy of 
the name this potentiality must be accompanied by its ‘negative’ 
counterpart (‘I can not’), which refers precisely to the possibility 
for the sovereign to suspend the law that it itself gives, to treat the 
Commonwealth tanquam dissoluta. It is in this suspended state that 
potentiality can maintain a real existence without passing completely 
into actuality and this is precisely the way the law exists in the state 
of exception: ‘the sovereign ban, which applies to the exception in no 
longer applying, corresponds to the structure of potentiality, which 
maintains itself in relation to actuality precisely through its ability 
not to be’ (ibid.: 46). It is thus impossible to oppose sovereignty as 
the actualising force of order to the constituent power of the multi-
tude as creative potentiality: 
potentiality and actuality are simply the two faces of the sovereign self-
grounding of Being. Sovereignty is always double because Being, as 
potentiality, suspends itself, maintaining itself in a relation of ban with 
itself in order to realize itself as absolute actuality. At the limit, pure 
potentiality and pure actuality are indistinguishable, and the sovereign is 
precisely this zone of indistinction. (Ibid.: 47) 
Thus, sovereign power always already possesses all those features of 
potentiality and creativity that Negri and other thinkers in the radi-
cal-democratic or populist traditions try to reserve for the multitude, 
the people, the revolutionary party, the councils or other embodi-
ments of constituent power. Agamben’s argument sheds light on the 
problem that has plagued arguably the entire history of revolution-
ary movements, whose victories have, with important variations, 
largely led to the reproduction of the sovereign and statist logics that 
these movements initially targeted. Examples of French, Russian and 
Chinese revolutions are sufficient to observe how sovereign power 
recuperates the creative potentialities ostensibly advanced against it. 
In Agamben’s interpretation, this repeated failure of radical politics 
has to do with its commitment to law and sovereignty in the guise of 
apparent opposition to them in the form of constituent power. 
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Politics has suffered a lasting eclipse because it has been contaminated 
by law, seeing itself, at best, as constituent power (that is, violence that 
makes law), when it is not reduced to merely the power to negotiate with 
the law. The only truly political action, however, is that, which severs the 
nexus between violence and law. (Agamben 2005a: 88) 
The pathway to a post-statist politics thus does not consist in vain 
attempts to purify constituent power from the constituted order but 
in severing the link between power (potentiality) and constitution as 
such, whatever positive form it takes:
That constituting power never exhausts itself in constituted power is not 
enough: sovereign power can also, as such, maintain itself indefinitely, 
without ever passing into actuality. [One] must think the existence of 
potentiality without any relation to Being in the form of actuality – not 
even in the extreme form of the ban and the potentiality not to be – and 
think the existence of potentiality even without any relation to being in 
the form of the gift of the self and of letting be. This, however, implies 
nothing less than thinking ontology and politics beyond every figure of 
relation. (Agamben 1998: 47)
These lines are among the most enigmatic in Agamben’s entire 
oeuvre, yet the conclusion to this chapter of Homo Sacer provides us 
with an important clue for their decipherment. Agamben concludes 
the discussion of potentiality and law with an invocation of none 
other than Bartleby, whose ‘objection’ to the principle of sover-
eignty was ‘stronger’ than that of Schelling, Nietzsche or Heidegger 
(ibid.: 48). It is thus inoperativity that emerges as the solution to the 
ontologico-political problem of the exception. Indeed, we had this 
solution in our sights all along, since it was embodied in none other 
than the sovereign itself as the figure that exists in the world in the 
suspended, exceptional mode of constitutive alterity. The problem is 
thus not sovereignty per se, which, as we have seen, is but a political 
translation of the ontological concept of potentiality and is therefore 
at work in any meaningful notion of freedom (see Prozorov 2007), 
but rather the confinement of this inoperative potentiality within the 
‘sacred’ sphere of the law that makes the state of exception always 
‘fictive’, its anomie always already annexed to or subsumed by 
the nomos (Agamben 2005a: 58–9). The inoperative potentiality of 
the sovereign exception is thereby brought back ‘to work’ as a form 
of power in the same way that the glorious bodies of the blessed are 
delivered from all functions and tasks, except for the ostensive func-
tion, the work of glory. Similarly to the glorious body, the feast or 
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the hymn, in politics inoperative potentiality is withdrawn from free 
common use and embodied in the figure of the sovereign, leaving its 
subjects to acclaim the glory of that which they were deprived of.
If this fictitious state of exception is to be made ‘real’, inoperativ-
ity must shed every relation to the law, which entails that it is no 
longer contained within a single sovereign person or institution but is 
radically generalised throughout the social realm. The empty throne 
that symbolised the restriction of inoperativity to a single glorified 
figure must be smashed into pieces that could never form a single 
whole. The idea of a dispersed or disseminated sovereignty, in which 
potentiality is no longer restricted to a particular person or structure, 
recalls Agamben’s idea of a universalist community wholly contained 
in the factum pluralitatis of being-in-common without a common 
identity, task or vocation. It is precisely this ‘coming community’ of 
whatever being that is the subject of politics in the real state of excep-
tion, a politics that is post-juridical or post-statist without being in 
a strict sense post-sovereign, since sovereignty in the ontological 
sense of potentiality, of the sheer affirmation ‘I can’ (cf. Derrida 
2005: 11–13, 23), is not only not absent from this community but 
is universally dispersed within and absorbed by it. The real state of 
exception thus consists in the reappropriation of the sovereignty that 
characterises our very being, the reappropriation of our potentiality 
from the ban and, ultimately, the appropriation of our abandonment 
as such (see Prozorov 2009a).
Thus potentiality without relation to the law is nothing other than 
inoperative praxis that neither sustains nor institutes a form of order 
but rather deactivates it, dissolving the relation between law and life, 
norm and fact, established in the state of exception. In his ‘Critique 
of Violence’ Benjamin terms this mode of action that is neither law-
preserving nor law-establishing ‘divine violence’ (1978: 297–300). 
While this esoteric concept has given rise to numerous divergent 
interpretations (see Derrida 1992; Žižek 2009: 157–73; Weber 
2008: 176–94; Martell 2011; Critchley 2012: 207–45), Agamben 
understands divine violence as a ‘pure means’ (2000: 116–18, 57–60; 
2005a: 60–4) that has lost every relationship to any end and merely 
manifests its own pure mediality. Similarly to the already familiar 
concepts of ‘whatever being’ and ‘being-thus’ a pure means is a 
being wholly exposed in the facticity of its being, subtracted from 
an identity or function and for this reason available for new forms 
of use. Divine violence is pure not in the sense of its transcendent 
or unearthly origin but in the same sense that Benjamin’s ‘universal 
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language’ was pure in being devoid of any signifying content, saying 
nothing but its own communicability: ‘To a word that does not bind, 
that neither commands nor prohibits anything, but says only itself, 
would correspond an action as pure means, which shows only itself, 
without any relation to an end’ (Agamben 2005a: 88).
What is divine about this exposure? Evidently, divine violence is 
not the violence authorised by a divinity or purified of all earthly 
considerations, but quite simply a mode of praxis that deactivates its 
tie to the law, rendering it inoperative and thus available for a new, 
non-instrumental use in the manner we described in Chapter 2 in 
terms of profanation and play: ‘one day humanity will play with law 
just as children play with disused toys, not in order to restore them to 
the canonical use but to free them from it for good’ (ibid.: 64). While 
we are conventionally inclined to only accept or forgive violence in 
the situations where it is ‘absolutely necessary’, divine violence is 
on the contrary devoid of any claim to necessity and divorced from 
every end. What is divine about it is precisely its utter indifference 
to any end, its non-strategic gratuitousness that contrasts with the 
calculative deployment of violence by various governmental appara-
tuses. Yet it would evidently be absurd to understand this gratuitous 
character of violence as the unconditional ‘licence to kill’. While 
the reference to divinity in Benjamin’s formulation is sometimes 
interpreted in terms of omnipotence, we may rather suggest that it 
should be understood in the diametrically opposite sense, resonating 
with the notion of ‘weak messianic power’ that Benjamin’s ‘Theses 
on the Philosophy of History’ invoke (Benjamin 1968: 254; cf. 
Agamben 2005b: 125–37, Santner 2006: 87–95, Dickinson 2011: 
84–98; Prozorov 2007: 143–6). Messianic power is ‘weak’ not only 
because it is comparatively weaker than sovereign power but because 
it operates by weakening the latter without producing its own form 
of sovereignty, its power being wholly exhausted in its Bartlebyan 
‘decreation’ of established orders. Divine violence does not seek to 
defeat sovereign power at its own game of establishing and maintain-
ing the law but rather seeks to put an end to the game itself.
Form-of-Life
What does it mean to live in the real state of exception? What 
happens to bare life when it is no longer caught up in the sovereign 
ban but exists with no relation to the law? Is this life still bare? Is it 
bios, zoe or perhaps something else entirely? In the final paragraph 
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to Homo Sacer Agamben presents the idea of life in the real state of 
exception in rather elliptic terms:
Just as the biopolitical body of the West cannot be simply given back to 
its natural life in the oikos, so it cannot be overcome in a passage to a 
new body – a technical body or a wholly political or glorious body – in 
which a different economy of pleasures and vital functions would once 
and for all resolve the interlacement of zoe and bios that seems to define 
the political destiny of the West. This biopolitical body that is bare life 
must itself instead be transformed into the site for the constitution and 
installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a 
bios that is only its own zoe. (Agamben 1998: 188) 
Agamben’s formulations in this fragment are easy to misunderstand. 
After all, doesn’t a ‘bios that is only its own zoe’ correspond precisely 
to the structure of the sovereign ban? It certainly does, since, as we 
have seen, the state of exception is the only site of political praxis 
left to us, neither pure bios nor pure zoe being any longer acces-
sible. Yet while sovereignty operates by capturing and separating 
bare life from the positive forms of bios or, in what amounts to the 
same thing, crushing these forms down to the level of pure survival, 
Agamben makes the opposite move of articulating zoe and bios into 
a new figure, in which ‘it is never possible to isolate something like 
naked life’ (Agamben 2000: 9). Thus, as Catherine Mills (2005: 
219) has argued, there are not two but four figures of life at work 
in Agamben’s argument: besides bios and zoe that are no longer 
accessible to us, there is bare life that is obtained by the negation 
of zoe within bios and, finally, the articulation of zoe and bios into 
a new unity, which Agamben calls form-of-life, the hyphenation 
highlighting the integrity of this figure, in which life and its form are 
inseparable (Agamben 2000: 11; cf. Agamben 1999b: 208). In order 
to understand the logic of this articulation, we must return to the 
homology between bare life and the Voice in language or pure being 
in ontology. 
[In] the syntagm ‘bare life’, ‘bare’ corresponds to the Greek haplos, 
the term by which first philosophy defines pure Being. The isolation 
of the sphere of pure Being, which constitutes the fundamental activ-
ity of Western metaphysics, is not without analogies with the isolation 
of bare life in the realm of Western politics. Precisely these two empty 
and indeterminate concepts safeguard the keys to the historico-political 
destiny of the West. And it may be that only if we are able to decipher the 
political meaning of pure Being will we be able to master the bare life that 
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expresses our subjection to political power, just as it may be, inversely, 
that only if we understand the theoretical implications of bare life will we 
be able to solve the enigma of ontology. (Agamben 1998: 182)
On the basis of this homology, the political resolution of the problem 
of bare life follows strictly from the Heideggerian affirmation of exist-
ence as the sole content of the essence of the human (Heidegger 1962: 
67). ‘Today bios lies in zoe exactly as essence, in the Heideggerian 
definition of Dasein, lies in existence’ (Agamben 1998: 188). If the 
essence of the human is unpresentable in terms of positive predicates 
(‘what one is’) but consists in the sheer facticity of its existence (‘that 
one is’), then the form of bios proper to the human is indeed its own 
zoe, whose sheer facticity is no longer the negated foundation of 
bios but rather its entire content, there being no other form, essence, 
task or identity imposed on it. What Agamben calls form-of-life is ‘a 
being that is its own bare existence, [a] life that, being its own form, 
remains inseparable from it’ (ibid.: 188). The notion of form-of-life 
follows the logic of the experimentum linguae that brings to speech 
the very existence of language and of the coming community whose 
sole content is the fact of being-in-common. Just as in Language 
and Death Agamben breaks with the ineffability of the Voice and 
attempts to ‘speak the unspeakable’ by bringing the existence of 
language itself to language, so at the end of Homo Sacer he affirms 
the possibility of a form of life that ‘brings bare life itself to life’ (see 
Kishik 2012: 99–119). 
In The Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben elaborates this notion 
of the form-of-life through an engagement with the theological idea 
of ‘eternal life’ (zoe aionios). While in Christian theology this idea 
ultimately took the form of the discourse on the resurrection of the 
kind we addressed in Chapter 2, Agamben highlights an earlier and 
more originary understanding of ‘eternal life’ in Pauline messianism, 
in which it does not pertain to a hypothetical future condition but 
rather designates a specific quality of life in the messianic time, char-
acterised by the becoming-inoperative of every determinate identity 
or vocation, which now appear in the suspended form of the ‘as not’ 
(hos me) – the notion we shall return to in the following chapter. 
Under the ‘as not’, life cannot coincide with itself and is divided into a 
life that we live and a life for which and in which we live. To live in the 
Messiah means precisely to revoke and render inoperative at each instant 
every aspect of the life that we live and to make the life for which we live, 
which Paul calls ‘the life of Jesus’, appear within it. (Agamben 2011: 248) 
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In this reading, eternal life has nothing to do with the afterlife but is 
rather a way of living this life that renders inoperative all its specific 
forms of bios, its functions, tasks and identities. 
Agamben then proceeds from the theological to the philosophical 
context to elaborate this figure of eternal life in terms of the Spinozan 
idea of acquiescentia (self-contentment), ‘the pleasure arising from 
man’s contemplation of himself and his power of activity’ (Spinoza 
cited in Agamben 2011: 250). In Agamben’s interpretation it is 
precisely this contemplation of one’s own power that articulates 
inoperativity and potentiality, opening one’s existence to a free and 
profane use. To the glorious life of the sovereign stands opposed the 
eternal life of the homo sacer restored to its potentiality, a form of 
life wholly exhausted in the reappropriated bare life (see Chiesa and 
Ruda 2011).
[The] life, which contemplates its (own) power to act, renders itself inop-
erative in all its operations, and lives only (its) livability. In this inopera-
tivity the life that we live is only the life through which we live: only our 
power of acting and living. Here the bios coincides with the zoe without 
remainder. Properly human praxis is sabbatism that, by rendering the 
specific functions of the living inoperative, opens them to possibility. 
(Agamben 2011: 251) 
Insofar as this ‘sabbatical’ life renders all positive forms of bios inop-
erative, it coincides with zoe, yet insofar as zoe is no longer negated 
as a foundation of bios, it does not take the degraded form of bare 
life. Rather than reduce political life to a pseudo-natural life through 
acts of dehumanisation, the ‘eternal life’ of contemplation affirms the 
potentiality of the human being and thus functions as a 
[metaphysical] operator of anthropogenesis, liberating the living man 
from his biological or social destiny, assigning him to that indefinable 
dimension that we are accustomed to call ‘politics’. The political is neither 
a bios nor a zoe, but the dimension that the inoperativity of contempla-
tion, by deactivating linguistic and corporeal, material and immaterial 
praxes, ceaselessly opens and assigns to the living. (Ibid.: 251) 
What is eternal about this ‘eternal life’ is then evidently not its span, 
but rather the excess of potentiality over actuality that is freed when 
the actual positive forms of life are rendered inoperative in the mode 
of contemplation.
It is easy to see that, just as the appropriation of the event of 
language in speech, on which it is modelled, the politics of the form-
of-life is made possible by the condition of nihilism, which renders 
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void all positive contents of speech acts and forms of life. Just as the 
experimentum linguae is enabled by the nihilistic perception of the 
vanity and vacuity of all speech, the affirmation of the inoperative 
form-of-life in the real state of exception is fortified by the crisis or 
demise of all other political alternatives to the status quo, particu-
larly in the post-Cold War era, which in the 1990s was optimistically 
labelled the ‘end of history’. While today the diagnosis of the end of 
history is perceived as naive if not outright ludicrous, it is arguably 
less productive to endlessly refute it, pointing to every minor event as 
an apparent ‘return’ of history, than to rethink it, which is precisely 
what Agamben has done in his writings from the late 1980s onwards. 
In the following chapter we shall address Agamben’s interpretation 
of modern nihilism as a post-historical condition and account for his 
messianic strategy of rendering the historical process inoperative.
Notes
1. This senselessness will become important to Agamben’s theorisation of 
the Shoah in both Homo Sacer and Remnants of Auschwitz. Agamben 
rejects the use of the concept of the Holocaust to describe the extermi-
nation of European Jews, since it lends a sacrificial aura to the process 
whose horror is amplified by the total senselessness of the process: ‘The 
Jews were exterminated not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as 
Hitler had announced, “as lice”, which is to say, as bare life. The dimen-
sion in which the extermination took place is neither religion nor law, 
but biopolitics’ (Agamben 1998: 114. See also Agamben 1999c: 28–31).
2. The twentieth century provides an abundance of examples of the totali-
tarian conversion of democracy, from the collapse of the Weimar Republic 
to the degeneration of the democracy of Soviets in post-revolutionary 
Russia into Stalinist autocracy. Yet Agamben’s scandalous invocation 
of an ‘intimate solidarity’ between democracy and totalitarianism is not 
merely grounded in this historical evidence of the fragility of democratic 
institutions but goes considerably further (Agamben 1998: 10). What 
accounts for the intimate solidarity of the two regimes is the condition 
of nihilism that renders both forms of rule devoid of sense and accounts 
for their ‘decadence’. The key inspiration here is Guy Debord’s famous 
theory of the ‘society of the spectacle’ (1994), which has been important 
for Agamben’s work since the 1970s. For Debord, both totalitarian and 
democratic regimes were forms of what he called the spectacle, in which 
authentic existence is replaced by representation and the commodity-
form colonises social life as such. Socialist totalitarianism exemplified 
a ‘concentrated’ spectacle, in which the sphere of representation was 
controlled by the state apparatus, while liberal democracy exemplified a 
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‘diffuse’ spectacle, in which this control is disseminated throughout civil 
society. In his later Comments on the Society of the Spectacle Debord 
(2011) introduced the third figure of the ‘integrated spectacle’, a post-
Cold War synthesis of democratic and totalitarian forms that combines 
enhanced state control with the proliferation of ‘private’ production of 
representations (see Agamben 2000: 73–89). This theory is important 
for understanding Agamben’s pessimism about democracy at the very 
moment of its apparent triumph in the Cold War. What some com-
mentators viewed as the ‘end of history’, whereby democracy became 
the ‘only game in town’, having triumphed over its adversaries, was for 
Agamben the premonition of democracy’s own decay. We shall return to 
Agamben’s diagnosis of the post-Cold War condition in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5 
The Time of the End: Inoperative History
In this chapter we shall probe Agamben’s affirmation of inoperativity 
in the domain of history. In the early 1990s Agamben joined other 
continental philosophers in the criticism of Francis Fukuyama’s 
influential adaptation of the Hegelian-Kojèvian thesis on the end of 
history and developed an alternative notion of the deactivation of 
the historical process. Tracing Agamben’s engagement with Hegel’s 
and Kojève’s thought, we shall reconstitute Agamben’s version of the 
end of history in terms of the suspension of the Hegelian Master–
Slave dialectic. Agamben’s end of history has nothing to do with the 
fulfilment of the immanent logic of the historical process but rather 
consists in rendering this process inoperative in emancipatory social 
practices that subtract from the identities of both Master and Slave. 
We shall then elaborate this logic of inoperative historicity by engag-
ing with Agamben’s reading of Pauline messianism, focusing on his 
idea of messianic time as the eruption of the kairos, a moment of 
rupture within history that carries an emancipatory possibility. In the 
conclusion we shall contrast this ‘profane messianism’ with the kat-
echontic logic of the political that restrains and delays the messianic 
suspension, perpetuating the reign of sovereign power. 
The End of History Revisited
Agamben’s Homo Sacer and other political works were written in 
the immediate post-Cold War period and their full appreciation is 
impossible without considering the context of their emergence and 
the political-theoretical standpoint they explicitly or implicitly tar-
geted. One of the most influential theoretical responses to the end 
of the Cold War was the resurgence of the Hegelo-Kojèvian thesis 
on the end of history, forcefully propagated in Francis Fukuyama’s 
seminal The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Even as today 
Fukuyama’s reading of the demise of Soviet socialism as inaugurat-
ing the end of history has lost its erstwhile popularity, this should by 
no means be equated with a successful refutation of his argument. 
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On the contrary, the post-Cold War proliferation of triumphalist 
discourses on globalisation, ‘transition to democracy’, ‘democratic 
peace’, and so on is clearly conditioned by the presupposition of the 
exhaustion of the rivalry between opposed teleological projects and 
the global hegemony of Western liberal capitalism that was asserted 
by Fukuyama in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet 
Union. 
In contrast to the predominant mood of derisive dismissal 
of Fukuyama’s thesis among critical intellectuals, Agamben has 
engaged with the theme of the end of history seriously and repeat-
edly. As early as 1985, he argued that ‘the one incomparable claim 
to nobility [that] our own era might legitimately make in regard to 
the past [was] that of no longer wanting to be a historical epoch’ 
(Agamben 1995: 87; emphasis original). While Fukuyama’s work 
is only alluded to but never directly addressed in his writings, 
Alexandre Kojève became a regular reference in Agamben’s work 
since Language and Death and the discussion of his interpretation of 
the Hegelian dialectic became more direct and explicit starting from 
the 1992 article ‘Notes on Politics’ (2000: 109–120) that prefigures 
many of the theses of Homo Sacer. In this chapter we shall address 
Agamben’s critique of Kojève’s thesis in the wider context of his poli-
tics of inoperativity in order to reconstitute Agamben’s alternative, 
non-dialectical version of the end of history. 
Let us begin with Agamben’s diagnosis of the era that Fukuyama 
described in terms of the victory of liberal democracy:
The fall of the Soviet Communist Party and the unconcealed rule of the 
capitalist-democratic state on a planetary scale have cleared the field of 
the two main ideological obstacles hindering the resumption of a political 
philosophy worthy of our time: Stalinism on one side and progressivism 
and the constitutional state on the other. The ‘great transformation’ con-
stituting the final stage of the state form is taking place before our very 
eyes: this is a transformation that is driving the kingdoms of the Earth 
(republics and monarchies, tyrannies and democracies, federations and 
national states) one after the other towards the state of the integrated 
spectacle (Guy Debord) and towards ‘capitalist parliamentarism’ (Alain 
Badiou). Contemporary politics is this devastating experiment that dis-
articulates and empties institutions and beliefs, ideologies and religions, 
identities and communities all throughout the planet, so as then to rehash 
and reinstate their nullified form. (Agamben 2000: 110)
For Agamben, the post-Cold War period is less a triumph of liberal-
ism than a triumph of nihilism that transforms global politics into the 
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‘society of the spectacle’, in which the political and legal categories of 
the previous eras no longer have any meaning: 
terms such as sovereignty, right, nation, people, democracy and general 
will by now refer to a reality that no longer has anything to do with what 
these concepts used to designate – and those who continue to use these 
concepts uncritically literally do not know what they are talking about. 
(Ibid.: 110) 
And yet in this nihilistic condition the ‘old regime’ of sovereign 
nation-states, democracy, international law, and so on is not suc-
ceeded by a new positive order but rather persists in a ‘nullified form’ 
and continues to be described by the concepts that no longer have 
any meaning (cf. Prozorov 2009b, Chapter 2).
It is this interpretation of the post-Cold War condition as the 
triumph of nihilism that draws Agamben’s attention to the revival 
of the Hegelo-Kojèvian end of history thesis that he proposes to ‘try 
and take seriously’ (ibid.: 110). For Agamben, Fukuyama’s liberal 
version of the end of history is one of the two dominant readings 
of the contemporary constellation in global politics, the other being 
the diverse field of globalisation theory. While the former theory 
views the liberal state as the endpoint of the historical dialectic, the 
latter approaches the alleged eclipse of the state by the globalising 
logic of capitalism as the proof of our present still being eminently 
historical and indeed constituting an ‘epoch’ of sorts. In contrast, 
Agamben insists that we should think ‘the end of the state and the 
end of history at one and the same time [and] mobilize one against 
the other’ (ibid.: 111; emphasis original).
[T]he battlefield is divided today in the following way: on one side, there 
are those who think the end of history without the end of the state (that 
is, the post-Kojèvian or postmodern theorists of the fulfilment of the 
historical process of humanity in a homogeneous universal state); on the 
other side, there are those who think the end of the state without the end 
of history (that is, progressivists of all sorts). Neither position is equal to 
its task because to think the extinction of the state without the fulfilment 
of the historical telos is as impossible as to think a fulfilment of history in 
which the empty form of state sovereignty would continue to exist. (Ibid.: 
110–11)
We easily recognise in the idea of a post-historical state that main-
tains its form but is devoid of all positive ideological or teleological 
content the logic of the state of exception that we have reconstituted 
in the previous chapter: ‘What, after all, is a State that survives 
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history, a State sovereignty that maintains itself beyond the accom-
plishment of its telos, if not a law that is force without signifying?’ 
(Agamben 1998: 60). From this perspective, the post-Kojèvian 
thought of the post-historical state is equivalent to the affirmation 
of the ‘fictive’ state of exception, in which the latter remains tied to 
the pure form of law. In contrast, thinking the end of history and 
the end of the state together is equivalent to the affirmation of the 
real state of exception, a post-statist politics of the integral form-of-
life in the community of whatever being. Just as Agamben’s theory 
of the ‘real state of exception’ radicalised the logic of sovereignty 
through disseminating it throughout the social realm, his thought 
of the end of history points to something like a ‘real’ or ‘proper’ 
end of history that goes much further than Fukuyama’s teleological 
liberalism. For Agamben, the end of history must necessarily pre-
suppose a radical crisis of the state or any other form of constituted 
order:     
Simply because history designates the expropriation itself of human 
nature through a series of epochs and historical destinies, it does not 
follow that the fulfilment and the appropriation of the historical telos in 
question indicate that the historical process of humanity has now cohered 
in a definitive order (whose management can be handed over to a homo-
geneous universal state). (Agamben 2000: 111) 
The search for a post-historical ethos of humanity becomes entirely 
heterogeneous to any statist project, but probes the possibilities of 
the human reappropriation of historicity, whereby time becomes 
available for free use in social praxis. ‘[T]his appropriation must 
open the field to a nonstatal and nonjuridical politics and human life 
– a politics and a life that are yet to be entirely thought’ (ibid.: 112; 
emphasis original). 
We are thus back to the main feature of Agamben’s politics, 
the appropriation of inoperativity as the originary feature of the 
human condition that frees the potentialities of human existence 
from their confinement within the apparatuses of language, law 
and, as we shall see in this chapter, history itself. Yet what does it 
mean to render history inoperative? As we shall demonstrate below, 
Agamben’s version of the end of history has little to do with the 
eschatological reading espoused by Kojève and Fukuyama, in which 
the end of history is understood as the final stage of the unfolding 
of the historical process that finds its fulfilment in the post-historical 
totality of the ‘universal homogeneous state’. Instead, Agamben 
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resumes Benjamin’s project of mobilising the heritage of Judaeo-
Christian messianism for a profane revolutionary act of arresting 
the development of history. In other words, history does not end 
by fulfilling its immanent logic but is rather brought to an end in 
the social practices that suspend its progress. In order to specify the 
character of these practices, we must first address the key modifi-
cations that Agamben introduces into Kojève’s version of the end 
of history. Since it is specifically Kojève’s reading of Hegel that 
Agamben engages with in his work, our discussion below does not 
address other readings of Hegel nor does it attempt to resolve the 
controversial question of Hegel’s own stance on the end of history 
(see Grier 1996; Maurer 1996; Harris 1996). Our task is merely to 
reconstitute Agamben’s conception of the end of history on the basis 
of his critique of Kojève’s thesis.
The Workless Slave 
In Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1979 
[1807]) history is understood in terms of ‘negating action’ that 
takes two forms: fight and work. The historical process is originally 
brought into motion by the primal human encounter that leads to the 
‘fight to the death for recognition’. In this fight, one of the partici-
pants risks his life and overcomes his antagonist, thereby becoming 
the Master and reducing the other to the role of the Slave. Yet while 
history is initiated by the violent confrontation and the fear of death 
that resigns the Slave to slavery, it is in fact work, i.e. the Slave’s sub-
sequent labour in the service of the Master, that forms the substance 
of the historical process as the realisation of the future by the nega-
tion of the present into the past. It is only through work, i.e. through 
negating action on the given reality, that humanity becomes ‘truly’ 
human, transcending the world of nature. Thus the history of human 
existence, or, better, human existence as history, is from the outset 
characterised by ineluctable negativity:
Man is ‘total’ or ‘synthetical’, or, better, ‘dialectical’; he exists ‘for 
himself’ or consciously and articulately, hence he is ‘spiritual’ or truly 
human, only to the extent that he implies the constituent-element of 
Negativity in his being, in his existence and in his ‘appearances’. Taken in 
itself, Negativity is pure nothingness: it is not, it does not exist, it does not 
appear. Therefore, it can exist only as a real negation of Nature. Now, 
this existence of Negativity is, precisely, specifically human existence. 
(Kojève 1969: 221)
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By his labour of negation the Slave transforms the natural world into 
the properly human, historical world: ‘It is only by work that man is 
a supernatural being that is conscious of its reality; by working, he 
is “incarnated” Spirit, he is historical “World”, he is “objectivized” 
History’ (Kojève 1969: 23, 25). While the Master passively consumes 
the products of the Slave’s work, the Slave represses his desire for the 
immediate consumption of the fruits of his activity and ‘cultivates 
and sublimates his instincts’, thus ‘civilizing and educating’ himself 
(ibid.: 24). Unlike the Master, who remains a static figure throughout 
the historical process that he initiates, the Slave’s entire being is con-
tained in the transformation of himself and its environment through 
negating action that ultimately leads to his liberation at the end of 
history:
[In] transforming the World by this work, the Slave transforms himself 
too and thus creates the new objective conditions that permit him to take 
up once more the liberating Fight for recognition that he refused in the 
beginning for fear of death. Therefore, it is indeed the originally depend-
ent, serving and slavish consciousness that in the end realizes and reveals 
the ideal of autonomous Self-Consciousness and is thus its ‘truth’. (Kojève 
1969: 29–30)
The entire dialectical process in the aftermath of the originary 
encounter is driven by the work of the Slave that actively negates 
the given reality and creates the human world that the Slave will 
inherit at the end of history, when his re-engagement in the strug-
gle for recognition will enable him to defeat the Master and attain 
in the universal homogeneous state the freedom that he is deprived 
of throughout the historical process. Yet, what if we imagine, for a 
moment, a figure of the Slave who suspends his work without at the 
same time taking up the fight for recognition? Such a figure would 
evidently be distinct from the Master who has never worked at all 
and survives in the present only in order to maintain the forced 
character of the Slave’s work. Yet this ‘workless’ Slave would also 
be distinct from the ‘autonomous Self-Consciousness’ of the Slave 
that has overcome itself through work and mastered history, produc-
ing the world in which he can become free. The Slave that has thus 
transcended his own condition does not work because he no longer 
has to, given the disappearance of the Master–Slave relationship. In 
contrast, a Slave that simply suspends his work is a figure that cannot 
be recuperated by the dialectical scheme, i.e. it is neither identity 
(by virtue of having worked before), nor negativity (by virtue of no 
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longer working in the present), nor totality (by virtue of suspending 
work prior to the fulfilment of the dialectical process). 
Thus the workless slave does not correspond to any term in the 
dialectic of history and instead renders this entire dialectic inop-
erative. While for Kojève ‘true Man can exist only where there is a 
Master and a Slave’ (ibid.: 43; emphasis original), the workless slave 
exists in the zone of indistinction between the two figures. It is not 
that Slave and Master have been dialectically overcome, but rather 
that their interaction enters a standstill, in which there opens a space 
for human praxis that is neither fight nor work (Agamben 2004b: 83; 
cf. Benjamin 2002: 463, 865). While Kojève’s reading conceives of 
the end of history in terms of its mastery by the reconciled human-
ity, the Slave’s suspension of work suggests something like the end of 
the ‘end of history’, a second end that does not merely end history’s 
perpetual evasion of human mastery but rather halts the drive for this 
mastery itself, whereby history is not completed but simply stopped 
in its tracks. In other words, the proper, definitive end of history 
consists in the annulment of the ‘first’, teleological end of history. 
Whereas the Kojèvian end of history is still graspable from a histori-
cal perspective as an end of history within history, the understanding 
of the end of history as the Slave’s suspension of work dismantles the 
very terms in which this ‘first end’ could be intelligible. This ‘second 
end’ of history no longer presupposes anything like a ‘universal 
homogeneous state’ that would be the ‘final term’ of history (Kojève 
1969: 9). Instead, this abrupt end carries no finality whatsoever, nor 
can it be presented in terms of the completion of some intelligible 
process. History truly comes to an end only when it is conceived as 
teleologically endless, devoid of any task in terms of which it could 
be fulfilled.
And yet if the ‘jamming’ of the dialectical machine of history 
is no longer governed by the desire for recognition that animated 
the historical process, what could possibly be its guiding principle, 
i.e. what does one abandon work for? As we have seen throughout 
this book, Agamben is singular among modern political thinkers to 
explicitly posit such a principle in terms of happiness, affirming the 
possibility of a comic overcoming of our confinement within the 
apparatuses of sovereignty and biopolitics for a ‘happy life’ of inop-
erative potentiality:
The ‘happy life’ on which political philosophy should be founded cannot 
be either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition so as 
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to turn it into its own subject or the impenetrable extraneity of science 
and of modern biopolitics that everybody today tries in vain to sacral-
ise. This ‘happy life’ should be, rather, an absolutely profane ‘sufficient 
life’ that has reached the perfection of its own power and of its own 
 communicability – a life over which sovereignty and right no longer have 
any hold. (Agamben 2000: 114–15)
In Kojèvian terms, such a ‘happy life’ beyond any possibility of distin-
guishing between bios and zoe throws into question the very distinc-
tion between natural and historical worlds that grounds the dialectical 
process of negation. The Slave, who no longer seeks recognition and 
has suspended his work, cannot by definition be resigned solely to the 
natural world – in fact, he has irrevocably left it in his first encounter 
with the (future) Master, in which he did not risk his life and even-
tually entered the Master’s service. Yet neither does he dwell in the 
historical world after abandoning his work, by the very definition of 
the historical process as contained entirely in the Slave’s negation and 
transformation of his world through work. Indeed, this figure of the 
inoperative Slave is so problematic for Kojève’s scheme that he hastily 
dismisses it as nothing but a relapse into the animal condition:
If per impossibile Man stopped negating the given and negating himself 
as given or innate – that is, stopped creating new things and creating 
himself as ‘new man’ – and were content to maintain himself in identity 
to himself and to preserve the place he already occupied in the Cosmos 
(or in other words, if he stopped living in relation to the future or to the 
‘project’ and allowed himself to be dominated exclusively by the past or 
by ‘memory’), he would cease to be truly human; he would be an animal, 
perhaps a ‘knowing’ and surely a very ‘complicated’ animal, very differ-
ent from all other natural beings, but not essentially something other than 
they. (Kojève 1969: 220) 
Thus for Kojève any suspension of work necessarily throws its 
subject to its merely natural, animal being, in which he would once 
again replay the encounter that launches the Master–Slave dialectic. 
In other words, if history stops ‘along the way’ (ibid.: 220, note 19), 
it must afterwards begin all over again from the very start rather 
than resume at the precise point of its stoppage. But this logically 
entails that with this ‘stopping along the way’ history has in fact 
ended, albeit not in the sense of a final accomplishment but rather 
in sense of the termination of its dialectical logic. We may therefore 
conclude that Kojève’s scheme must admit the non-dialectical end of 
history as an ever-present possibility within history. What remains 
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problematic in Kojève’s account is his overly hurried reduction of 
the workless Slave that actualises this possibility to an animal, a 
reduction that diverts attention from the end of history to the neces-
sity of its resumption. The suspension of work does not necessarily 
entail persisting in one’s identity to oneself or preserving the place 
‘already occupied in the Cosmos’. On the contrary, this suspension 
by definition negates the Slave’s self-identity qua Slave and hence has 
nothing to do with the affirmation of inert being against becoming. 
Rather than throw the human being back towards its animal exist-
ence, the suspension of work leads the former Slave to reclaim his 
present as the time of potentiality and hence freedom. As we have 
argued repeatedly in this book, the affirmation of inoperativity in 
Agamben’s work has nothing to do with the valorisation of inertia or 
inaction but rather consists in the reappropriation of the potentiality 
of human existence captured and confined in various apparatuses 
that put human beings to work. As we shall demonstrate in the fol-
lowing section, Agamben’s inoperative slave is therefore distinct not 
merely from Kojève’s Master and Slave as historical subjects but also 
from Kojève’s account of the post-historical subject. 
The Snob and the Messiah
In Chapter 2 we saw that Agamben borrowed his concept of inop-
erativity from none other than Kojève himself. In his review of 
Raymond Queneau’s novels (1952), Kojève termed their charac-
ters ‘lazy rascals’ (voyous désoeuvrés) and compared them to the 
Hegelian figure of the ‘wise man’ at the end of history. Yet rather 
more famous is another figure of the post-historical subject presented 
by Kojève, i.e. the snob. In Kojève’s early argument in the 1930s, the 
end of history logically leads to the ‘disappearance of Man’, who 
was, after all, defined precisely by his participation in the historical 
process of negating action. Yet this disappearance only entails the 
radical cessation of Action (‘the disappearance of wars and bloody 
revolutions’) (Kojève 1969: 158–9), leaving the natural world and 
the natural or animal life of the human intact. As ‘man no longer 
changes himself essentially’ (ibid.: 159), philosophy will follow the 
historical process into oblivion, having reached its completion in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Nonetheless, Kojève argues that 
‘all the rest can be preserved indefinitely: art, love, play, etc., etc.’ 
(ibid.: 159). Once the struggle for recognition is completed under the 
aegis of the ‘universal homogeneous state’ and there are no longer 
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Masters or Slaves, all that remains is the newly animalised humanity 
engaging in art, love and play that are devoid of all human meaning 
and reduced to something like purely natural pleasures.
However, in the 1962 note to the second edition of his Introduction 
to the Reading of Hegel Kojève abandons the idea of the post- 
historical animalisation of mankind. He describes the experience 
of his visit to Japan that led him to rethink the status of the post-
historical man in terms of a caricaturistic figure of the snob, who 
is ‘anything but animal’ (Kojève 1969: 161). In the absence of 
properly historical ‘Religion, Morals and Politics’, the Japanese 
civilisation nonetheless created ‘[disciplines], negating the “natural” 
or “animal” given, which in effect surpassed those that arose from 
historical action’ (ibid.: 161). Referring to the Noh Theatre, tea 
ceremonies and ikebana, Kojève claims that this snobbish disposi-
tion leads to a life ‘according to totally formalized values – that is, 
values, completely empty of all “human” content in the “historical 
sense”’ (ibid.: 162). The snob may therefore retain or borrow histori-
cal values, using them in the ritualised, purely formal manner that 
deprives them of all their meaning. Since ‘no animal can be a snob’ 
(ibid.: 162), post-historical beings will remain human, although this 
humanity will no longer consist in the transformative work of nega-
tion that produced new content, but rather in the formalised rituals 
that the snob tirelessly reproduces with no developmental or progres-
sive effects whatsoever. Kojève ventures that the interaction between 
Japan and the Western world will eventually end in ‘the Japanization 
of the Westerners (including the Russians)’ (ibid.: 162).
Kojève’s description of snobbery corresponds almost to the letter 
to Agamben’s formula of ‘being in force without significance’: snob-
bish rituals maintain the pure form of historical action with no posi-
tive transformative effects, so that the avowedly ‘historical’ machine 
keeps running on empty, negating the natural (be it the animal voice, 
the factum pluralitatis or zoe) without producing positive, historico-
cultural forms of life. In the condition of nihilism, modern societies 
only pretend to engage in historical action but in fact merely go 
through the motions of its formal reproduction. Post-historical snob-
bery is thus an apparatus that, similarly to the glorious body, the reli-
gious hymn or the sovereign state of exception, confines inoperativity 
in a separate sphere, putting it to work of its own glorification. The 
snob works tirelessly at exhibiting its own worklessness.
Agamben’s politics of inoperativity may then be rigorously defined 
as the attempt to bring the Kojèvian end of history itself to an end, 
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to suspend the suspension that is already at work in the condition of 
nihilism. In this approach inoperativity is understood as neither sheer 
laziness, attributable to a caricaturised ‘wise man’, nor a snobbish 
action devoid of significance, but rather as a more radical yet also 
more originary condition of ‘whatever being’ of pure potentiality, 
lacking an identity or a vocation yet not for this reason reducible 
to nature or animality. Agamben’s post-historical subject does not 
become inoperative as a result of having fulfilled all of its tasks and 
actualised all of its potential, but rather reclaims its inoperativity 
from the apparatuses of sovereignty, law and governance that have 
all appropriated it as their own modus operandi. The dialectic of 
history that has been running on empty in the condition of nihilism is 
terminated without thereby being in any way fulfilled.
In its emphasis on bringing the dialectic to a standstill, Agamben’s 
vision of the end of history resonates with Benjamin’s messianism, 
whose logic Agamben has developed in a series of studies from the 
1980s onwards (see 2007a: 89–106; 1999b: 48–61, 243–71). For 
Agamben, Benjamin is singular among modern philosophers in sup-
plementing the traditional metaphysical search for the foundation or 
origin with the perspective of fulfilment of redemption, which alone 
permits us to break out of the apparatus of history, whose negating 
action has long lost all meaning:
[In] our tradition, a metaphysical concept, which takes as its prime focus 
a moment of foundation and origin, coexists with a messianic concept, 
which focuses on a moment of fulfilment. What is essentially messianic 
and historic is the idea that fulfilment is possible by retrieving and revok-
ing foundation, by coming to terms with it. If we drop the messianic 
theme and only focus on the moment of foundation and origin – or even 
the absence thereof (which amounts to the same thing) – we are left with 
empty, zero degree, signification and history as its infinite deferment. 
(Agamben 2005b: 104)
While the discussion of the full extent of Benjamin’s influence on 
Agamben’s reconstruction of messianism in profane and profanatory 
terms is beyond the scope of this chapter, we may briefly  illuminate 
its significance by considering Benjamin’s argument on the relation 
between the messianic and the profane in his ‘Theologico-Political 
Fragment’. In Benjamin’s famous expression, ‘from the standpoint 
of history [the Messianic Kingdom] is not the goal but the end’ 
(Benjamin 1978: 312). This means that, to the extent that the 
end of history can be considered an accomplishment, it is not an 
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accomplishment of history but rather of something extraneous to 
it. Unlike Kojève, both Benjamin and Agamben consider the advent 
of messianic time in terms of a simple termination of the historical 
process rather than the fulfilment of its internal logic: ‘nothing histor-
ical can relate itself on its own account to anything Messianic’ (ibid; 
see also Agamben 1999b: 144–5). Nonetheless, while Benjamin’s 
and Agamben’s notion of the messianic is thoroughly heterogeneous 
to history, it is not transcendent in relation to the historical world, 
but is rather irreparably profane, governed by the worldly ideal of 
happiness, which Benjamin famously conceived of as the ‘rhythm 
of Messianic nature’: ‘the order of the profane should be erected on 
the idea of happiness’ (Benjamin 1978: 312). Insofar as it is entirely 
unattainable through work (Agamben 2007b: 19–21), happiness is 
a profane condition that is unrelated to anything historical and for 
this reason corresponds in its effects to those of the advent of the 
Messianic Kingdom: ‘Just as a force can, through acting, increase 
another that is acting in an opposite direction, so the order of the 
profane assists, through being profane, the coming of the Messianic 
Kingdom’ (Benjamin 1978: 312). 
The parallel between the advent of the messianic kingdom and 
the profane ‘rhythm’ of happiness makes possible the reappropria-
tion of the emancipatory potential of messianism in the absence of 
any theological content. If messianic time has no necessary connec-
tion with the actual arrival of the Messiah but shares its ‘rhythm’ in 
bringing about a profane, ‘earthly restitution’ (Benjamin 1978: 312), 
then messianism no longer refers to an experience of perpetual expec-
tation but rather offers a paradigm of bringing history to an end in 
the here and now, at any historical moment whatsoever (Agamben 
2005b: 99–103). In order to understand this possibility we must 
introduce two concepts of time that are central to Agamben’s rein-
terpretation of messianism, chronos (linear homogeneous time) and 
kairos (the time of rupture or decision). As early as the 1978 book 
Infancy and History (2007a), Agamben attempted to challenge the 
continuous concept of time, which fused the Antique circular notion 
of time with the Christian linear notion. Instead, Agamben proposes 
the idea of kairological time, which marks the human appropriation 
of its temporal existence and thus frees the human being from its 
subjection to history. In this manner, the experience of temporality 
is no longer conceived in terms of servitude and work but rather as 
an experience of pleasure, akin to the Spinozan acquiescentia that we 
analysed in the previous chapter as a mode of ‘eternal life’. Insofar 
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as eternity in this figure refers not to the never-ending span of life (or 
its ‘sempiternity’) but rather to its location outside history, we may 
understand kairological time in terms of the eruption of the eternal 
within the historical process:
Contrary to what Hegel stated, it is only as the source and site of hap-
piness that history can have a meaning for man. In this sense, Adam’s 
seven hours in Paradise are the primary core of all authentic historical 
experience. For history is not, as the dominant ideology would have it, 
man’s servitude to continuous linear time, but man’s liberation from 
it: the time of history and the kairos in which man, by his own initia-
tive, grasps favourable opportunity and chooses his own freedom in the 
moment. Just as the full, discontinuous, finite and complete time of 
pleasure must be set against the empty, continuous and infinite time of 
vulgar historicism, so the chronological time of pseudo-history must be 
opposed by the kairological time of authentic history. (Agamben 2007a: 
115)
How is this messianic kairos of ‘authentic history’ related to the 
more familiar (if ultimately alienating) experience of chronological 
time that guides the Hegelo-Kojèvian historical process? In The Time 
that Remains (2005b), Agamben cites the following definition from 
the Corpus Hippocraticum: ‘chronos is that in which there is kairos, 
and kairos is that in which there is little chronos’ (Agamben 2005b: 
69). The continuous temporality of chronos contains moments of 
kairos within itself, while the latter is defined by the contraction 
and abridgement of chronos, the time where there is little time left 
for anything. Contrary to frequent misunderstandings, the mes-
sianic kairos is not the equivalent of a chronological ‘end of time’, 
the eschaton. As an ‘image devoid of time’ (ibid.: 70), the eschaton 
may never be grasped but can only be perpetually deferred as the 
endpoint of transition. ‘[E]very transition tends to be prolonged into 
infinity and renders unreachable the end that it supposedly produces’ 
(ibid.: 70). In contrast, kairological temporality rather consists in the 
attempt to grasp, in the here and now, what transition only promises 
in the unforeseeable future. 
Agamben presents the difference between messianism and escha-
tology in terms of the distinction between the ‘end of time’, which 
the apocalyptic prophet that resembles the Hegelian figure of the 
Philosopher (see Kojève 1969: 157–67) observes and describes, and 
the ‘time of the end’ that is experienced in the messianic suspension 
of the apparatus of history. 
PROZOROV 9780748676200 PRINT.indd   138 04/12/2013   15:07
139
the time of the end: inoperative history
What interests the apostle is not the last day, it is not the instant in which 
time ends, but the time that contracts itself and begins to end, or if you 
prefer, the time that remains between time and its end. (Agamben 2005b: 
62)
Messianic time is neither chronos nor its end (eschaton) but rather 
the time that remains between the two, ‘the time that time takes to 
come to an end’ (ibid.: 67). The kairological mode of temporality 
is constituted by the secondary division that divides the division 
between chronos and eschaton, being neither the former nor the 
latter but implicated in both.
Thus, kairological time is not external to the linear and con-
tinuous chronos but rather refers to a specific mode of grasping and 
reclaiming this temporality, rendering its ordinary progression inop-
erative and putting it in relation to the eschaton that it both promises 
and defers. Thus, any historical moment whatsoever may become the 
moment of kairos, in which the chronological movement of history 
is deactivated. Yet, to the extent that it negates the historical process 
itself, how does this suspension differ from the negating action of the 
Slave, either the working slave of the historical process or the self-
emancipating slave of the end of history? What is this mode of praxis 
that does not seek liberation within history but rather strives to attain 
a happy ‘eternal life’ outside it? In order to understand this difference 
we must address the two forms of negation that define respectively 
Kojève’s and Agamben’s approaches to the end of history. 
Destruction and Subtraction
In a key footnote to his ‘Note of Eternity, Time and the Concept’ 
Kojève defines historical action as characterised by ‘the primacy of 
the future’ (1969: 136, note 25). Historical action negates the exist-
ing reality, transforming it into the past, and in this manner actual-
ises its vision of the future in and as the new present. 
[We] say that a moment is ‘historical’ when an action that is performed in 
it is performed in terms of the idea that the agent has of the future (that is, 
in terms of a Project): one decides on a future war, and so on; therefore, 
one acts in terms of the future. But if the moment is to be truly ‘historical’ 
there must be change; in other words, the decision must be negative with 
respect to the given: in deciding for the future war, one decides against the 
prevailing peace. And, through the decision for the future war, the peace 
is transformed into the past. (Ibid.: 136, note 24; emphasis original)
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Every historical action must be oriented towards the fulfilment of 
some future-oriented project through the negation of the present 
reality into the past. In contrast, the messianic suspension of history 
in the inoperative praxis of the workless slave evidently frees human 
action from the very horizon of the project to which existence is 
subjected. Thus, the second end of history is only thinkable as the 
negation of the project itself rather than its fulfilment. Yet since we 
still seem to be stuck with negation, does not Agamben’s inoperativ-
ity remain eminently historical despite its best efforts to halt the his-
torical process? Does not the workless slave still negate given reality, 
even if it is only the reality of his own negation? 
It is here that we ought to introduce two distinct modes of nega-
tion. In Kojève’s argument, negating action must necessarily take 
the form of the destruction of the existing world: ‘[The] idea can be 
transformed into truth only by negating action, which will destroy 
the World that does not correspond to the idea and will create by this 
very destruction the World in conformity with the ideal’ (ibid.: 98). 
Throughout the historical process, this destruction is undertaken in 
the service of the Master who appropriates the new present created by 
this destruction as the object of his consumption and enjoyment. At 
the end of this process, the Slave will refuse his enslavement, taking 
up the struggle for the revolutionary destruction of the world of the 
Master, overcoming his initial fear of death and becoming a ‘free 
Worker who fights and risks his life’ (ibid.: 57). The formula ‘free 
worker’ occurs very rarely in Kojève’s text (see also ibid.: 230, note 
25) and is evidently paradoxical in terms of his theory. If the Slave 
overcomes his fear of death and confronts the Master, his freedom is 
indeed realised in the destructive struggle, but in what sense can he 
then remain a ‘worker’ and, moreover, what is the meaning of this 
work, given Kojève’s insistence that it is only forced, slavish work 
that matters in the historical process? This paradoxical concept is 
deployed as a transition point between the working Slave who is not 
yet free and the emancipated ex-Slave who no longer works. Yet the 
transition in question is ultimately contained in the move from one 
mode of destructive negation to another, from the negation of the 
world for the Master to the negation of the world of the Master. At 
the very moment the ‘worker’ frees himself from the forced character 
of his destruction of the real, he immediately becomes a fighter on a 
quest to destroy the world that he has himself produced in the service 
of the Master. 
Moreover, in the context of Kojève’s reading of the Master–Slave 
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dialectic destruction is not merely a metaphor but must be taken 
quite literally (see ibid.: 29). While on the ontological level Hegel’s 
dialectic is famously fulfilled through the synthesis of identity and 
negativity that constitutes totality, on the phenomenological level of 
the existential dialectic, we find no parallel synthetic operation: 
In truth, only the Slave ‘overcomes’ his ‘nature’ and finally becomes 
Citizen. The Master does not change: he dies rather than cease to be 
Master. The final fight, which transforms the Slave into Citizen, over-
comes Mastery in a nondialectical fashion: the Master is simply killed and 
he dies as Master. (Ibid.: 225, note 22; emphasis original) 
By murdering the Master, the Slave alone achieves the synthesis of 
Mastery and Slavery, since his re-engagement in the struggle for 
 recognition entails that he is no longer a Slave, and the murder of 
the Master (as opposed to his enslavement) entails that there is no 
longer anyone left to become the Master of (ibid.: 231). The murder 
of the Master is the final act in the drama of destruction coextensive 
with human history, the last project of realising the future by negat-
ing the present into the past. Even the negation of slavery that ushers 
in the end of history takes the form that defined the Slave’s activity 
to begin with.
To what extent does Agamben’s inoperative praxis succeed 
in negating the historical world of Mastery and Slavery without 
assuming the same form of the destruction of the real? Our discus-
sion of Agamben’s wariness of constituent power in Chapter 4 dem-
onstrates his attunement to the problem: even if it affirms and enacts 
popular sovereignty, revolutionary destruction ends up reproducing 
the very logic of the historical process, in which the subject was 
enslaved in the first place. It is therefore not surprising that for all 
the fury of the destruction it unleashed, the politics of popular sov-
ereignty often subjected the populace to a sovereign power at least 
as intense and exactly as exceptionalist as the one it overthrew. 
Just as in the context of sovereignty the idea of constituent power 
is abandoned by Agamben for a more originary potentiality with 
no relation to the actuality of law, so in the domain of history the 
process of negating action is itself negated in the singular manner 
that avoids the replication of its destructive logic. In order to grasp 
the specificity of inoperativity as a mode of negation we may make 
use of Badiou’s distinction between destruction and subtraction. In 
Being and Event (2005a: 407–8), Badiou introduces this distinc-
tion in the context of his theory of the truth procedure in order 
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to emphasise the irreducibility of novelty to the destruction of the 
existent:
[E]mpirically, novelty is accompanied by destruction. But it must be clear 
that this accompaniment is not linked to intrinsic novelty. Destruction is 
the ancient effect of the new supplementation amidst the ancient. Killing 
somebody is always a matter of the (ancient) state of things; it cannot be 
a prerequisite for novelty. (Ibid.: 408)
In contrast to destruction, the subtractive procedure, presented 
by Badiou as the true source of novelty and thus the ‘affirmative’ 
element in every negation, consists in the production of something 
that is indiscernible within the negated situation, that cannot be ren-
dered positive in its terms and thus avoids any engagement or incor-
poration in this situation instead of destroying it (Badiou 2005a: 
371). Agamben draws on and develops this logic of subtraction in his 
theory of the coming community (1993a: 75, 85–7): the inoperative 
community of whatever singularities subtracts itself from the myriad 
of positive identities that divide its members and thus establishes 
itself as something new that is literally inaccessible to the apparatuses 
governing the situation and remains impervious to their grasp. While 
destruction does nothing but perpetuate the dialectical process of 
negating action, subtraction suppresses the movement of the dialectic 
by virtue of its avoidance of any engagement with what it negates. 
In his Highest Poverty Agamben finds a paradigm of subtractive 
negation in the practices of Franciscan monasticism, which has been 
a key reference for many of Agamben’s concepts, from profanation 
to the form-of-life. While numerous monastic movements of the 
thirteenth century challenged the authority of the Church, positing 
 themselves as the ‘true Church’ and thus inevitably entering into 
conflict with the existing hierarchy, the singularity of the Franciscan 
movement consisted in its avoidance of such an open conflict 
through the cultivation of a radical distance from the institution of 
the Church as well as other authorities. The ‘form of life’ cultivated 
by the Franciscans did not consist in the application of any existing 
rules or laws to life, nor in the establishment of new rules or laws that 
could serve as alternatives to the existing church office and liturgy, 
but was rather ‘completely extraneous to both civil and canon law’, 
having its entire content in the life of Christ alone (Agamben 2013: 
122). ‘Life according to the form of the holy Gospel is situated on 
a level that is so distinct from that of the life according to the form 
of the holy Roman Church that it cannot enter into conflict with 
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it’ (ibid.: 122). Rather than locate this form of life on the level of 
positive institutions as a new and ‘true’ rule, law or liturgy, which 
logically leads to a frontal antagonism with the established authori-
ties that can only be resolved through the destructive negation of 
the opponent, the Franciscan movement subtracted itself from the 
institutional apparatuses without any polemic against them in order 
to invent a form of life that is strictly inaccessible to them and may 
therefore evade their capture.
While Kojève’s fighting ‘free worker’ evidently exemplifies the 
logic of destruction, which Badiou explicitly links to Hegel’s account 
of revolutionary Terror (2007: 53–4), the slave that simply suspends 
his work, without simultaneously opting for the destruction of the 
Master and his world, is a paradigm of the logic of subtraction. By 
subtracting himself from the very relationship that sets the dialectic 
into motion, this figure that is neither Slave nor Master, a non-Slave 
that does not thereby become Master or a non-Master that does 
not thereby become Slave, embodies the kind of novelty that could 
never be recuperated by the dialectic and for this very reason renders 
the latter inoperative. Subtraction is thus a mode of negation that 
consists entirely in its own withdrawal from the Master–Slave rela-
tion: in contrast to Kojève’s pathos of destruction, the Master is here 
negated solely by virtue of the inoperativity of the Slave.
As Not
Having defined subtraction in logical terms as a non-destructive 
mode of negation, let us now address it as an ethos, a way of life 
of the post-historical subject. What does it mean to subtract oneself 
from the historical process in one’s lifeworlds that are still historical, 
even if, as Agamben insists, their historical content is increasingly 
null and void? In his reinterpretation of Pauline epistles Agamben 
isolates a formula that defines subtraction as a mode of subjectiva-
tion proper to messianic time. Paul uses the expression ‘as not’ (hos 
me) in the First Letter to the Corinthians to describe the ways of 
being and acting in the ‘contracted’ time of the end: 
But this I say, brethren, time contracted itself, the rest is, that even those 
having wives may be as not having, and those weeping as not weeping, 
and those rejoicing as not rejoicing, and those buying as not possessing, 
and those using the world as not using it up. For passing away is the 
figure of this world. But I wish you to be without care. (I Cor. 7: 29–32, 
cited in Agamben 2005b: 23)
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The formula ‘as not’ should be rigorously distinguished from the 
rather more familiar concept of ‘as if’, which, from Kant onwards, 
was widely used in philosophy to posit fictitious conditions as ‘regu-
lative ideas’, guiding action in the present without themselves being 
realisable in it (Agamben 2005b: 36–7. See also Taubes 2004: 53–4, 
74–6). In contemporary political philosophy, this logic is operative 
in the Derridean version of messianism. Derrida’s famous idea of 
‘democracy to come’ presupposes, precisely by virtue of its clear 
distinction from any ‘future democracy’ (see Derrida 2005: 90–3), 
that it is never actually going to arrive (i.e. it will remain ‘to come’ 
at any point in the future) but must rather motivate contemporary 
praxis as if it were already here. This is why Agamben has repeat-
edly criticised Derridean messianism as ‘thwarted’ or ‘paralyzed’, 
producing perpetual deferral and incapable of attaining fulfilment 
(see Agamben 1991: 39; 2005a: 64; 2005b: 103; 1999b: 171). In 
contrast to Derrida’s refusal of the very problematic of the ‘ends’ (of 
man, history or politics) and his insistence of the inaccessibility of 
the eschaton, which makes the perspective of messianic redemption 
wholly fictitious, Agamben asserts the possibility of redemption in 
the here and now, any moment in time being a potential kairos for 
the subtraction from the historical dialectic.
In contrast to the fictitious vantage point of the ‘as if’, the Pauline 
‘as not’ does not leave the subject any vantage point from which to 
imagine a hypothetical redemption, but rather ‘dislocates and, above 
all, nullifies the entire subject’ (Agamben 2005b: 41). The significance 
of the formula is thus contained in the tension it introduces into the 
object or practice to which it is applied (i.e. weeping, rejoicing, pos-
sessing, using, and so on), which is undermined from within by the 
revocation of its content without necessarily altering its form. The 
workless slave does not simply abandon all his activities in the world 
but rather works as not working, diverting his actions from the task 
of negation in the service of the Master. As we have argued repeat-
edly with regard to the notion of inoperativity, it is not a matter of 
abandoning all activity, opting for not weeping, not possessing, etc., 
but rather a matter of neutralising the force and function of the activ-
ity in question from within, opening it up to a different use. Thus, 
Agamben’s messianic subject certainly continues to inhabit the world 
with its apparatuses of government but subtracts itself from its intra-
worldly identities and roles that are constituted by these apparatuses. 
It is truly in the world but not (fully) of the world. Such a subtraction 
requires neither the exodus from the world into fantasy and fiction 
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nor the violent destruction of the world. Recalling Agamben’s mini-
malist approach to messianism as a ‘tiny displacement’ that leaves 
things ‘almost intact’ (Agamben 1993a: 53), we may conclude that 
this displacement consists precisely in the subtraction of the subject 
from its prescribed place in the world that makes it possible to ‘reside 
in the world without becoming a term in it’ (Coetzee 1985: 228). 
As we can see, Agamben’s messianic subject exhibits all the 
familiar features of the post-statist community of whatever being, 
grounded in the sheer factum pluralitatis that we have addressed 
in Chapters 3 and 4: subtraction from positive identity, suspension 
of particularistic forms of life, life without relation to law, and so 
on. Indeed, it is an important methodological feature of Agamben’s 
work that despite the dazzling variety of thematic contexts that he 
addresses (such as poetry, pornography, monasticism, law, language) 
we encounter the same concepts in different paradigmatic guises, so 
that a myriad of terms, both traditional ones and neologisms, refer to 
the same underlying ontological constellation of inoperativity, poten-
tiality and whatever being. Thus in the context of Pauline messian-
ism inoperativity is presented through the paradigm of the Pauline 
concept of katargesis, the fulfilment of law through its deactivation 
(Agamben 2005b: 98–9), and the experimentum linguae is discussed 
in terms of Paul’s ‘word of faith’ not exhausted in signified contents 
but rather contained in the ‘pure and common potentiality of saying, 
open to a free and gratuitous use of time and the world’ (ibid.: 
135–6). The messianic end of history thus appears to be yet another 
name for the comic politics of taking leave of the apparatuses that 
govern our existence. Rather than indicate anything like a resurgence 
of the ‘theological’ element in Agamben’s work, his version of mes-
sianism is entirely directed towards the profanation of all appara-
tuses, including the theological one, and return of what they captured 
and confined to free use, be it language, life or time.
Removing the Katechon
From this perspective, it is important to specify what tradition of 
political thought Agamben is actually opposing with his profanatory 
messianism. It is evidently not an avowedly theological or theocratic 
politics, which in the condition of nihilism may only be affirmed at 
best in bad faith and at worst as a farcical parody that does not even 
pretend to believe in itself. Yet neither is it a purely ‘secular’ politics 
– as we have seen in Chapter 2, for Agamben secularisation merely 
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transfers a force from one domain to another without deactivating it. 
What Agamben targets is rather a politics that, to wit, ‘theologises’ 
nothing but itself, a politics that valorises not any hypothetical end 
or goal of political action, but the essence of the political itself, irre-
spectively of whether it is understood in terms of the friend–enemy 
distinction, agonistic contestation, acting in common or rational 
argumentation. Just like Agamben’s version of messianism, this 
tradition may be traced back to the Pauline epistles, specifically 
the notion of the katechon in Paul’s (disputed) Second Letter to the 
Thessalonians (see Hell 2009; Prozorov 2012). In this letter, Paul 
responds to the audience’s agitation concerning the imminence of the 
Second Coming addressed in the First Letter, explaining the present 
delay of the return of Christ and elaborating the process by which it 
will eventually take place: 
[Let] no one deceive you in any way. Because it will not be unless the 
apostasy shall have come first, and the man of lawlessness, the son of 
destruction is revealed. He opposes and exalts himself above every so-
called god and object of worship. As a result, he seats himself in the sanc-
tuary of God and declares himself to be God. You know what it is that is 
now holding him back, so that he will be revealed when the time comes. 
For the mystery of anomy is already at work, but only until the person 
now holding him back (ho katechon) is removed. Then the lawless one 
(anomos) will be revealed, whom the Lord will abolish with the breath of 
his mouth, rendering him inoperative by the manifestation of his presence 
(parousia). (2 Thessalonians 2, 6–8, cited in Agamben 2005b: 109)
Since the notion of the katechon does not occur anywhere else in 
the Scripture, the interpretation of this passage remains ambiguous, 
particularly with respect to what or who the katechon is and what its 
relation is to the Antichrist (the ‘lawless one’), whose revelation and 
elimination would pave the way for the divine parousia. In Schmitt’s 
reading, the function of the katechon has historically been fulfilled 
by sovereign power, starting from the Roman Empire. The katechon 
is the worldly force that delays the advent of the Antichrist, which 
in turn would eventually lead to the messianic redemption (Schmitt 
2003: 59–60). It is as this delaying or restraining force, as opposed 
to a direct agent of the Good, that sovereign power receives its val-
orisation. For Schmitt, the concept of the katechon made it possible 
to link the eschatological promise of Christianity and the concrete 
experience of history, explaining the delay of parousia and giving 
meaning to historical and political action, which the imminence of 
the Second Coming would understandably devalue: 
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I do not believe that any historical concept other than katechon would 
have been possible for the original Christian faith. The belief that a 
restrainer holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge 
between the notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and 
a tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian empire of the 
German kings. (Schmitt 2003: 60)
For Schmitt the idea of the katechon made it possible simultane-
ously to endow Christianity with political form and incorporate pre-
Christian forms of political authority into the eschatological context 
of Christianity, deactivating the ‘paralysing’ force of that context. It 
is evident that the paralysis in question pertains precisely to the mes-
sianic experience of the suspension of chronological history in the 
kairological moment of the ‘time of the end’. The idea of katechon is 
thus profoundly incompatible with any messianism and may rather 
be grasped as an intricate mode of its negation, which prolongs 
history indefinitely in the face of its ending, keeping the historical 
dialectic in process and the Slaves at work. Indeed, the entire dura-
tion of history is nothing but the delay that the katechon is able to 
produce by restraining the messianic, and the entire existence of 
constituted power, from empires to nation-states, Christian or oth-
erwise, is contained in the katechontic gesture of ‘holding back’. It is 
thus clear why Schmitt, the apologist of the political, did not simply 
valorise the katechon, but in a certain sense worshipped it: ‘I believe 
in the katechon; for me he is the sole possibility for a Christian to 
understand history and find it meaningful’ (Schmitt cited in Meier 
1998: 162).
In Agamben’s argument, this belief in the katechon characterises 
every theory of the State, ‘which thinks of it as a power destined to 
block or delay catastrophe’ (2005b: 110). In this secularised (yet 
not profaned!) sense the katechon refers to any constituted author-
ity whose function is to restrain social anomie (violence, anarchy 
or chaos), while simultaneously withholding a radical redemption 
from it. In contrast to this tradition, Agamben’s interpretation of 
the Pauline text asserts that rather than grounding something like a 
Christian ‘doctrine of State power’ (ibid.: 109), it harbours no posi-
tive valuation of the katechon whatsoever. Indeed, in the above-cited 
fragment, the katechon is something that is to be ‘removed’ or ‘taken 
out of the way’ in order to reveal the ‘mystery of anomie’ that is 
‘already at work’: ‘[T]he katechon is the force – the Roman Empire 
as well as every constituted authority – that clashes with and hides 
katargesis, the state of tendential lawlessness that characterizes the 
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messianic, and in this sense delays unveiling the “mystery of law-
lessness”’ (ibid.: 111). The valorisation of the katechon thus begs a 
simple question: ‘if we longed for parousia, should we not be impa-
tient with the interference of the katechon?’ (Rasch 2007: 106). This, 
as Agamben shows, is precisely Paul’s attitude, yet clearly not the 
approach taken by the philosophers of the political, for whom the 
katechon has assumed an autonomous value:
[What] if, after two thousand years and untold promises, we have lost our 
faith in the parousia and grown weary of waiting for the arrival of divine 
violence? Then would not delaying the Antichrist be what we should hope 
for? The katechon, as a figure for the political, rejects the promise of the 
parousia and protects the community from the dangerous illusions of 
both ultimate perfection and absolute evil. (Rasch 2007: 107)
In Rasch’s view, what the defenders of the katechon fear is not so 
much the Antichrist but the Messiah himself, who, moreover, might 
well appear to them indistinct from the Antichrist: both are ‘figures 
who promise us perfection, figures who offer us redemption and 
bestow upon us the guilt of failing perfection or rejecting their offer’ 
(ibid.: 107). There is a certain irony in the ‘Christian doctrine of state 
power’ ultimately coming down to the apostasy of any recognisable 
Christianity in the nihilistic vision of an exhausted humanity that 
can no longer distinguish between the Antichrist and the Messiah. 
However, Agamben’s reading of Paul leads us to a different case 
of indistinction. If the katechon conceals that all power is ‘absolute 
outlaw’ and thereby defers the reappropriation of this anomie by the 
messianic community, then it would not be too much to suggest that 
the katechon actually is the Antichrist that perpetuates its reign by 
concealing the fact of its long having arrived. Thus, Agamben argues 
that 
[it] is possible to conceive of katechon and anomos [Antichrist] not as 
two separate figures, but as one single power before and after the final 
unveiling. Profane power is the semblance that covers up the substantial 
lawlessness of messianic time. In solving the ‘mystery’, semblance is cast 
out and power assumes the figure of the anomos, of that which is the 
absolute outlaw. (2005b: 111) 
The katechon may thus be understood as an insidious device, by 
which ‘substantially illegitimate’ anomic power perpetuates its reign, 
converting the seekers of redemption into the guardians of its perpet-
ual inaccessibility and thereby ensuring the survival of greater evil in 
the guise of the lesser one. As Rasch sums up Agamben’s argument, 
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‘embracing the political is equivalent to building concentration 
camps while awaiting the Antichrist’ (Rasch 2007: 106). 
It is precisely this survival of evil in the guise of a victory over it, 
whereby the Antichrist as katechon inserts itself between us and the 
messianic redemption, that constitutes what Paul calls the ‘mystery’ 
of anomie. This mystery, whose survival over the centuries Agamben 
has traced in his detailed genealogies of sovereignty and government, 
finds its ultimate ‘resolution’ in the reappropriation of anomie by the 
messianic community in the real state of exception, which reclaims its 
inoperativity by subtracting itself from the historical dialectic. Yet, as 
we have seen, this resolution is furthest away from a Kojèvian syn-
thesis, fulfilment or accomplishment: when the katechon is removed 
and its delaying function rendered inoperative, history simply ends 
without either the grand execution of the Master or the still grander 
emancipation of the Slave. In full accordance with the comic logic of 
the ‘slight adjustment’, the end of history in its messianic sense does 
not lead to either paradisiacal bliss or the agonies of perdition. As 
Agamben argued in The Coming Community, ‘the life that begins on 
earth after the last day is simply human life’ (1993a: 7). On the basis 
of the preceding three chapters we can certainly appreciate how this 
life would be ‘simple’, insofar as it is no longer fractured by the nega-
tivity of the Voice, bare life or history as negating action but rather 
exists as its own form, living its own potentiality in the absence of 
identity or tasks. Yet, there remains a question: insofar as this life has 
overcome all these fractures that have defined human existence as we 
know it, to what extent can it still be called human? This is the ques-
tion we address in the following chapter that traces the unfolding of 
Agamben’s politics of inoperativity in the fourth and widest domain, 
that of humanity as such.
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Chapter 6 
Outside of Being: Inoperative Humanity
This chapter probes Agamben’s affirmation of inoperativity in the 
domain of humanity. Many representatives of continental philoso-
phy have recently engaged with the anthropocentric foundations 
of the Western political tradition, targeting exclusion and domina-
tion involved in it. In his work of the 2000s Agamben developed 
an original solution to the problem of anthropocentrism that does 
not attempt to include non-human or non-living beings within the 
domain of human politics but rather disrupts the very distinction 
between humans and non-humans. Agamben demonstrates how this 
distinction is always contingent and arises from the operation of the 
apparatus that he terms anthropological machine. In this chapter we 
shall discuss Agamben’s attempt to render this machine inoperative 
in his work The Open: Man and Animal (2004b), focusing in par-
ticular on Agamben’s critique of Heidegger’s attempt to distinguish 
humanity from animality on the basis of the exclusively human 
faculty of the disclosure of the world. Reversing Heidegger’s line of 
reasoning, Agamben rather approaches this faculty as an indicator of 
an extreme affinity between humanity and animality, paving the way 
for the deactivation of the machine in the figure of saved life beyond 
all separations and divisions between humanity and animality. We 
shall address this figure of post-anthropocentric ‘life outside of being’ 
as the most radical and thoroughgoing version of the comic affirma-
tion of inoperativity in Agamben’s work. 
Problematising the Human
Our discussion of Agamben’s politics in the preceding pages has 
tended to emphasise continuity in Agamben’s thought, demonstrat-
ing the persistence of the same themes in his work from his earliest 
writings on aesthetics, language and ontology to his most recent 
studies of government and religion. Rather than indicate a discontin-
uous ‘turn’ towards politics in the post-Cold War period, the Homo 
Sacer series and subsequent works must be understood as taking 
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explicit stock of Agamben’s politics as it has been theorised implicitly 
or elliptically in the previous decades.
Nonetheless, there is also an important discontinuity in Agamben’s 
work that we encounter in the fourth and final domain that we shall 
consider in our analysis of his politics of inoperativity. This discon-
tinuity pertains to the question of anthropocentrism, the centrality 
(primacy, privilege or uniqueness) of the human being in both onto-
logical and political terms (and, as we have seen, for Agamben the 
two are always connected, if not identical). This site is crucial for 
understanding Agamben’s political thought, since it is here that the 
various strands of his work, analysed in the preceding three chapters, 
ultimately converge: what is at stake in the experimentum linguae 
and the experience of infancy, in the deactivation of the logic of 
sovereignty and the constitution of the form-of-life, in the suspen-
sion of historical action and the messianic reappropriation of time is 
ultimately a reconsideration of what it means to be human: a being 
endowed with language, a political animal, a self-negating subject of 
the historical process. This reconsideration is all the more important, 
since it connects with the problematisation of anthropocentrism 
and humanism in various currents of contemporary critical thought, 
such as speculative realism and object-oriented philosophy, new ver-
sions of materialism, trans- and post-humanist theories (Meillassoux 
2008; Harman 2011; Brassier 2007; Bennett 2010; Latour 2004; 
Bryant 2011; Barad 2007; Pettman 2012), which were previously 
very distant from the main concerns of Agamben’s philosophy.
[The] main focus of nearly all of Agamben’s published writings thus 
far has been avowedly anthropocentric. Despite his unflinching and 
far-reaching criticisms of metaphysical humanism, it is clear that he has 
never shown a sustained interest in exploring the anthropocentric dimen-
sions and consequences of his metaphysical project. Especially those texts 
published prior to and including The Coming Community can be read as 
contribution to and deepening of the anthropocentrism underlying the 
metaphysical tradition. (Calarco, 2007: 164)
In Calarco’s argument, this anthropocentrism began to be problema-
tised, if not overcome, in the more political works of the Homo Sacer 
series and this problematisation reaches its peak in The Open: Man 
and Animal, a brief text that is nonetheless one of the most impor-
tant in Agamben’s entire oeuvre. This discontinuity must nonetheless 
not be overstated. It would be a mistake to produce an image of an 
‘anthropocentric’ early Agamben and a later advocate of inoperative 
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humanity: rendering humanism inoperative was on the agenda at 
least since Infancy and History. The difference is rather between 
two interpretations of this inoperativity: while in the earlier work it 
functions as yet another marker of difference between humans and 
animals, in the later work it serves as a pathway towards the erasure 
of that difference. It is precisely in its attempt to render inoperative 
the separation of humanity and animality that Agamben’s critique of 
anthropocentrism belongs to the comic logic that we have reconsti-
tuted in this book.
Let us begin by recapitulating the theme of human existence in 
Agamben’s texts discussed in the previous chapters. In all the three 
domains that we have covered so far human existence was consti-
tuted as profoundly different from that of animals. Aside from the 
exceptional case of the axolotl, it is only the human being that is 
originally ‘infant’, lacking language, and must enter into it in a dual 
move of subjectivation (as a speaking being) and desubjectivation 
(as a living being). It is only human speech that rests on the negative 
foundation of the removed voice, which introduces scission into the 
experience of language, which can never be as ‘natural’ as the ‘chirp-
ing of the cricket’ or the ‘braying of an ass’. It is this idiosyncratic 
condition of ‘having language’ (as opposed to ‘being language’ in the 
case of animals) that simultaneously resigns human existence to neg-
ativity and makes possible human freedom as the experience of both 
potentiality to and potentiality not to. While animal potentiality is 
contained in the finite set of possibilities inscribed in the genetic code, 
so that animals can do certain things and cannot do others, human 
beings are capable of their own impotentiality, i.e. they can not do or 
be and are hence never tied to any genetic inheritance, specific envi-
ronment or particular vocation. Since Agamben’s vision of political 
community is based on the strict homology between factum loquendi 
and factum pluralitatis and the essence of this community is wholly 
contained in the inoperative exposure of potentiality, it apparently 
follows that this community can only be a human one, the animal 
resigned to endlessly wander in the actuality of its being-language, at 
one with its chirping and braying.
By the same token, the discussion of the sovereign state of excep-
tion and bare life as its product is clearly restricted to human beings, 
for whom alone the distinction between zoe and bios would make 
any sense in the first place. Although in Homo Sacer Agamben 
illustrates the idea of the ban with the figure of the werewolf, 
which occupies the threshold between the human and the animal 
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(1998: 104–11), the idea of bare life is otherwise addressed squarely 
within human existence as the negation of zoe within bios (akin to 
the ‘removal’ of phone within logos). This is all the more true for 
Remnants of Auschwitz, where the animal enters the discussion only 
figuratively, be it as the ‘lice’ to which Hitler compared the Jews or 
the ‘stray dogs’ to which the guards compared the Muselmann in the 
camps. The negation of zoe in the production of bare life is analysed 
as the movement of de-humanisation, which is capable of the infinite 
destruction of the human without ever really reaching the animal, 
which must have already been negated for us to become human in the 
first place and to which the negation of the human cannot any longer 
return us (Agamben 1999c: 132–4).
Finally, Agamben’s approach to the end of history followed 
Kojève’s a priori restriction of the historical dimension to human 
existence. While Hegel’s stance on the issue was at least ambivalent 
(Kojève 1969: 216–18), Kojève’s interpretation is entirely unequivo-
cal: there is no such thing as the dialectic of nature and only human 
beings are capable of the negating action that constitutes history. For 
this reason, the question of the end of history is also only meaning-
ful for human beings, animals forever resigned to traversing empty 
and homogeneous time without any modification in their being. 
Agamben’s own reinterpretation of the end of history from the 
perspective of inoperativity is therefore by definition focused on the 
liberation of human existence from history as a singularly human 
curse. 
Thus, in all three domains of Agamben’s work there is an evident 
anthropocentric bias that is hardly overcome by his critique of con-
ventional humanism – all the critical operations on humanism are 
performed within the human and do not bring one closer to the over-
coming of the separation of man and animal. Nonetheless, such a 
reading would be overly hasty, since the move away from anthropo-
centrism is also observable at least implicitly in all the three domains. 
Agamben’s idea of ‘calling into question the prestige that language 
has enjoyed in our culture, as a tool of incomparable potency, effi-
cacy and beauty’ in the Sacrament of Language (Agamben 2009a: 
71) clearly targets the sublimation of the human being as zoon logon 
echon. The experimentum linguae that Agamben proposes actually 
brings human language closer to the ‘chirping of the cricket’: by 
suspending the signifying function and communicating nothing but 
its own communicability language becomes almost indistinguishable 
from the natural voice prior to its negation. 
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In turn, the deconstruction of the sovereign ban and the affirma-
tion of the real state of exception remove the prestige that could 
be accorded to the human as zoon politikon: if all that political 
life meant in the state of exception was exposure to death, it could 
not possibly be used to distinguish humans from animals, let alone 
elevate the former above the latter. If the proud subject of human 
rights is ultimately the one that can be compared to lice or dogs, then 
politics does not transcend nature but may well form the quickest 
path of the return to its least pleasant aspects.
Finally, Agamben’s idea of the messianic end of history that 
suspends, without completing or fulfilling, the historical process of 
negating action renders vain Kojève’s efforts to distinguish the end of 
history from a mere relapse into the non-historical animality: 
After the end of History Man no longer negates, properly speaking. 
However, Man does not become an animal since he continues to speak 
(negation passes into the dialectical thought of the Wise Man). But post-
historical Man, omniscient, all-powerful and satisfied Man (the Wise 
Man) is not a Man in the strict sense of the world either: he is a ‘god’ (a 
mortal god, admittedly). (Kojève 1969: 220, note 19) 
While Kojève resorts to every possible sleight of hand to maintain 
the difference of the post-historical being from an animal (transpos-
ing ‘real’ negation into ‘verbal’ or ‘intellectual’ activity he otherwise 
derides, maintaining negation in the ritualised form of snobbery, 
converting the workless Wise Man into a ‘mortal god’), it is evident 
that the inoperativity of the post-historical being renders its differ-
ence from the animal unobservable and informulable, and ‘the face 
of the wise man who, on the threshold of time, contemplates this end 
with satisfaction, necessarily fades into an animal snout’ (Agamben 
2004b: 7).
Indeed, this is the thesis with which Agamben begins The Open, 
which explicitly takes up these themes in the most thoroughgoing 
investigation of the impact of the idea of inoperativity on the notion 
of humanity. Written as a series of vignettes on various aspects of 
the man–animal division, The Open nonetheless follows a clear logic 
that is already familiar to us: the identification of the apparatus of 
government that Agamben terms the ‘anthropological machine’, 
the deactivation of its logic through a critical engagement with 
Heidegger’s approach to humanity and animality, and, finally, the 
deactivation of the machine through the articulation of a form of 
life, in which the very separation between the two is overcome. In the 
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remainder of this chapter we shall consider these three stages of the 
argument in turn.
The Anthropological Machine 
In Agamben’s argument, it is only at the end of history that the 
problem of the division between man and animal assumes its full 
ontological importance. If the end of history entails the disappear-
ance of the human ‘properly so called’, then the entire apparatus that 
separated humanity and animality for the entire duration of history 
is thrown into disarray: 
If animal life and human life could be superimposed perfectly, then neither 
man nor animal – and, perhaps, not even the divine – would any longer be 
thinkable. For this reason, the arrival at posthistory necessarily entails the 
reactualization of the prehistoric threshold, at which that border has been 
defined. Paradise calls Eden back into question. (Agamben 2004b: 21) 
The perspective of the end of history permits us to problematise 
the historical apparatus that ceaselessly separated man and animal, 
which Agamben terms the anthropological machine.
As is the case with every apparatus (language, law, history, and 
so on), this machine operates through the capture, confinement and 
ordering of beings. The key principle of its operation is the division 
between animality and humanity that it draws within both humans 
and animals. Even a cursory familiarity with the history of this 
apparatus demonstrates that this division does not have any secure 
ontological foundation but, similarly to the sovereign decision on 
the exception, is radically contingent. For example, in his analysis of 
Carl Linnaeus’s attempts to formulate the difference between men 
and anthropoid apes Agamben highlights the historical fluidity of 
boundaries between the human and the animal: since in the eight-
eenth century the possession of language, which later became the key 
distinguishing principle, was thought to also characterise animals, the 
only ‘specific difference’ that Linnaeus could assign to human beings 
was not a positive feature but rather an old philosophical imperative: 
nosce te ipsum (know thyself!): ‘Man has no specific identity other 
than the ability to recognize himself. Man is the animal that must rec-
ognize itself as human to be human’ (ibid.: 26). Yet this is no longer a 
stable ontological difference but rather an intricate epistemic device: 
[a] machine for producing the recognition of the human, constructed of 
a series of mirrors in which man, looking at himself, sees his own image 
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always already deformed in the features of an ape. Homo is a consti-
tutively ‘anthropomorphous’ animal who must recognize himself in a 
non-man in order to be human. (Ibid.: 26–7) 
A human being is thus an animal that resembles a human being 
and has learned to recognise this resemblance. It does not have any 
essence other than the capacity to set itself apart from the animal 
from which it otherwise does not essentially differ: ‘Homo is con-
stitutively nonhuman, he can receive all natures and all faces’ (ibid.: 
30). 
Agamben proceeds from this undecidability of the human to 
identify two historical versions of the anthropological machine, the 
modern and the ancient one. The overall structure of the machine is 
strictly identical to that of the sovereign state of exception analysed 
in Chapter 4:
Insofar as the production of man through the opposition man/animal, 
human/inhuman, is at stake here, the machine necessarily functions by 
means of an exclusion (which is also always a capturing) and an inclusion 
(which is also always already an exclusion). Indeed, precisely because 
the human is already presupposed every time, the machine actually pro-
duces a state of exception, a zone of indeterminacy in which the outside 
is nothing but the exclusion of an inside and the inside is in turn only the 
inclusion of an outside. (Ibid.: 37)
The modern version of the machine operates by the animalisa-
tion of the human being, by drawing the dividing line within the 
human itself and thus isolating the non-human within the human. 
Agamben’s example here is the ‘ape-man’ or homo alalus, a figure 
of nineteenth-century biology that marked the passage from the 
anthropoid apes (‘man-apes’) to humans proper. This being was 
no longer an ape in its strictly anatomical characteristics, but not 
yet human due to its not possessing language. Nonetheless, as sub-
sequent evidence showed, this figure was clearly fictitious, ‘only a 
shadow cast by language, a presupposition of speaking man’ (ibid.: 
36): all that the idea of the ‘ape-man’ does is perform the animali-
sation of man by subtracting the potentiality for language from his 
existence. The ape-man is thus not the ‘pre-human’ being, from 
which ‘man proper’ originates, but rather a ‘post-human’ being 
produced by a subtractive and reductive gesture that corresponds 
exactly to the production of bare life in the sovereign exception. 
Evidently, this version of the machine can easily be shown to operate 
beyond biological science and directly intervene in the narrowly 
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political domain, as the dehumanisation of Jews in the Nazi camps 
but also other, less extreme forms of discrimination and exclusion 
testify. Since the criterion that separates humans from animals has 
no ontological foundation, it is always possible to try to isolate and 
separate an animal within the human.
The version of the machine that Agamben terms ‘ancient’ (but 
which one can certainly observe in modern times as well) proceeds 
in the diametrically opposed way, not by excluding the inside in 
the movement of animalisation but by including the outside in the 
mode of the ‘humanisation’ of an animal, producing the animal in 
human form, be it the ‘map-ape’, homo ferus, the enfant sauvage, 
the werewolf or, metaphorically and closer to immediately politi-
cal concerns, the slave, the barbarian or simply the foreigner. While 
animalised humans were understood as animal though still in some 
sense human, humanised animals were taken to belong to humanity 
despite being in some sense animal. Yet, irrespectively of the direc-
tion the division took in the machine, its end result is the produc-
tion of a life that is neither animal nor human but precisely bare, 
lacking any positive determination and existing solely as the object 
of  inclusive exclusion: 
Like every space of exception this zone [of indistinction between man 
and animal] is, in truth, perfectly empty, and the truly human being who 
should occur there is only the place of a ceaselessly updated decision, in 
which the caesurae and their rearticulation are always dislocated and dis-
placed anew. What would thus be obtained, however, is neither an animal 
life nor a human life, but only a life that is separated and excluded from 
itself – only a bare life. (Ibid.: 38) 
Just as the state of exception suspends the law, rendering it informu-
lable and unobservable, the ceaseless caesurae of the anthropological 
machine necessarily fail to stabilise the human–animal distinction 
and instead separate ever more forms of life from themselves by 
drawing this distinction within living beings. Once again, we encoun-
ter the idea of bare life not as a synonym of natural, physical or 
animal life but rather as its negation: while there exist living beings, 
animal and human, bare life exists nowhere but in the machine that 
seeks to both separate and articulate the two and ends up negating 
both. The idea of the anthropological machine makes it clear why 
any ‘post-anthropocentric’ politics that simply attempts to include 
animals within the sphere of ‘human politics’, for example through 
their endowment with rights, freedom and equality with humans, 
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remains insufficient if not counter-productive. If humanity itself is 
produced through an isolation of bare life within it, the inclusion 
of other living beings within this category only serves to feed the 
machine by providing it with ever more ‘ape-men’ or ‘man-apes’ to 
capture and dominate.
For this reason, the solution to the violence of this apparatus 
cannot consist in its reform or replacement but only in rendering it 
inoperative: ‘It is not so much a matter of asking which of the two 
machines is better or more effective – or rather less lethal and bloody 
– as it is of understanding how they work so that we might, eventu-
ally, be able to stop them’ (ibid.: 38). The next step that Agamben 
takes towards this understanding consists in a critical re-engagement 
with Heidegger, who, more than any other philosopher in the twen-
tieth century, insisted on the radical difference between humanity 
and animality. In the following section we shall address Agamben’s 
deconstructive reading of Heidegger’s 1929–30 lectures entitled The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.
Boredom
Even a cursory familiarity with the philosophy of Heidegger reveals 
the centrality of the themes of humanity and animality to his investi-
gation of the question of being (see Garrido 2012: 36–62). In Being 
and Time Heidegger famously rejected the traditional metaphysical 
definitions of the human being as animal rationale, which add the 
possession of language or reason to ‘simply living being’ (1962: 
71–7). In these conceptions life is interpreted in a ‘privative’ mode as 
something that remains when everything proper to the human being 
is subtracted, as ‘what must be the case if there can be anything like 
mere-aliveness’ (ibid.: 75). Rather than define Dasein in terms of 
an ontologically indeterminate ‘life as such’, to which something 
else is then added, Heidegger seeks to uncover a more fundamen-
tal structure of Dasein’s being in the world that is simultaneously 
presupposed and concealed in the more ‘specific’ interpretations of 
human and animal life in the disciplines of biology, anthropology, 
and psychology. While in Being and Time the question of animal 
or biological life is quickly dismissed as secondary and epiphenom-
enal to the question of being, in the 1929–30 lectures Heidegger 
engages with biology in much greater detail. In these lectures animal 
life becomes the main focus of a properly ontological investigation, 
albeit as a paradoxical mode of being that lacks access to being. Since 
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it is this mode of being that Agamben will take up in his critique of 
Heidegger, let us reconstitute Heidegger’s line of reasoning in more 
detail.
Heidegger begins with the threefold thesis: ‘the stone is world-
less (weltlos); the animal is poor in world (weltarm); man is world-
forming (weltbildend)’ (Heidegger 1995: 176–7). The stone (or any 
other non-living being) has no access to the world at all, hence there 
is no question of them being ‘deprived’ or ‘lacking’ of the world that 
human beings can, on the contrary, access and form. Things are 
much more complicated in the intermediate category of animals: they 
are not completely devoid of access to the world but their mode of 
access is itself characterised by lack, privation and, ultimately, inac-
cessibility. Relying on the contemporary zoological studies of Jakob 
von Uexkull, Heidegger analyses the animal’s relation to its environ-
ment in terms of captivation (Benommenheit), whereby the animal 
always remains closed in the circle of its ‘disinhibitors’, i.e. the ele-
ments of the environment that interest the animal and on which its 
receptive organs are focused. In Heidegger’s argument, insofar as the 
animal is completely absorbed in its disinhibitors, it cannot truly act 
in relation to them as beings but only ‘behave’ with regard to them 
as if ‘taken’ by them (ibid.: 242). What is withheld from the animal 
is the very possibility of apprehending something as such, as a being. 
The animal’s poverty-in-world thus pertains to its impotentiality for 
the disclosure of beings:
Beings are not revealed to the behavior of the animal in its captivation, 
they are not disclosed and for that reason are not closed off from it either. 
Captivation stands outside that possibility. We cannot say: beings are 
closed off from the animal. This would be the case only if there were 
some possibility of openness at all, however slight that might be. But 
the captivation of the animal places the animal essentially outside of the 
possibility that beings could be either disclosed to it or closed off from it. 
The animal as such does not stand within a potentiality for revelation of 
beings. (Ibid.: 248)
Thus the animal only ‘has’ the world in the mode of not having it (cf. 
Garrido 2012: 56–7). In terms of Agamben’s concept of potential-
ity, the animal simultaneously lacks the potentiality for the disclo-
sure and the non-disclosure of beings: beings as beings are neither 
revealed to it nor concealed from it but simply remain inaccessible. 
And yet, the animal certainly relates to beings that form its disinhibit-
ing ring, even if it does not relate to them as beings. Heidegger terms 
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this relation ‘opening’ and contrasts it rigorously to the disconceal-
ment or disclosure proper to the human being: yes, the disinhibitor is 
open (offen) for the animal but not disclosed to it as such (offenbar, 
literally ‘openable’) (Heidegger 1995: 253).
For the animal, beings are open but not accessible; that is to say, they 
are open in an inaccessibility and an opacity. This openness without dis-
concealment distinguishes the animal’s poverty in world from the world-
forming, which characterizes man. The animal is not simply without 
world, for insofar as it is open in captivation, it must, unlike the stone, 
which is worldless – do without world, lack it; it can, that is, be defined 
in its being by a poverty and a lack. (Agamben 2004b: 55)
The opening that Heidegger grants the animal is thus entirely dis-
tinct from the poetic understanding of the kind offered in Rilke’s 
eighth Duino Elegy, in which it is the animal rather than the human 
that dwells in and sees the open ‘with all its eyes’ (ibid.: 57–8). For 
Heidegger, any such anthropomorphisation of the animal is inadmis-
sible and groundless. The animal is only open to what is inaccessible 
and opaque to it: look ‘with all its eyes’ it might, but it will never see 
anything in the open. Nonetheless, on some occasions in the lectures 
Heidegger converts this ‘poverty in world’ into a kind of plenitude or 
wealth that is in turn withheld from humans, who, while remaining 
living beings, are somehow deprived of access to ‘life’ as such: ‘life is 
a domain that possesses a wealth of being-open, of which the human 
world may know nothing at all’ (Heidegger 1995: 255). Human 
beings are capable of the understanding of their being but not of 
their life.
Yet if this is so, if the modes of animal and human being are so 
heterogeneous, then to what extent is it possible to claim that human 
beings even share the same world with ‘world-poor’ animals? From a 
Heideggerian perspective, no being-with-animals appears to be pos-
sible since being with logically presupposes being in the same world, 
which is not the case for humans and animals. While we can easily 
transpose ourselves into the place of another human being and defi-
nitely cannot transpose ourselves into the place of the stone (because 
it does not have such a place, not having a world to begin with), with 
respect to the animal things are more complicated. Heidegger claims 
that while it is possible for a human being to ‘transpose oneself’ into 
the place of the animal, it is impossible to, in a strict sense, ‘go along 
with it’, if ‘going-along-with means directly learning how it is with 
this being, discovering what it is like to be this being’ (ibid.: 202). 
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Discussing the example of domestic animals, he demonstrates how 
problematic it is to speak of ‘living with’ animals:
We keep domestic pets in the house with us, they ‘live’ with us. But we do 
not live with them if living means: being in an animal kind of way. Yet 
we are with them nonetheless. But this being-with is not an existing-with 
because a dog does not exist but merely lives. Through this being with 
animals we enable them to move within our world. [The] dog feeds 
with us – and yet, we do not really ‘feed’. It eats with us – and yet, it does 
not really ‘eat’. Nevertheless, it is with us. A going along with … a trans-
posedness, and yet not. (Ibid.: 210)
This ‘and yet not’ appears to be the most concise definition of the 
world-poverty of the animal: having world and yet not having it, 
open to its exterior yet not to beings within it, displaying a sphere of 
transposability yet refusing any going along with. In this interpreta-
tion, the human–animal relation is not, in a strict sense, a relation at 
all, which makes all talk of being-with or community with animals 
meaningless and misleading. Anthropocentrism appears to have been 
vindicated. Nonetheless, Heidegger refrains from positing a complete 
divergence between the human world and animal environment and 
finds a way to connect them with a reference to the passage in Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans (8: 19) about the worldly creatures’ groan-
ing for redemption. The animal can yearn for redemption precisely 
because in its very opening to the opacity creates an ‘essential disrup-
tion’ within it (Heidegger 1995: 273), a disruption that, while not 
equivalent to the ecstatic existence of Dasein, nonetheless creates a 
possibility of conceiving of a connection or even a passage between 
the two modes of being.
In his reading of Heidegger, Agamben traces such a passage 
through a comparison of animal captivation with the attunement of 
‘profound boredom’, first discussed by Heidegger at the beginning 
of the course as the fundamental mood, in which the world and its 
beings are disclosed. In his phenomenology of boredom Heidegger 
moves from the most familiar form of boredom as being-bored-
by- something (a determinate object or situation) through the more 
general being-bored-with-something that arises from within Dasein 
and has no determinate object to the most ‘profound’ boredom, which 
is precisely the attunement through which the world is disclosed 
(ibid.: 82–8, 113–25, 136–43). This profound form of boredom is 
characterised by the intensification of the two ‘structural moments’ 
that define boredom as such: being left empty and being held in limbo. 
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The first moment refers to Dasein’s ‘being delivered to beings’ 
telling refusal of themselves as a whole’ (ibid.: 137), whereby it finds 
itself in a state of indifference that envelops all beings, including 
Dasein itself. In this state beings around us do not disappear but 
rather manifest themselves as such precisely in their indifference. The 
things we do in order to pass the time when bored, the diversions 
with which we try to entertain or amuse ourselves, fail to engage 
us, leaving us suspended in the withdrawal of beings. No possibility 
of action or use is available to us in the midst of beings that ‘refuse 
themselves’ and have ‘nothing to offer’ to us. ‘In becoming bored by 
something we are precisely still held fast by that which is boring, we 
do not yet let it go, or we are compelled by it, bound to it for what-
ever reason’ (ibid.: 92). It is easy to observe an uncanny proximity of 
Dasein in its fundamental mood to the captivation of the animal: ‘In 
becoming bored, Dasein is delivered over to something that refuses 
itself, exactly as the animal, in its captivation, is exposed in some-
thing unrevealed’ (Agamben 2004b: 65). Both animal and man are 
‘open to a closedness’ (ibid.: 65).
The second moment, being held in limbo, is closely related to 
this opening. The beings that refuse themselves are nothing other 
than possibilities of Dasein’s existence that are left unexploited 
(Heidegger 1995: 141). What refuses itself to Dasein are the things 
it could have done, experienced or used, which now stand before it 
as wholly inaccessible and yet present. ‘Beings in their totality have 
become indifferent. Yet, there [also] occurs the dawning of the pos-
sibilities that Dasein could have, but which lie inactive precisely in 
this “it is boring for one”, and, as unutilized, leave us in the lurch’ 
(ibid.: 141). Nonetheless, this withdrawal of concrete or specific 
possibilities impels Dasein towards a more extreme and originary 
possibility that characterises its very mode of being. In other words, 
the suspension of particular possibilities reveals what makes these 
possibilities possible in the first place and thus makes Dasein itself 
possible as the being whose essence is contained in its potentiality 
for being. 
Those beings refusing themselves in their totality do not make an 
announcement concerning arbitrary possibilities of myself, they do not 
report on them, rather insofar as announcement in refusal is a calling, it 
is that which makes authentically possible the Dasein in me. This calling 
of possibilities as such, which goes together with the refusal, is not some 
indeterminate pointing to arbitrary, changing possibilities of Dasein, but 
an utterly unequivocal pointing to whatever it is that makes possible, 
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bears and guides all essential possibilities of Dasein. (Ibid.: 143; emphasis 
original)
This description of the disclosure of the originary possibility clearly 
resonates with Agamben’s dual structure of potentiality. Dasein, 
which for Heidegger exists in the mode of possibility, is made pos-
sible by the suspension and deactivation of concrete factical possibili-
ties as a result of beings refusing themselves: potentiality is always 
also, and primarily, a potentiality not to. Thus, Dasein is simultane-
ously entranced by the emptiness of the beings’ total indifference and 
impelled towards what Heidegger calls the ‘moment of vision’ (ibid.: 
151–2; cf. Heidegger 1962: 371–80), a resolute grasp of the authen-
tic possibility of existence, which is itself nothing but existence in the 
mode of possibility. 
We may now clearly see both the similarities and the differences 
between animal captivation and human boredom. While both animal 
and man can be left empty by beings that refuse themselves, no 
animal can ever be held in limbo. ‘What the animal is unable to do is 
suspend and deactivate its relationship with the ring of its specific dis-
inhibitors. The animal environment is constituted in such a way that 
something like a pure possibility can never become manifest within 
it’ (Agamben 2004b: 68). It is this difference which leads Agamben 
to a striking conclusion that remains only implicit in Heidegger since 
it runs contrary to the privilege his thought grants to Dasein. If the 
passage from animal to man (anthropogenesis) proceeds through the 
limbo as the structural moment of boredom, then this passage 
does not open onto a further, wider and brighter space, achieved beyond 
the limits of the animal environment and unrelated to it; on the contrary, 
it is opened only by means of a suspension and a deactivation of the 
animal relation with the disinhibitor. (Ibid.: 68). 
It is only when this relation is suspended that the animal captivation 
can be grasped as such – a possibility that, as we recall, is not avail-
able to the animal itself: ‘the open and the free-of-being do not name 
something radically other with respect to the neither-open-nor-closed 
of the animal environment: they are the appearing of an undiscon-
cealed as such’ (Ibid.: 69). If the animal was open to a closedness that 
it could never access, the human being is able to do precisely that; 
it is able to grasp the inaccessible as inaccessible. Yet this obviously 
does not amount to much or, in fact, to anything at all. The ‘priva-
tive’ understanding of animal life as a subtraction from human being 
is thus reversed: it is rather the human being-in-the-world, standing 
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out in the clearing of being, that is derived from the suspension of 
the animal captivation: ‘[The] jewel set at the centre of the human 
world and its Lichtung (clearing) is nothing but animal captivation. 
Whoever looks in the open sees only a closing, only a not-seeing’ 
(Ibid.: 69).
This line of reasoning permits us to understand Heidegger’s 
intricate arguments on the coexistence of being and nothing. In the 
lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’, delivered during the same year as The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Dasein is explicitly defined 
as ‘being held out into the nothing’ (Heidegger 1977: 108) and this 
nothing is posited as the paradoxical ‘ground’ in which all beings 
come to appear: Ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit [from the nothing all 
beings as beings come to be] (ibid.: 108). The lectures on the essence 
of animality permit us to understand where this negativity of being 
comes from:
From the beginning, being is traversed by the nothing: the Lichtung is also 
originarily Nichtung, because the world has become open for man only 
through the interruption and nihilation of the living being’s relationship 
with its disinhibitor. Being appears in the ‘clear night of the nothing’ only 
because man, in the experience of profound boredom, has risked himself 
in the suspension of his relationship with his environment as a living 
being. (Agamben 2004b: 70)
Anthropogenesis is thus a negative operation that does not ‘enrich’ 
animal captivation but impoverishes it even further by making 
opacity, closedness, the undisconcealed manifest as such: ‘Dasein is 
simply an animal that has learned to become bored. This awakening of 
the living being to its own being-captivated, this anxious and resolute 
opening to a not-open, is the human’ (ibid.: 70).1 This understand-
ing of Dasein clearly breaks with the tradition of twentieth-century 
philosophical anthropology, which valorised the ‘open’ character of 
the human condition, its independence from its environment, its lack 
of a determinate identity or task, and so on. While, as we have seen, 
influences of that approach could still be found in Agamben’s early 
works on infancy, in The Open his approach is much more sober and 
austere: yes, the human can access the open that the animal is simply 
exposed to, yet all that can be accessed in this ‘clearing of being’ is the 
manifestation of the inaccessible in all its nullity. Man is an animal 
that knows life as being, which is to say, as nothing.
On the basis of this reading Agamben is able to reinterpret 
Heidegger’s more famous argument in the ‘Origin of the Work of 
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Art’ (1977: 143–206) about the perpetual strife of ‘world’ and ‘earth’ 
in terms of the struggle within the human being of humanity (the 
world, openness, disconcealment) and animality (earth, closedness, 
opacity). Yet, more importantly, he is also able to advance beyond it, 
since, unlike Heidegger, Agamben has no illusions about the produc-
tive character of this strife, whereby the mastery and overcoming of 
animality would produce positive forms of life (bios), endowed with 
a historical destiny. In Agamben’s diagnosis of modern nihilism that 
we have addressed at length, all that historical projects of nations and 
states have produced and keep producing is the state of exception, 
in which the law is in force without significance and the historical 
machine of negating action is running on empty. In a word, like all 
other apparatuses at the end of history, the anthropological machine 
is ‘idling’ (Agamben 2004b: 80). The human mastery and overcom-
ing of its own animality only leads to the degrading reduction of 
humanity itself to bare life, be it in the extreme form of concentration 
camps or in the admittedly more benign ‘positive’ biopolitics of the 
management of life as such:
Do we not see around and among us men and peoples who no longer have 
any essence or identity, who are delivered over to their inessentiality and 
their inactivity, and who grope everywhere, and at the cost of gross falsi-
fications, for an inheritance and a task, an inheritance as task? Even the 
pure and simple relinquishment of all historical tasks (reduced to simple 
functions of internal or international policing) in the name of the triumph 
of the economy, often today takes on an emphasis in which natural life 
itself and its well-being seem to appear as humanity’s last historical task. 
(Ibid.: 76)
Yet what does it mean for humanity to assume the management of its 
own animality, its own biological life? From a Heideggerian perspec-
tive, such a humanity abandons its constitutive feature of keeping 
itself open to the opacity of animality and instead seeks to secure (by 
opening, if necessary!) this not-open at all cost. In Agamben’s concise 
phrase, such a humanity makes being itself ‘its specific disinhibitor’ 
(ibid.: 77) and becomes a paradoxical animal that is captivated by 
its own captivation. This is precisely the animalised, or, in a more 
refined argument, snobbish humanity that emerges at the Kojèvian 
end of history, which is the triumph of nihilism. ‘The total humaniza-
tion of the animal coincides with a total animalization of man’ (ibid.: 
77).
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The Saved Night
Just as the snobbish end of history could be opposed by its messianic 
version, the biopolitical ‘animalisation’ whereby man dominates its 
own animality by means of technology is not the only possibility 
available to us. The alternative is presented by Agamben in the fol-
lowing manner: ‘Man, the shepherd of being, appropriates his own 
concealedness, his own animality, which neither remains hidden nor 
is made an object of mastery, but is thought as such, as pure aban-
donment’ (ibid.: 80). While this idea of appropriation has evident 
Heideggerian overtones, at this stage in the argument Agamben actu-
ally abandons Heidegger’s text and, as he frequently did on other 
occasions, turns to Benjamin, whom he once called ‘an antidote that 
allowed me to survive Heidegger’ (Agamben cited in De la Durantaye 
2009: 53). The final pages of The Open, offering nothing less than 
the manifesto of anti- or post-biopolitics, are among the most eso-
teric in Agamben’s oeuvre. In the remainder of this chapter we shall 
explicate Agamben’s argument by demonstrating its dependence on 
and radicalisation of the already familiar affirmation of inoperativity 
as both the goal and method of his comic politics.
Agamben’s point of departure in his elaboration of the alter-
native to the biopolitical domination of animality is Benjamin’s 
figure of the ‘saved night’. While, similarly to Heidegger, Benjamin 
approaches nature or animal life in terms of the concealed and the 
opaque (‘night’) in contrast to the revelatory character of humanity 
and history, for him the role of such historical endeavours as works 
of art and ideas is not to disclose this concealed figure but rather 
to maintain it in its undisconcealed status, to leave it ‘in the night’ 
and thereby to ‘save’ it (Agamben 2004b: 81–2). The Pauline idea 
of nature’s yearning for redemption is thus rethought: the salvation 
that natural creatures groan for consists precisely in remaining ‘in the 
night’, i.e. remaining unsaved and unsavable by human disclosure 
and mastery: 
The ‘saved night’ is the name of this nature that has been given back to 
itself. The salvation that is at issue here does not concern something that 
has been lost and must be found again, something that has been forgotten 
and must be remembered; it concerns, rather, the lost and the forgotten 
as such – that is, something unsavable. (Ibid.: 82)
This idea of the unsavable or ‘irreparable’ has been central to 
Agamben’s theorisation of whatever being and form-of-life and offers 
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a good illustration of the comic mood of his thought. It is clear that if 
we define comedy in terms of a happy ending after tragic tribulations, 
the theme of salvation should be central to any comic disposition. 
And yet, in full accordance with the minimalist or austere character 
of this disposition, discussed in Chapter 1, Agamben’s salvation 
introduces no new positive content, nor does it restore positivity to 
the tradition that nihilism has already rendered vacuous. We can 
never go back on nihilism but it does not follow from this that the 
horizon of salvation is itself to be annulled. For Agamben, salvation 
does not consist in reclaiming what was lost or making the profane 
sacred but rather in the ‘irreparable loss of the lost, the definitive 
profanity of the profane’ (Agamben 1993a: 102). What is worthy of 
salvation for Agamben is never any particular form of life, specific 
language or a historical project but only the inoperative potentiality 
of ‘whatever being’, constitutive of and confined within them. Insofar 
as the essence of whatever being is its own inoperative existence and 
the form of this life is its own potential formlessness, it is devoid of 
any discernible features in terms of which it would strive for salva-
tion. The salvation of a whatever being could therefore not possibly 
consist in abandoning one set of identity predicates for another. 
What is saved is saved along with all of its predicates, as ‘consigned 
without remedy to [one’s] way of being’ or irreparable (ibid.: 90). To 
be saved as unsavable or irreparable is to be saved from the salvation 
promised by the myriad of historical apparatuses that capture and 
dominate one’s animality in order to perfect one’s humanity, to be 
let be in one’s being-thus, in the night of one’s originary inoperativ-
ity (Agamben 2005b: 39–41; 2007b: 35. See De la Durantaye 2009: 
197–9).
In terms of the logic of the anthropological machine this impera-
tive entails bringing to a standstill the ceaseless project of articulating 
humanity and animality either through animalisation or humani-
sation. The ‘stoppage’ of the machine entails that it is no longer 
 possible either to master animality in a historical project of human 
(self-)realisation or to master humanity by, as it were, returning the 
human to the nature from which it originates. Since the machine 
operates by the identification of one term through the exclusion of 
the other, its jamming entails the inoperativity of both of them and 
the emergence of something else in the space between them:
[Neither] must man master nature nor nature man. Nor must both be 
surpassed in a third term that would represent their dialectical synthesis. 
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What is decisive here is only the ‘between’, the interval or the play between 
the two terms, their immediate constellation in a non-coincidence. In the 
reciprocal suspension of the two terms, something, for which we perhaps 
have no name and which is neither animal nor man, settles in between 
nature and humanity and holds itself in the mastered relation, in the saved 
night. (Agamben 2004b: 83) 
Following Benjamin’s esoteric allusion to sexual fulfilment as the 
‘hieroglyph’ of this saved being, Agamben elaborates the idea of the 
unsavable in an analysis of Titian’s painting Nymph and Shepherd, 
which depicts the two lovers in a somewhat melancholic scene of 
‘exhausted sensuality’. In Agamben’s interpretation, the melancholy 
in question has little to do with the lovers’ realisation of having 
sinned and their looming expulsion from Eden but rather pertains 
to the transformation that the consummation of the erotic encounter 
effects in the lovers: 
In their fulfilment the lovers learn something of each other that they 
should not have known – they have lost their mystery – and yet have not 
become any less impenetrable. But in this mutual disenchantment from 
their secret, they enter a new and more blessed life, one that is neither 
animal nor human. It is not nature that is reached in their fulfilment 
but rather a higher stage beyond both nature and knowledge, beyond 
concealment and disconcealment. These lovers have initiated each other 
into their own lack of mystery as their most intimate secret. Bare or 
clothed, they are no longer either concealed or unconcealed – but rather 
 inapparent. In their fulfilment, the lovers who have lost their mystery 
contemplate a human nature rendered perfectly inoperative – the inactiv-
ity and désoeuvrement of the human and the animal as the supreme and 
unsavable figure of life. (Ibid.: 87)
In their encounter the lovers have been initiated into each other’s 
‘mystery’, i.e. the disclosure of the animality of the other.2 Yet this 
mystery has no positive content aside from its own mystification: 
what is revealed in this disclosure is the impenetrability of nature, 
its opacity to any knowledge. Thus, the lovers only come to know 
each other in the sense of knowing that there is nothing to be known 
about each other. Their mystery is thus not really ‘solved’ but simply 
‘severed’ (ibid.: 83–4). Insofar as humanity was defined by the task 
to solve this mystery by mastering animal nature, as a result of this 
severance it ends up rendered inoperative. But, insofar as the mystery 
itself was revealed as the lack of mystery, it can no longer transfix 
one in the mode akin to animal captivation, hence animality ends 
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up inoperative as well. Yet these inoperative lovers remain alive and 
presumably well. The key to understanding this form of life beyond 
both animality and humanity is Agamben’s figure of the knowledge 
the lovers gain about each other, the knowledge that knows nothing 
but its own ignorance:
[This life] surely ‘does not see the open’ in the sense that it does not 
appropriate it as an instrument of mastery and knowledge but neither 
does it remain simply closed in its own captivation. The agnoia, the non-
knowledge which has descended upon it, does not entail the loss of every 
relation to its own concealment. Rather, this life remains serenely in rela-
tion with its own proper nature as a zone of nonknowledge. (Ibid.: 90–1)
In order to specify the character of this nonknowledge or a-knowl-
edge (ignoscenza) we must return to Heidegger’s characterisation of 
the human and animal relation to being. We recall that only Dasein 
is endowed with the potentiality for the disclosure of beings and 
worlds by standing in the open (the clearing of being, the Nothing). 
It is only to Dasein that beings become manifest in their being, while 
the animal can never disclose its disinhibitor as such, as a being. The 
ethical principle of Heideggerian ontology is thus ‘letting be’: ‘man 
makes himself free for the possible and in delivering himself over to 
it, lets the world and beings be as such’ (ibid.: 91). Yet if what lies at 
the heart of world disclosure is the suspension of animal captivation, 
letting be inevitably means letting the animal be. Where, however, is 
this animal let be once Dasein discloses the ‘mystery’ of its captiva-
tion? As we have seen, the ‘world-poor’ animal does not know being, 
remaining outside it ‘in an exteriority more external than any open 
and inside in an intimacy more internal than any closedness’ (ibid.: 
91). Evidently the only possibility to let the animal be is then to let it 
be outside of being (ibid.: 91). 
Being with Animals
Let us attempt to interpret this arcane expression that arguably 
marks the culmination of Agamben’s confrontation with the Western 
ontopolitical tradition. What does it mean to be outside of being? 
Evidently it does not refer to non-being in the sense of nothingness 
or death. The claims about being ‘outside of being’ pertain not to 
being itself but rather to the understanding or knowledge of being, 
which for Heidegger was the defining attribute of Dasein. The animal 
that lives outside of being certainly is, yet it dwells in the zone that 
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is neither the open which is opened to and by the human that knows 
and understands being, nor the closed where the animal dwells in an 
informulable yearning for seeing the open:
The zone of nonknowledge that is at issue here is beyond both knowing 
and not knowing, beyond both disconcealing and concealing, beyond 
both being and the nothing. But what is thus left to be outside of being is 
not thereby negated or taken away; it is not, for this reason, inexistent. 
It is an existing, real thing that has gone beyond the difference between 
being and beings. (Ibid.: 90–1) 
If letting the animal be means leaving it as ‘unsavable’ in the zone 
outside of being, what about the human: can a human being who 
lets the animal be also dwell, unconcerned with being, in this zone? 
In his cautious admission of the possibility of transposition into the 
animal sphere (if not going-along-with), Heidegger clearly recognised 
the possibility for the human being to enter this zone. Agamben’s 
explication of anthropogenesis in terms of the openness to the animal 
opacity demonstrates why this possibility is in fact ever-present. In 
fact, if humanity is obtained only by the suspension of animal capti-
vation, the human never really leaves the zone outside of being but 
only changes its perspective on it. Once the anthropological machine 
is stopped and the animal is let be, the zone outside of being is opened 
as the formerly unthinkable site of the coexistence of humanity and 
animality that involves neither humanisation nor animalisation. 
Contrary to Heidegger, it is indeed possible to be with the animal, 
just as long as this takes place outside of being. This is evidently not 
a matter of the disappearance of humanity: just as animals or stones, 
the human being that has moved outside its understanding of being 
still is and has not been consumed by non-being. If being is not life, 
then life is not being and it is possible to live outside of being, which 
is precisely what the animal does in its captivation. Of course, this 
life can no longer distinguish (as only Dasein can) between worldless-
ness, poverty in world and world formation, yet it still remains there, 
in the world that it no longer opens or is captivated by:
In being with the animal – in worldlessness – Dasein finds itself having the 
experience of not being able to understand, of not being able to be-with 
or to coinhabit. It is the experience of being with what is unconcerned 
with being and therefore of what stands out of the world. Life (animal-
ity) becomes, in this particular sense, the other of being. Life shows itself 
as what exceeds the horizon of ontology. (Garrido 2012: 60; emphasis 
original. Cf. Bull 2012: 112–15)
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The ethos of letting be outside of being thus makes possible a com-
munity of truly whatever being that is no longer restricted to human 
beings but extends to animals and, although Agamben himself does 
not go that far, even inorganic entities:
On Heidegger’s account, it is a priori impossible to go along with or to 
follow stones. In that they are worldless, they do not offer a sphere of 
transposition. But precisely for that reason, stones may bear witness to 
the most original possibility of being-with. To be ‘with’ a stone – to touch 
its impenetrability, to sense its opacity, to experience its absolute inac-
cessibility – is ‘to be with’ something in absolute worldlessness – beyond 
being, beyond existence, beyond life. Is it not a radical way to think the 
originarity of being-with? (Garrido 2012: 59)3
It is important to appreciate the radicality of Agamben’s position: the 
idea of a being ‘outside of being’ goes far beyond not only his own 
earlier concept of ‘whatever being’, which, insofar as it was modelled 
on the experience of language, was always restricted to humanity, 
but also the various attempts in twentieth-century continental phi-
losophy to conceive of a non-identitarian and impersonal mode of 
being. In his Third Person Roberto Esposito provides a brief geneal-
ogy of the philosophy of the impersonal that proceeds from Simone 
Weil’s valorisation of the impersonal aspects of the human, through 
Benveniste’s account of the singularity of the third-person pronoun 
and impersonal expressions, Kojève’s argument for the impersonal-
ity of the post-historical state, Levinas’s Other, Blanchot’s Neuter 
and Foucault’s ‘infamous men’, finding its culmination in Deleuze’s 
notion of ‘becoming-animal’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 242–59; 
Esposito 2012: 104–49). Since it was precisely the ‘animalisation’ 
of the human in states of exception and concentration camps that 
was the main ‘problem’ with what Esposito calls the ‘dispositif of 
the person’ (Esposito 2012: 56–63), the notion of becoming-animal 
appears to be a surprising solution to this problem. And yet for 
Esposito it is precisely the radical affirmation of that very animality 
that this dispositif was intended to master and control that may suc-
cessfully deactivate it: 
The vindication of animality as our own most intimate nature breaks 
with a fundamental interdiction that has always ruled over us. Becoming-
animal, for Deleuze, does not signify sinking into the darkest pit of the 
human being; nor is it a metaphor or a literary phantasm. On the con-
trary, it is our most tangible reality, as long as what we mean by real is 
the process of mutation that our nature has always undergone. What we 
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are talking about is not humankind’s alter, or the alter in humankind, but 
rather humankind brought back to its natural alteration. What matters in 
the becoming-animal, even before its relationship with the animal, is espe-
cially the becoming of a life that only individuates itself by breaking the 
chains and prohibitions, the barriers and the boundaries that the human 
has etched within it. (Esposito 2012: 150)
Even though Esposito does not mention Agamben in this geneal-
ogy, we may suggest that his figure of a being outside of being is 
the true culmination of the genealogy of the impersonal, going 
beyond Deleuze’s becoming-animal precisely in rendering inop-
erative the very possibility of differentiating between humanity and 
animality. While there are evident resonances between Agamben’s 
approach and Deleuze and Guattari’s complex and intricate theory 
of becoming animal, there is also a key difference between them. The 
Deleuzian animal is defined by transgression of barriers, openness 
to the outside, metamorphosis and mutation – the features that are 
furthest away from the Heideggerian captivation and rather bring to 
mind the attributes of the human in both Hegel (self-transcendence 
through negation) and Heidegger (ecstatic character of existence). To 
become animal for Deleuze is to transgress one’s confinement within 
a specific environment, form of life or identity, subvert one’s voca-
tion, task or function – in short, negate that which the philosophical-
anthropological tradition subsumed under the category of animality 
as world-poverty. There is quite simply something very ‘human’ 
about the Deleuzian animal, which suggests that rather than halt the 
anthropological machine this approach only reverses its direction, 
making what was once the index of humanisation the sign of animal-
ity and the other way round. 
In contrast to this continuing valorisation of self-transcendence 
and exposure to the open, in Agambenian terms to ‘become animal’ 
would be to become captivated by what refuses itself. Rather than 
move outside of being, such a being would rather be stuck with being 
that refuses all access. To become an animal in this sense would be to 
assume poverty in the world and, unlike the animal, to do so volun-
tarily, by, as it were, renouncing the opening of the world and recoil-
ing into the closed sphere of captivation. What Agamben proposes 
instead could be termed ‘unbecoming’ both animal and man, ceasing 
the very process of becoming this or that but rather dwelling in the 
zone where humanity and animality are not separable and hence no 
difference between them (be it cast in Heideggerian or Deleuzian 
terms) is possible to mark. Rather than affirm yet another version 
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of becoming something else, Agamben focuses on the possibilities of 
being-with on the basis of nothing but being-thus, a being together 
of man and animal in which one does not become the other but both 
are let be outside of being.
In his Anti-Nietzsche, Malcolm Bull (2012: 98–102) addresses 
this possibility of such a non-exclusive community in terms of ‘sub-
humanism’, an ironic reversal of Nietzsche’s famous reference to the 
superhuman. This community is made possible by renouncing the 
potentiality for mastering the animal within or outside oneself and 
rather occupying the sub-human position of the animal with a crucial 
difference of no longer being captivated by its disinhibitors. The sub-
human is no longer the proud Heideggerian ‘shepherd of being’, yet 
neither is it a sheep. It is an animal that is no longer poor in world or 
a human being who no longer sees the open and cannot even be both-
ered to try. Neither captivated (taken, mastered) nor itself captivat-
ing (mastering, capturing), neither passive nor active – like Kafka’s 
Bucephalus, the children of limbo or Bartleby, this is a being that just 
is without being anything, a whatever life that does not articulate its 
own concept, a life that lives and speaks without negating itself in the 
apparatuses of language, law and history. Evidently, this life outside 
of being resonates with Agamben’s most famous concept of ‘bare 
life’, yet the meaning of ‘bareness’ is completely transformed here. 
This life is not bared or stripped in the sense of being separated from 
its form but rather is exposed in a nudity that is nothing but the pure 
appearance of the inapparent, the complete exposure of the opaque, 
the revelation of the absence of secrets: 
The only thing that the beautiful face can say, exhibiting its nudity with 
a smile, is ‘You wanted to see my secret? Then look right at it if you can. 
Look at this absolute, unforgivable absence of secrets!’ The matheme of 
nudity is, in this sense, simply this: haecce! There is nothing other than 
this. Yet, it is precisely the disenchantment of beauty in the experience of 
nudity, this sublime, but also miserable exhibition of appearance beyond 
all mystery and all meaning, that can somehow defuse the theological 
apparatus and allow us to see beyond the prestige of grace and the chi-
meras of corrupt nature, a simple, inapparent human body. This simple 
dwelling of appearance in the absence of secrets is its special trembling – it 
is the nudity that signifies nothing and, precisely for this reason, manages 
to penetrate us. (Agamben 2010: 91)
Thus, at the endpoint of Agamben’s investigations into post- 
humanism we re-encounter bare life, this time in the sense of a life 
that makes its nudity its own form and hence renounces any positive 
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form imposed on it by the law and other apparatuses of sovereign 
power; a life that exposes itself in the absence of any signified content 
or meaning; a life that no longer struggles to dominate, mobilise and 
negate its own nature in a historical project but dwells in time at one 
with its natural opacity; a life no longer marked by the apparatuses 
of language, law, history and humanity. 
In the conclusion to his ‘Theory of Signatures’ Agamben contem-
plated the possibility of a discourse that could go beyond the study of 
signatures, the acts of the passage of the semiotic into the semantic, 
towards the dimension that logically precedes them yet can only be 
accessed by rendering them inoperative: ‘Whether a philosophical 
inquiry is possible that reaches beyond signatures toward the Non-
marked that, according to Paracelsus, coincides with the paradisiacal 
state and final perfection is, as they say, another story, for others to 
write’ (Agamben 2009b: 80). This reticence is arguably an instance 
of false modesty on Agamben’s part: actually, he has been writing 
that ‘another story’ all along, since his early works on infancy. If, 
according to Paracelsus, signatures that exist everywhere in nature 
are, for human beings, markers of original sin, of ‘falling into nature, 
which leaves nothing unmarked’ (ibid.: 33), then Agamben’s comic 
politics, which leaves the tragic logic of sin and guilt behind is pre-
cisely a pathway towards the non-marked, not in the sense of the 
transcendence of the nature irredeemably marked by signatures, but 
in the sense of the erasure of the signatures themselves, whereby 
phone and logos, zoe and bios, Master and Slave, man and animal 
become indistinct. 
The idea of an unmarked life, appearing as inapparent, is the 
culmination of the many strands of Agamben’s thought we have 
addressed in the preceding chapters. The notion of inoperativity that 
has been our guiding thread through Agamben’s philosophy may 
evidently be grasped in terms of the deactivation of all signatures 
that assign a being to this or that identity or function in various 
apparatuses of government. It is also easy to observe the aspiration 
towards the unmarked in the four domains of Agamben’s work 
that we have covered. Firstly, the experimentum linguae that speaks 
the pure being of language beyond all signification literally strips 
language of all signifying marks, restoring it as pure communicabil-
ity that precedes and exceeds the actual communicative function. 
Secondly, the post-sovereign ‘form-of-life’ wholly exhausted in bare 
life, a bios that is only its own zoe, is similarly a life unmarked, either 
negatively or positively, by the signatures of ‘good life’ produced by 
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the apparatuses of government and hence no longer threatened by 
the sovereign potentiality of stripping life of all these signatures in the 
state of exception. Thirdly, the post-historical condition is produced 
through the erasure of the marks defining the historical struggle 
for recognition: the ‘workless slave’ as the post-historical subject is 
neither Master nor Slave but an inoperative figure subtracted from 
the process of negating action. Finally, the figure of a ‘saved’ and yet 
unsavable life, in which one cannot distinguish between humanity 
and animality, points to a being that has travelled furthest towards 
the unmarked towards the outside of being as such, forgoing its 
understanding of being in favour of the possibility of going-along 
and being-with all other beings in the mode of whatever being.
Of course, contra Paracelsus, this unmarked life outside of being 
has nothing to do with ‘final perfection’, if only because inoperativity 
ensures that there is no longer anything final or perfect in the sense 
of completion or accomplishment. The unmarked Eden cannot be 
found on any map not because it is transcendent, an ‘other place’ 
beyond the present world, but precisely because it is wholly dissemi-
nated in the immanence of the latter. The unmarked is things as they 
are in their whatever being, irreparable and profane, inoperative and 
potential. On second thoughts, maybe this is final perfection, since in 
a strict logical sense there is nothing that can come after it. There is 
only this, thus, whatever, nothing else.
Notes
1. A somewhat similar interpretation of Heidegger’s lectures was offered 
by Derrida, whose attempt to destabilise the difference between humans 
and animals proceeds by questioning the human capacity for the disclo-
sure of beings as beings, as such, without particular perspective, interest 
or design. For Derrida, ‘there is no pure and simple “as such”’ (2008: 
160), which means that humans are not blessed with what the animal is 
supposedly deprived of.
2. The reference to lovers is not fortuitous here, since in his earlier work 
Agamben already defined love in terms of ‘intimacy with the stranger’, 
in which the loved one remains ‘inapparent’: ‘To live in intimacy with 
a stranger, not in order to draw him closer, or to make him known, but 
rather to keep him strange, remote: unapparent, so unapparent that his 
name contains him entirely. And, even in discomfort, to be nothing else, 
day after day, that ever open place, the unwaning light, in which that 
one being, that thing remains forever exposed and sealed off’ (Agamben 
1995: 61). In Agamben’s reading, the experience of love has nothing to 
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do with the ecstatic fusion of singularities into a fantasmatic unity, but 
rather consists in sharing the disjunction whereby these singularities 
are exposed in their mutual opacity, open to and touching each other 
without ever grasping each other as objects of knowledge.
3. See Nancy 1994: 158–66 for the discussion of the possibility of attribut-
ing freedom to non-human and non-living beings that follows a similar 
line of reasoning. See Prozorov 2013a, Chapter 3 for a detailed discus-
sion of the derivation of freedom, equality and community from the sheer 
being of beings, so that these notions no longer have humanity as their 
exclusive or even privileged referent.
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Conclusion 
An Optimist Against All Odds
We have now completed our inquiry into Agamben’s affirmative 
politics of inoperativity. In conclusion, let us address the possible 
problems with this vision of politics that have been identified by 
Agamben’s numerous critics and discuss the possibility of their 
resolution within his theoretical scheme. Throughout the book we 
have already encountered various criticisms of Agamben’s political 
thought from alternative normative standpoints and his response 
to them. It is possible to group these criticisms into two categories. 
On the one hand, Agamben’s politics has been criticised from the 
perspective of constituted power, i.e. the institutions of the state, 
law, public sphere, communicative action, and so on, as not suf-
ficiently appreciative of the capacity of these institutions to deal 
with the problems of sovereignty and biopolitics that he highlights 
(see Connolly 2007; Fitzpatrick 2005; Mills 2008; Rasch 2007). On 
the other hand, Agamben has been criticised from the perspective 
of constituent power, be it in the form of Negri’s multitude (2000), 
Rancière’s people (1999), Badiou’s militant subject (2005b), and so 
on, as not sufficiently appreciative of the capacity of the political 
subject to depose and dismantle the structures of sovereign biopoli-
tics and replace them with an alternative form of sovereignty, order, 
state, etc. (see Laclau 2007; Chiesa and Ruda 2011; Toscano 2011). 
These extrinsic forms of criticism are as plausible as they are inef-
fective, insofar as Agamben’s theory of sovereignty demonstrates 
both the indispensability of the state of exception to the ‘normal’ 
functioning of the state, law and other constituted structures of 
authority, and the complicity of constituent power in the state of 
exception as the manifestation of the sovereign potentiality not 
to be. Thus, Agamben always already anticipates and ventures to 
respond to and disarm the objections of his critics. While it would 
be naive to expect this disarming to be entirely convincing and suc-
cessful, as long as one subscribes to the basic logic of Agamben’s 
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thought, his opposition to both the ‘reformist’ path of improving 
positive institutions and the ‘revolutionary’ path of overthrowing 
them in a voluntarist act of popular sovereignty appear entirely 
plausible. 
Of course, the problem is precisely that this basic logic, which we 
have analysed in terms of inoperativity, is so difficult to subscribe to. 
The idea of a comic redemption through a generalised inoperativity 
is so counter-intuitive that Agamben almost seems to be purposefully 
audacious. After all, our idea of politics is conventionally phrased in 
the activist terms of the positive transformation of social reality, and 
a politics of disengagement, deactivation, subtraction and suspension 
can only be accepted as a temporary and partial solution, always to 
be followed by the next productive, constructive and affirmative step 
(cf. Hardt and Negri 2000: 204). Hence the disappointment of all 
those critics who, while sympathetic to Agamben’s work as a criti-
cal diagnosis of the situation and even the idea of inoperativity as a 
means of undermining the dominant apparatuses, end up frustrated 
when their impatient question ‘What then?’ is answered by a curt 
‘nothing’ (or at best an elliptical and enigmatic allusion to happy 
life). 
And yet this is the price to be paid for a politics that takes leave of 
what has arguably been the defining feature of sociopolitical life, if 
not for Agamben’s proverbial ‘forty millennia’, then for at least the 
last two centuries, i.e. the mobilisation of human existence by politi-
cal authority, be it revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, liberal or 
socialist. In full accordance with this tradition, Agamben’s critics, 
particularly on the Left, repeatedly emphasise the insufficiency of 
merely negative ‘resistance’ and the need to theorise the ‘morning 
after’ of the construction of a new post-revolutionary positive order. 
In their account, Agamben’s privilege granted to inoperativity and 
deactivation makes him less radical, shunning the ‘dirty work’ of 
post-revolutionary construction (cf. Žižek 2003: 27–8; 2012: 128). 
Yet what if a ‘less radical’ stance is precisely the one that remains 
committed to the conventional distinctions between constituent and 
constituted power, between revolutionary turmoil and a stable order, 
destruction and construction, whereby every revolution must be fol-
lowed by the sobering work of the ‘morning after’? What if there is 
no morning after? Or, a bit less ominously, what if the morning after 
is precisely the novissimas dies of ‘simply human life’ that Agamben 
proclaims as the effect of the messianic suspension of all apparatuses? 
While the elliptical character of Agamben’s response to the 
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questions of what happens after the apparatuses have been rendered 
inoperative is understandably frustrating, any possible elaboration 
of inoperative politics in terms of the construction of a positive order 
would contradict the fundamental logic of Agamben’s thought. Just 
as one cannot consistently uphold both the generic universality of 
whatever being and sexual or ethnic difference (a self-evident point 
that nonetheless continues to inspire fervent criticism), so it is impos-
sible to combine the affirmation of inoperativity with a new historical 
project of emancipation. Yet is there really a lack of such projects? 
While the projects seem to be in great abundance, it is emancipa-
tion that somehow seems to be in short supply. Perhaps this is so 
because its cause is not really served by projects, i.e. new sets of tasks 
that submit human existence to negating action in the present in the 
name of the bright future. Thus, while it is easy to understand the 
reluctance of many critics to embrace the fundamental attunement 
of Agamben’s political thought, it is important to appreciate both 
its principled divergence from the dominant tradition of activist-
voluntarist politics and its consistency and fidelity to this divergence.
Since extrinsic criticism grounded in an alternative normative per-
spective always risks relapsing into an interminable polemic on first 
principles, it would be more productive to focus on an immanent 
mode of criticism that focuses on the internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies in an author’s work that undermine it from within. 
A good starting point for such a critique of Agamben’s politics 
would be the apparent incompatibility between its grand ambitions 
(nothing less than the deactivation of the apparatuses of language, 
law, history and humanity) and its valorisation of inoperativity in 
opposition to all historical action, emancipatory projects, and so on. 
Bluntly put, do not the ambitions of Agamben’s politics demand far 
more work than the idea of inoperativity can sustain? While we may 
well entertain the ‘eternal Sabbath’ as the ideal of comic politics, 
how can it possibly also be its method? And if it cannot, then doesn’t 
inoperative politics become yet another exercise in utopianism, 
promising us comedy while we remain stuck in tragedy? It is thus 
possible to simultaneously share the ambitions of Agamben’s politics 
and remain deeply sceptical or pessimistic about the possibilities of 
its realisation. 
Nonetheless, Agamben himself has explicitly rejected any attribu-
tion of a ‘personal or psychological pessimism’ to his work and, on 
one occasion, proclaimed that his critical interlocutor was ‘more 
pessimistic than he was’ (Agamben 2004a: 124; see Prozorov 2010). 
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Agamben’s optimism regarding the possibility of the actualisation of 
his political vision rests on three principles that we shall consider in 
this conclusion. Firstly, Agamben is optimistic because the intensifi-
cation of the global state of exception under modern nihilism entails 
that we have nothing to lose from a radical disruption of the existing 
apparatuses of government, which have degraded into a combination 
of the ‘killing machine’ of sovereignty and the meaningless ‘spec-
tacle’ of ad hoc government without ontological foundation. The 
contemporary condition that Agamben, following Schmitt, likens to 
a ‘global civil war’ (2005a: 3) is not a result of a malfunctioning inef-
fectiveness or betrayal of any of the classical political paradigms but 
rather a holistic crisis of Western politics, which reveals the nullity 
of its foundational distinctions that was there all along but was for-
merly concealed by the relatively ordered character of political life. 
In this holistic crisis there is literally nothing in our tradition that we 
can rely on as a foundation for political transformation, hence there 
is nothing to lose from a complete ‘halting of the machine’.
Agamben rejects as illusory any attempt to find the locus of 
radical transformation in either the state and the legal system or the 
immanence of social praxis, but, rather than draw from this disil-
lusionment the pessimistic conclusion about the impossibility of an 
alternative politics, finds in it the possibility of radical change, which 
is no longer constrained by any institutional structures of the con-
temporary order, but jams the entire biopolitical apparatus in both 
its sovereign and governmental aspects. Simply put, all that the con-
temporary apparatuses of government offer us is the choice between 
sovereign violence in the state of exception and the nihilistic manage-
ment of life itself, the choice between Death and Nothing, which is 
really not much of a choice at all. Yet it is precisely the falsity of this 
alternative that liberates us from having to choose between different 
versions of nihilism and enables us to probe the possibilities of forms 
of life outside all governmental apparatuses.
Secondly, insofar as the nihilistic drive of the biopolitical machine 
does all the work of emptying out positive forms of life, identities 
and vocations, we literally do not have much to do to attain an inop-
erative life of whatever being. In full accordance with the ‘Hölderlin 
principle’, radical transformation is actually made possible by 
nothing other than the unfolding of biopolitical nihilism itself to its 
extreme point of vacuity, whereby the apparatuses of government no 
longer produce anything positive but are, at best, running on empty 
or, at worst, functioning as killing machines. Agamben’s metaphor 
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for this condition is bankruptcy: ‘One of the few things that can 
be declared with certainty is that all the peoples of Europe (and, 
perhaps, all the peoples of the Earth) have gone bankrupt’ (2000: 
142). It is precisely this diagnosis that makes intelligible his politics 
of profanation: it is nihilism itself that reveals the fundamental inop-
erativity of the human being, the experience of language prior to all 
signification, the sovereign potentiality of the human being, and so 
on, and it is only a matter of reclaiming these ontological attributes 
from their expropriation by historically contingent apparatuses that 
isolate them into a separate sphere of glory and make their free use 
impossible. 
We must therefore rigorously distinguish Agamben’s approach 
from utopianism. As Foucault has argued, utopias derive their 
attraction from their discursive structure of a fabula, which makes 
it possible to describe in great detail a better way of life, precisely 
because it is manifestly impossible (Foucault 1970: xvii). While 
utopian thought easily provides us with elaborate visions of a better 
future, it cannot really lead us there, since its site is by definition a 
non-place. In contrast, Agamben’s works tell us rather little about 
life in an inoperative community of whatever being, but they are 
remarkably concrete about the practices that are constitutive of this 
community, precisely because these practices require nothing that 
would be extrinsic to the contemporary condition of biopolitical 
nihilism. Thus, Agamben’s coming politics is manifestly anti-utopian 
and draws all its resources from the condition of contemporary nihil-
ism; it attempts not to introduce anything new or ‘positive’ into the 
condition of nihilism but rather to use this condition itself in order to 
reclaim human existence from its biopolitical confinement. 
Thirdly, Agamben’s political thought is optimistic because the 
inoperative form-of-life that it affirms is no longer posited as a his-
torical task, something to be attained in reformist or revolutionary 
praxis, but merely requires the subtraction of the subjects from the 
existing apparatuses, whereby they reappropriate their own poten-
tiality for ‘whatever being’. Agamben’s politics is not a matter of 
a painstaking process of the composition of a social movement or 
coalition of parties, of raising awareness and mobilising the civil 
society, of articulating and aggregating particular interests into a 
(counter)hegemonic bloc, and so on. All of the above would contra-
dict Agamben’s affirmation of inoperativity as not merely a distant 
ideal but an actual method of politics. Politics need not take the 
form of (yet another) historical project but rather consists in one’s 
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subtraction from the apparatuses that govern us and the identities 
that they prescribe, rendering them inoperative and in this manner 
reclaiming our own inoperativity. Thus, the passage from the worst 
to the best, from tragedy to comedy, literally takes a single step. 
Yet why would this step be taken by the subjects of contemporary 
societies? Why not prefer to go on dwelling in the inauthentic realm 
of the degraded sociality of late-modern nihilism? Even if we agree 
that the sole choice that the existing apparatuses offer is between 
Death and Nothing, why not choose Nothing, especially since it is 
clearly preferable to death, despite being metaphysically or meta-
phorically close to it? Surely the subtractive step outside the appara-
tuses cannot be a matter of historical (or post-historical) necessity, 
since what is at stake is precisely the overcoming of every claim to 
necessity in the affirmation of radical freedom understood in terms 
of potentiality (not to). Neither, however, is it possible to conceive of 
the move towards the inoperative community of whatever being as a 
matter of free will, since Agamben refuses to frame this transforma-
tion in terms of a project, a decision, or even, as we shall see below, 
as an act as such.
This problem is somewhat concealed by the focus of Agamben’s 
commentators on his most controversial claim about the concentra-
tion camp as the paradigmatic nomos of modernity. If this identifica-
tion is accepted, then the problem of will does not really arise, as it 
would be obscene to pose the question of why anyone would want 
to leave the concentration camp. Yet, as we have argued, the camp 
is only an extreme and hyperbolic example of the far more general 
logic that is otherwise manifested in relatively more benign cases 
of, for example, community policing, counter-terrorist policies, the 
management of migration, and so on. Once we abandon the focus on 
the camp, it is by no means guaranteed that the subjects of the con-
temporary biopolitical societies would want to abandon the existing 
apparatuses of law, order and security for a ‘real state of exception’ 
devoid of all protections granted by these apparatuses. 
The same applies a fortiori to the socioeconomic apparatuses of 
the capitalist ‘society of the spectacle’, whose profanation Agamben 
advocates in order to liberate the pure means, the facticity of being-
thus, confined in them. While the desire for liberation can be safely 
presupposed in the case of the camp, what about shopping malls 
and reality shows, self-help books and package tours, bingo halls 
and porn websites? Since what is at stake in profanation is a non- 
canonical or unconventional use of the practices that the apparatuses 
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have captured and diverted for their purposes, Agamben must 
account precisely for this turn towards experimentation and free 
use. Even if the vacuity of contemporary apparatuses is increasingly 
evident to everyone, is it not too optimistic to expect late-modern 
societies to opt en masse for the unconventional and experimental 
modes of use as opposed to sticking to the tried and true, nullified 
as it is? To recall Heidegger’s discussion of the ‘They’ (das Man) 
in Being and Time, this inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world 
attains its hold over Dasein not so much by oppression but rather by 
‘accommodating’ it, making its everydayness more comfortable pre-
cisely insofar as it conforms to the average understandings, however 
vacuous or absurd. If, as Heidegger suggests, ‘fallenness’ is ‘tempt-
ing’ and ‘tranquilizing’, then how is this temptation to be overcome? 
(Heidegger 1962: 164–8, 224)
Contrary to first impressions, the problem with Agamben’s comic 
politics is not its excessive radicalism but its relative modesty in the 
wider social context. Agamben proposes what appears to be a self-
consciously minoritarian, if not outright ‘bohemian’, form of life that 
can hardly be expected to be replicated across the whole of society, 
simply because the attraction of profanatory experiments and playful 
subversions of the existing apparatuses is far from self-evident. Why 
would anyone who is not already outside the apparatuses in ques-
tion (for example, critical intellectuals, avant-garde artists) want 
to exit them in order to engage in these practices, especially insofar 
as Agamben refuses to frame this move in terms of a revolutionary 
project of emancipation, which would involve articulating some 
form of normative justification for these practices? 
Of course, the problem of how a theoretical design of transfor-
mation is to be translated into political practice is not unique to 
Agamben, yet in his work it becomes more acute due to his refusal of 
any construction of politics in terms of a project and the affirmation 
of inoperativity as both a means and an end of the coming politics. 
What Agamben’s work lacks is an equivalent of Badiou’s valorisa-
tion of militant political action in terms of its ‘fidelity’ to the event 
and its participation in the production of the ‘truth’ of the situation 
(see Badiou 2005b). While Badiou’s politics is also presented in terms 
of a subtractive break with the existing state of affairs, this break is 
explicitly cast as an ethico-political injunction, a call to disciplined 
militant action that is framed precisely in terms of an emancipa-
tory and egalitarian project that Agamben seeks to dispense with. 
Badiou is explicitly concerned with championing militant activism, 
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not least by philosophically linking it with the production of truth. 
In contrast, since for Agamben the truth of being is exhausted in the 
facticity of whatever being, access to it no longer requires a long-term 
political project in which militancy, asceticism and discipline could 
be valorised in a Badiouan manner, but only a single act of subtrac-
tion, which nonetheless remains very difficult to account for (see 
Agamben 1991: 84–106; 1999b: 116–37).
It is of course possible to dismiss this question altogether in the 
manner best exemplified by Foucault’s approach to the function 
of his work. Rather than posit normative criteria that would tell 
people why they must act in this or that manner, Foucault claimed 
to be content with simply demonstrating how one could resist, if one 
wanted, without imposing this mode of praxis as normatively privi-
leged (Foucault 1990b: 9). 
It is absolutely true that when I write a book I refuse to take a prophetic 
stance; that is, the one of saying to people: here is what you must do, and 
also: this is good and this is not. I say to them, roughly speaking, it seems 
to me that things have gone this way; but I describe those things in such 
a way that the possible paths of attack are delineated. Yet, even with this 
approach I do not force or compel anyone to attack. So then, it becomes a 
completely personal question, if I choose, if I want, to take certain courses 
of action with reference to prisons, psychiatric asylums, this or that issue. 
(Foucault 1996: 261)
This is certainly a valid option, though it is arguably less appropri-
ate for Agamben’s works, which are marked by a strong messianic 
pathos completely alien to Foucault and which promise a global 
transformation that Foucault refused even to discuss. Moreover, it 
is important that Foucault referred to his practical disposition in 
terms of ‘pessimistic activism’ rather than optimism (cf. Foucault 
1988: 156), an activism alongside others who are already resist-
ing the apparatuses of power from a minoritarian position. While 
Agamben could also claim that his idea of an inoperative form-
of-life is a ‘toolkit’, intended for ‘users’ rather than an ‘audience’ 
(Foucault 1980: 145), this limitation of the vision of transformation 
to those already interested or involved in it would certainly result 
in a thorough desublimation of the messianic pathos that made his 
political philosophy so attractive. In contrast to Foucault’s somewhat 
contrived indifference as to whether his toolkits are indeed applied, 
Agamben grants an unequivocal ethical privilege to inoperativity and 
potentiality and even goes so far as to pronounce their negation ‘evil’:
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[The] only ethical experience (which, as such, cannot be a task or a 
subjective decision) is the experience of being (one’s own) potentiality, 
of being (one’s own) possibility – exposing, that is, in every form one’s 
own amorphousness and in every act one’s own inactuality. The only 
evil consists instead in the decision to remain in a deficit of existence, to 
appropriate the power to not-be as a substance and a foundation beyond 
existence or to regard potentiality itself, which is the most proper mode 
of human existence, as a fault that must always be repressed. (Agamben 
1993a: 44) 
In The Coming Community Agamben recognises the paradox of 
formulating as a matter of injunction, demand or duty precisely the 
freedom from any essence, identity or vocation: 
there is in effect something that humans are and have to be, but this some-
thing is not an essence or properly a thing: it is the simple fact of one’s 
own existence as possibility or potentiality. But precisely because of this 
things become complicated. (Agamben 1993a: 43; emphasis added) 
The originary inoperativity and potentiality of the human condition 
do not mean that human beings are ‘simply consigned to nothing-
ness and therefore can freely decide whether to be or not to be, to 
adopt or not to adopt this or that destiny (nihilism and decisionism 
coincide at this point)’ (ibid.: 43). Since inoperativity does not simply 
mean remaining stuck in nihilism and potentiality does not simply 
mean deciding on a way of life in a sovereign manner, they cannot 
be simply enjoyed within the apparatuses of sovereign power and 
nihilistic management but must be reappropriated in political praxis, 
even if this praxis takes a minimal form of subtraction. Yet as soon 
as we speak of this praxis as something that ‘must’ or ‘has to’ be, 
we risk converting and perverting inoperativity into a new histori-
cal project in whose actualisation potentiality is exhausted. In short, 
while the subtraction from the apparatuses is definitely not merely 
a possible action among others but rather is affirmed with a strong 
ethical exigency (cf. Agamben 2005b: 39), this exigency cannot serve 
as a foundation for political activism, an emancipatory project or 
any act of will, so as not to contradict the very inoperativity and 
potentiality that it affirms. One’s subtraction from the apparatuses 
is ethical and one’s dwelling within them is evil, yet the apparently 
self-evident passage from the evil to the ethical ends up extremely 
problematic, perpetually at the risk of relapsing back into the evil it 
ventures to leave behind. It is as if the activist or voluntarist concept 
of politics were an insidious device that trapped us within the ‘deficit 
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of existence’ precisely by offering us an easy yet ultimately illusory 
way out of them.
The problem may be illustrated by revisiting the figure of 
Bartleby, who, as we recall, was ‘capable without wanting’, his 
‘preference not to’ being distinct from any alternative preference. 
Despite all efforts to present Bartleby as the embodiment of abso-
lute contingency, beyond both will and necessity, Agamben cannot 
avoid bringing the themes of will and decision back to account for 
the question of how Bartleby became what he is, how he entered the 
state of absolute contingency: Bartleby ‘decided to stop copying’, he 
‘must stop copying, must give up his work’ (Agamben 1999b: 268; 
emphasis added). This is neither a careless slip nor the abandon-
ment of an earlier stance – logically, Bartleby must have decided to 
become inoperative, must have originally preferred to prefer not to. 
And yet this decision cannot simply be an act of will that actualises 
one potentiality and negates others, since this would be a relapse 
into the logic of historical action that Agamben seeks to deacti-
vate. It must rather be something like a meta-decision in favour 
of potentiality as such, in favour of actualising the potentiality for 
potentiality, setting aside the potentiality for potentiality not to be. 
To the extent that such a ‘passive decision’ can be accounted for at 
all, it is as a matter of conversion or metanoia, a radical perspectival 
shift that unfolds in an almost magical manner, as something that 
happens to or befalls us rather than something that we choose or 
produce. 
In the context of Agamben’s work magic would not be an acci-
dental metaphor, since the comic mood of his thought is inextricably 
linked to it. 
Whatever we can achieve through merit and effort cannot make us truly 
happy. Only magic can do that. At that point, when we have wrenched it 
away from fate, happiness coincides entirely with our knowing ourselves 
to be capable of magic. (Agamben 2007b: 19) 
While historical apparatuses promise us chimerical happiness in the 
future in return for our subjection and work in the present, genuine 
happiness is only possible when these apparatuses are rendered 
inoperative and the irreducibly potential character of our existence 
is restored. 
If the only way to achieve happiness is not to aspire to reach it, 
then the decision in favour of potentiality and inoperativity is only 
conceivable as itself inoperative and potential, something that can 
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not be. It is neither something that was meant to happen in accord-
ance with the immanent logic of history nor something that was 
made to happen through a voluntarist domination of history that 
breaks it into two. It is simply something that happens – or not, in 
a strictly contingent manner. Yet to what extent can one remain an 
optimist when affirming this radical contingency? At first glance, any 
contingency worthy of the name is entirely indifferent to either opti-
mism or pessimism since it warrants nothing but the possibility of 
things being otherwise without any specification of the likelihood of 
this possibility.1 The nihilistic degradation of the global biopolitical 
apparatuses does indeed open the possibility of the reappropriation 
of our potentiality in an inoperative community of whatever being 
but this very possibility must presuppose its own potentiality not-to-
be. It is therefore just as possible that we remain within the deficient 
mode of existence that we misrecognise for their authentic ethos, 
remain stuck in the worst, just one step away from the best. It is per-
fectly possible that nothing will happen – it is not for nothing that the 
time we live in is called the age of nihilism. 
Agamben clearly recognises these possibilities but adds to them 
a crucial caveat: ‘This – but not only this – is possible’ (Agamben 
1999b: 126; emphasis original). It is precisely the supplementary 
‘but not only this’ that permits Agamben to retain his optimism in 
the face of absolute contingency. Even if it all amounts to nothing, 
if the subjects caught up in the apparatuses of biopolitical nihilism 
end up not wanting what they are capable of, if they shrug and say 
‘whatever’ in response to Agamben’s vision of whatever being, this 
only means that ‘not only this is possible’, that the possibility of a 
happy life remains a possibility, that whatever is can not be. This is 
the ultimate limit of Agamben’s optimism, beyond which his thought 
cannot venture, having dispensed with both will and necessity and 
finding its ground in absolute contingency alone. Devoid of all assur-
ances of teleology and the hopes invested in voluntarism, Agamben’s 
thought is nonetheless characterised by a strong belief in the power 
of the possible, in potentiality as the power to render inoperative 
all the apparatuses that govern our existence and expropriate our 
potentialities. This belief, which can only be strengthened with each 
successive failure, resonates with Wallace Stevens’ moving words in 
Notes on the Supreme Fiction, ‘It is possible, possible, possible, it 
must be possible. It must be that in time the real will from its crude 
compoundings come’ (Stevens 1990: 404). It remains up to each of 
us whether and how to act on this belief.
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Note
1. As Quentin Meillassoux (2008: 82–111) has demonstrated, the absolute 
contingency of things (e.g. of the laws of physics) can coexist without 
any contradiction with their utmost stability over millennia. The aban-
donment of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason only asserts that 
everything is contingent and can be otherwise without specifying the 
likelihood of such transformation.
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